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Abstract 
This thesis provides a composite picture of the Islamic concept of intelligence traces the 
historical roots of Islamic intelligence activities and explains the (Ideological) relationship 
between the Islamic religion and the intelligence concept adhered to by modern Arab and 
Islamist paramilitary groups. Special reference is made to Fatah movement which has been 
taken up as a case study. The thesis shows that the two main sources of Islam (the Quran 
and the Sunnah) provided the regulative codes of practice towards intelligence activities. 
Prophet Muhammad‘s intelligence tradition offers the ideal model that the Arab / Islamic 
paramilitary groups emulate. Referring to the Islamic roots, the research seeks to point out 
that the hallmarks of the Islamic intelligence concept which emerged from the Quran and 
Prophet Mohammed‘s tradition, became the framework that accommodated ‗Arab / Islamic 
modern paramilitary intelligence activities‘, such as Fatah‘s. The thesis uses the modern 
concept of the intelligence to identify the ancient activities and compares data process 
within the intelligence cycle. The range of activities is broad: clandestine collection, 
counterintelligence, analysis and dissemination, and covert action. It also introduces the 
Arab intelligence tradecraft such as the uses of safe houses, methods of communication, 
secrecy and concealments...etc. This thesis also aims to correct the perception that Arab 
intelligence concept developed after the emergence and expansion of the Islamic Empire. 
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Chapter One 
1.1 Introduction 
Intelligence has since time immemorial played a significant role in defending both states 
and paramilitary groups. Through intelligence, many dangers and threats both foreign and 
domestic were averted. In providing forecasts, reliable information on all manner of issues 
and threats, states and paramilitary organizations become better equipped to make 
appropriate decisions and carry out policies aimed at achieving their own agendas.
1
 Across 
history intelligence has always proved to be of vital importance not only to politicians and 
policy makers but also to military leaders as well: Its effective use has led to the ―killing or 
saving of millions.‘‘2    
 History also indicates that no insurgency can survive without an effective intelligence 
capability.
3
 It is axiomatic that in order to survive and carry on fighting for their cause, 
large and well-organized paramilitary organizations depend on the collection and analysis 
of intelligence.
4
 These secretive organizations develop highly sophisticated intelligence, 
counter-intelligence and security systems as well as programmes for covert political action 
and overt use of violence. They resort to these tactics in order to achieve their political, 
psychological and morale-boosting purposes. 
 A paramilitary group is defined by the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms as ―a force or group distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but 
resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission‖.5 In practical usage, 
however, the term has come to apply to everything from self-defence forces or UK Home 
Guard-style militias, to counter-guerrilla ―death squads‖. Throughout this study, it will be 
used in its broadest sense: ―a group of civilians organized to function like a military unit‖ 
in implementing guerrilla agendas including terrorist tactics and carrying out specific 
duties. These duties include, on the dark side, acts of violence, sabotage, hijacking, 
subversion, kidnapping, assassination, raiding private or state-owned facilities and more 
recently, suicide-bombing.   
 The strategies and activities of paramilitary groups have attracted the attention of 
academic researchers as well as veteran soldiers in the field of combating terrorism. 
Interest in this vital issue has significantly intensified since the atrocities of September 11, 
2001 and the Jihadist attacks in Spain, the UK and elsewhere. These tragic events have 
generated a deep controversy about how much or how little information we have about the 
terrorists and their organizations.
6
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 A wealth of scholarship and in-depth case studies dealing with terrorist or paramilitary 
groups has appeared, but most such studies have concentrated on discussing or analyzing 
aspects such as their ideological, social or political background, fundraising tactics, 
supporters, methods of arms procurement, leaderships and operations, while not enough 
attention has been paid to the investigation of their organizational structure, security 
systems or intelligence apparatuses. The dearth of scholarship on such paramilitary matters 
may be explained by the immense difficulties which researchers encounter when 
attempting to access documents containing highly sensitive and confidential information. 
Beside the multilayered secrecy with which security and intelligence matters are 
surrounded, paramilitary members are loath to offer any assistance to researchers for fear 
that they might be liquidated if they were even perceived to have divulged any secrets 
pertaining to their organizations.  
 The present study will examine how one particular Arab paramilitary group handles 
intelligence activities such as clandestine collection, analysis and dissemination, 
counterintelligence and covert action. The study will argue for and demonstrate the 
relevance of an Arab / Islamic concept of intelligence which has afforded Islamic and Arab 
paramilitary groups a rich and accessible model whose practices and approaches they have 
freely drawn upon and emulated. Further, it will be argued that rather than any foreign 
influence, Fatah‘s intelligence doctrine reflects an Arab / Islamic approach. The research 
will then focus on tracing this concept among the leaders of one of the most important 
Arab and Islamic paramilitary groups, Fatah, which will be taken as a case study. It will be 
seen that the paramilitary groups which mushroomed in the Arab and Islamic world after 
World War II and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 have exerted immense efforts 
to build and develop security and intelligence organs in order that they may influence the 
course of events at the regional and international levels. In implementing their intelligence 
activities, these organizations have been inspired by the rich Islamic heritage which 
constituted an intellectual and doctrinal frame of reference. Despite the modern technical 
and technological advances achieved in intelligence work, to these paramilitary groups, the 
Islamic heritage is, as it were, the foundation stone upon which they based their concept of 
intelligence and a benchmark for their plans. 
  To most zealous Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and other religious 
groups, the main source of intelligence concept remained unaffected and unchanged by the 
developments across the ages, being deemed to be good for all ages and circumstances. For 
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example, the Quran (the Holy Book of Islam) legitimizes intelligence work, especially 
when it involves hardships, sacrifices or risks taken in defence of Islam  
 Nothing could they [Muslims] suffer or do, but was reckoned to their credit as 
a deed of righteousness, whether they suffered thirst, or fatigue, or hunger, in 
the cause of Allah, or trod paths to raise the ire of the Unbelievers, or received 
any injury whatever from an enemy: for Allah suffereth not the reward to be lost 
of those who do good.
7
 
 
This verse according to Quranic commentator, Muhammad Alqasimi, refers to the fact 
that to defend the faith Allah enjoins Muslims to inflict as much damage upon the enemy 
as possible and that the more the intelligence workers are exposed to hazards and perils, 
the closer they get to obtaining divine rewards from Allah for the efforts they exert.
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 While the Quran contains the basic moral and legal principles which regulate 
intelligence work, Prophet Muhammed‘s Sunnah represents a second source and a set of 
practical examples embodying the Quranic tenets and rules. In Islam, it is incumbent upon 
all believers to follow in the footsteps of Prophet Muhammed and refrain from disobeying 
his call. Those who respond positively are promised ample reward in this life and the next. 
In the national conscience of the Muslims, ―Muhammed was a great fighter and skilful 
military commander‖9 whose ―memory persists in the minds of modern Jihadis‖. 10 
 The third source is jurisprudence and its process of ‗Ijtihad‘, which means exercising 
one‘s judgment in deriving and deducing religious opinion on some point that is not 
mentioned in the Quran or in Prophet Muhammed‘s traditions. Ijtihad is based upon a 
widely accepted principle in jurisprudence which permits individuals to do all that is not 
expressly prohibited by Allah or Prophet Muhammed. In the fields of intelligence and 
security, Ijtihad provides much needed flexibility and freedom to do all that is in the 
interest of the Muslims anywhere and at any time. In theory, this is intended to reconcile 
Islam with all new inventions and technologies, provided that these do not run counter to 
the Islamic tenets contained in the Quran and Traditions.  
 The Islamic concept of intelligence played a significant part in initiating the 
intelligence activities of the Islamic organizations. It provided the leaders of Islamic and 
nationalist organizations a model and a living example for their own intelligence 
apparatuses to follow and emulate. Fatah‘s reliance on the Islamic model when setting up 
its apparatuses and carrying out clandestine activities by all possible means was a major 
factor behind its success as an intelligence actor.  
 Islamic intelligence activities did not themselves arise ex nihilo; the early Islamic 
intelligence work was an extension and continuation of the clandestine activities of pre-
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Islamic Arabia. In those early times, in communities where allegiance to the tribal leader 
was of paramount importance, able-bodied men with special capabilities were employed to 
carry out specific intelligence duties against rival tribes. These men, variously called 
„Uyoun‟ (eyes), ‗Rabee‟a‟ (gazing observer), „Tala‟e‟ (herald), and „Adila‟ (scouts), were 
instrumental not only in achieving victory against their master‘s enemies but also in 
strengthening his grip over his own tribesmen. Tribal leaders relied heavily on them, 
especially in times of crisis and tribal warfare. The Rabee‟a, for example, performed a task 
akin to that of the present-day early warning device: his duty was specifically confined to 
watching the land of the enemy from a distance. The Tala‟e were employed as scouts 
whose duties were to survey a battlefield before launching a raid against a specific target.
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Despite their crude and as yet undeveloped methods, these intelligence activities and 
military tactics served their purpose and responded to the needs of the ancient 
communities. In point of fact, they constitute an intelligence concept which reflected the 
prevalent culture and circumstances of those communities and can rightly be called the 
precursor of the Islamic concept of intelligence.     
 To the Islamic paramilitary groups of our present time, which have no fixed or declared 
headquarters and which mainly operate underground and couch their plans in total secrecy, 
the early Arab intelligence practices afforded a readily available model and intellectual 
frame of reference. When setting up their intelligence apparatuses, these paramilitaries 
draw their inspiration from the practices of Prophet Muhammed. To them, all the laws and 
rulings governing intelligence work are set forth in the Quran and Sunnah. Among the 
numerous paramilitary groups in the Arab world, some, such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Hamas, have always been linked to Islam, while others operate under deep cover, 
professing secularism although their core ideology is Islam. Of these, the most significant 
paramilitary group is the Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fatah. 
 Fatah is among the most prominent Middle Eastern paramilitary groups and has been a 
player on the regional and international scenes over the last five decades. The present 
investigation will focus on this organization in order to find answers to a number of 
questions. Chief among these is whether Fatah possesses an intelligence capability and of 
what sort? i.e. whether it has a special apparatus or apparatuses entrusted with the task of 
executing intelligence and security duties. This investigation will examine the templates or 
doctrine of intelligence employed by Fatah and will also assess whether it succeeded or 
failed in its pursuit of intelligence activities. In drawing up a composite picture of Fatah‘s 
intelligence doctrine, the roots of the Organization‘s leaders and cadres who were tasked to 
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construct and supervise the intelligence apparatuses of the organization at various points in 
history will be investigated.  
 Until January 2006, when Hamas, Harakat al-Muqāwamat al -Islāmiyyah, "Islamic 
Resistance Movement" scored a landslide victory in the Palestinian general elections, over 
the main Palestinian paramilitary group, which had always been at the head of the 
movement for Palestinian national independence, was Fatah. This latter group was, until 
the Oslo negotiations in the early 1990s, considered a terrorist organization, particularly in 
Israel. But this was not the case throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds and in much of the 
wider international community. Indeed, as early as the mid-seventies, the umbrella 
organization which Fatah led and operated under, the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), was accorded observer status at the UN General Assembly in 1974
12
 and Israel 
later recognized it as a legitimate partner in the Middle East peace process. Furthermore, 
Fatah has since 1974 not appeared on the US State Department list of terrorist 
organizations. 
 The choice of Fatah as the subject of a pilot case study is based on the group‘s success 
and strength as an organization espousing armed struggle which has shown considerable 
ability to organize political and intelligence tactics to achieve its objectives. The 
organization has furthermore evinced a well-established structure, consistency and 
resilience over decades, and has carried out numerous operations, which have had a 
noticeable impact not only on Israel but also on the wider Middle East region, particularly 
in Syria and Lebanon.   
The other reason for this choice was the striking resemblance between the 
circumstances under which the non-state based Fatah movement rose on the Middle 
Eastern political scene and those under which early Islam rose and grew in stature and 
influence in Mecca and Medina. The displacement, suffering and persecution to which the 
founders of Fatah were subjected at the hands of the occupation forces were to a large 
degree similar to Quraishi persecution of those who embraced the new religion. Like the 
early converts to Islam who felt compelled to resort to armed struggle in order to defend 
their faith and build their own state, the Fatah leaders espoused armed struggle as a 
legitimate way to wrest back their lands and live as a free nation.  
From its inception in the late 1950‘s, Fatah‘s strategic aim of liberating the 
occupied lands and the holy Aqsa Mosque, which in Islam is third only to Mecca and 
Medina, won the movement many followers and supporters in Palestine and throughout the 
Arab and Muslim world. This ambitious objective echoes the aims of the early Muslims 
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who strove under Prophet Muhammed‘s banner to liberate the Kaaba from the clutches of 
the polytheist Quraishis and return to Mecca from which they had been forcefully evicted.  
A glance at the history of Fatah will show that there are three distinct stages 
through which it passed before it finally crowned its achievements with the creation in 
1993 of the Palestinian Authority. These stages are first the clandestine underground stage, 
which was marked by absolute secrecy. During this period the Fatah founders, like their 
Muslim predecessors, resorted to extreme caution when approaching new recruits. They 
also employed such intelligence tradecraft as concealment and safe houses. Fatah‘s first 
safe house in Kuwait is but a latter day ―Dar Al-Arqam‖, the first hideaway in Islam.  
This period was followed by the ―open‖ stage during which the Fatah leaders were 
actively engaged in consolidating and widening their power base, especially in the 
aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Just as Prophet Muhammed‘s followers were 
brutally victimized, subjected to severe reprisals and forced to flee their homes in Mecca 
when it was felt that they constituted a threat to Quraishi hegemony, the Fatah followers 
too had a similar fate. They were meted out heavy blows in 1970 in what Palestinians and 
their sympathizers now call ―Black September‖. During that eventful month, the Jordanian 
military launched a massive assault on Palestinian positions in Jordan when it was 
perceived that Fatah and other Palestinian groups posed a threat to the authority of the 
Jordanian crown and government. During this open stage Fatah was in point of fact 
operating under immense pressures from Arab regimes which were, despite all ostentations 
and pretentions, quite suspicious of and hostile towards Fatah, especially as Fatah‘s 
aggressive strategies and initiatives snatched the Palestinian card away from the hands of 
these regimes which had always sought to exploit the Palestinian issue for their own 
private interests.  
The third stage during which Fatah embarked upon establishing a new stronghold 
in Lebanon resulted in the creation of what the Lebanese negatively refer to as the 
―Fakahani Republic‖. This echoes the efforts exerted by the early Muslims to use their 
newly established state in Medina as a power base and springboard for their return to 
Mecca which they indeed were able to do when they conquered it or ―opened‖ (Ar. Fatah) 
it eight years later. The choice of the Arabic word ―Fatah‖ for the new Palestinian 
movement is therefore laden with significance as the name is both highly emotive and 
steeped in Islamic history and the national consciousness of the Arabs.  
There are other parallels as well. On the military level, the first battle waged by the 
Muslims against the polytheists of Quraish was that of Badr in which the Muslims scored a 
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decisive victory against a formidable army which greatly outnumbered them. While it 
cannot be claimed that the Palestinians scored a victory against the Israeli forces in their 
first large scale encounter with them at Karameh (1968), the fact remains that the 
Palestinian fighters stood up to the invading Israeli army and put up quite a tough 
resistance that frustrated the invaders‘ intention of uprooting the military bases of Fatah. 
Moreover and in some ways far more significant is the fact that the Fatah leaders who were 
all practicing if not devout Muslims, never ceased to emulate the ways of Prophet 
Muhammed and the early builders of Islam who always punctuated their discourse with 
verses from the Quran or quotes from the sayings of Prophet Muhammed.  
 
 The main focus of the research will be to investigate how Fatah's intelligence apparatus 
or apparatuses functioned from the Organization‘s inception in 1959 until 1993, when the 
PLO signed the Oslo Accords which were the base for the peace process between Israelis 
and Palestinians.. The research will also seek to elucidate the conception and approach to 
intelligence which the Fatah leaders adhered to and attempted to put into practice. This can 
perhaps be best determined by studying the roots of those leaders and cadres who were 
tasked to construct and supervise the intelligence apparatuses of the organization at various 
points in history. The study will also attempt to establish whether Fatah adopts the same 
intelligence activities and tactics as those employed by specialized national intelligence 
services. One of the principal functions of such a study is to demonstrate that Fatah‘s 
approach to intelligence is rooted in a uniquely Arab and Islamic view of the subject which 
is rooted in the early history of Arabia. 
 The thesis is made up of ten chapters the first of which contains an introduction, an 
examination of the theoretical background to the case study, a literature review and an 
account of the methodology employed. It also expounds the mechanism and preparatory 
measures adopted in order to carry out the case study in which the intelligence machinery 
of Fatah will be shown as analogous and akin to the Arab Islamic intelligence model. This 
will be done through examining the performance of Fatah's different intelligence organs 
and investigating the social and political backgrounds of those Palestinians who planned 
and oversaw Fatah's intelligence work from the creation of its first clandestine apparatus to 
the Oslo Peace accord of 1993 when all security and intelligence organs were restructured 
and unified.    
 In Chapter 2 the early evidence of intelligence activities in the Arabian Peninsula is 
discussed. The epigraphy of the ancient Qahtani realm in southern Arabia confirms its 
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capabilities in military intelligence. The employment of spies and secret agents is well 
attested by documents dating back to pre-Islamic times. By resorting to espionage and 
spycraft, the Qahtanis were able to survive in the hostile environment of the arid plateaus 
of the Peninsula. Admittedly, very little is known of the history of ancient southern 
Arabia,
13
 but it is clear from surviving evidence that inhabitants of the central and northern 
parts of the peninsula practiced primitive intelligence, not only when they found 
themselves at war with each other but also for economic and survival purposes.  
 The importance given to intelligence in the Quran will be taken up in Chapter 3 which 
will also examine the legitimacy of intelligence work in Islam. Since the Quran is 
considered the primary source of legislation and the ultimate source of legal, spiritual and 
moral guidance for Muslims, many verses are cited, referred to and explored. It will be 
seen that a number of Quranic Surahs (chapters) refer to intelligence work and draw clear 
demarcation lines between admissible and inadmissible practices. The Quran furthermore 
contains numerous parables and moral lessons given either in a direct didactic way or 
through narratives such as that which relates the story of King Solomon and the hoopoe in 
which the intelligence cycle and the elements of the intelligence report can easily be 
identified.   
 The next chapter focuses on the clandestine activities of Prophet Muhammed in the 
light of the modern definition of intelligence activities, which include clandestine 
collection, counterintelligence, analysis and dissemination, and covert action. Details are 
given of the Prophet‘s intelligence practices during the three stages of the Islamic 
revelation. The chapter begins with what is called in Islamic literature ‗the secret stage‘, 
when Prophet Muhammed started approaching individuals and inviting them to follow 
Islam secretly, followed by an account of his second-stage activities, i.e. his peaceful call 
to Islam, and then the ‗Medina stage‘ when soon after his migration from Mecca he 
established the nucleus of the Islamic state.  
The military intelligence of wars and incursions led by Prophet Muhammed himself or by 
one of his military commanders will be focused on in Chapter 5. Special attention is paid 
to the three major battles led by Prophet Muhammed: Badr, Uhud and Khandaq.  Of all the 
battles fought during Prophet Muhammed's lifetime, these three abound with clandestine 
intelligence activities. Some of these activities were purely military such as scouting in 
order to identify and make use of the advantages afforded by the topography of battlefield 
terrain. Other activities included employment of agents to obtain information, execution of 
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clandestine operations through which Prophet Muhammed succeeded in breaking down 
alliances against him.    
 Chapter 6 discusses in some detail the intelligence skills of the early Islamic period. 
Among the wide range of issues considered are security and counterintelligence, the 
mechanisms by which the Arabs communicated intelligence (such as coded signals, written 
and verbal messages) the use of safe houses to provide havens for clandestine gatherings, 
secrecy and concealment, bribes, intrigue and disinformation techniques, diversion, 
deception, speed of movement and allies as intelligence sources. 
 The part played by Islamic jurisprudence and Ijtihad (judgement) as a source of 
legislation is discussed in Chapter 7. The chapter will examine the attitude of some Islamic 
schools of thought towards intelligence. It will also take up the rules governing intelligence 
work in Dar Al-Islam (Land of the Muslims) and Dar Al-Harb (Land of the Infidels).The 
chapter will also touch upon the punishment meted out to Muslims and non-Muslims 
involved in inadmissible espionage activities 
 The intellectual and ideological roots of those who set up the intelligence apparatuses 
in Fatah are traced in Chapter 8. Their links with the Islamist groups operating on the Arab 
political scene at the time of Fatah‘s inception will be closely examined. In discussing this 
issue an attempt will be made to assess any influence the Islamist movement may have had 
on the intellectual framework within which Fatah‘s leaders operated.  
 The security and intelligence apparatuses of Fatah are then examined in the following 
chapter. It will be seen that the founders of Fatah realized from the time they launched 
their underground organization on 10
th
 October 1959 that its success depended to a large 
extent on collecting information not only on Israel but also on the Arab countries. It will 
also be seen that the intentions of the Arab leaders were of particular interest to Fatah. 
Those who had lost the 1948 war against Israel were acting as if they were guardians of the 
Palestinian people. They succeeded neither on the military and political scenes, nor were 
they able to improve the economic and living conditions of the Palestinians. Fatah 
continued to operate underground until it went public, when it started to build its first 
intelligence apparatus, which soon came to rival its Arab counterparts. Within a few years, 
Fatah‘s intelligence capabilities had developed to such a degree that some of the great 
powers sought Fatah‘s help to safeguard their interests in the region. There were of course 
many security failings, especially in Fatah‘s lacklustre inability to protect its own leaders, 
who were hunted down by Israel one after the other.  
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 The conclusion and recommendations of this study are presented in the last chapter, 
which sums up the main features of Arab intelligence work from earliest times to the 
advent of Islam. This chapter stresses the continuity of these intelligence activities to such 
a degree that they have constituted a distinct Arab Islamic intelligence concept which is 
emulated and adhered to by present-day Islamist organizations. The chapter also highlights 
the vital role played by culture and religion in formulating an intelligence concept for the 
Muslims. The conclusion contained in this chapter which is based on the outcome of 
examining Fatah as a case study clearly indicates that Fatah closely followed the Islamic 
model in the field of intelligence and covert action. It also emphasizes that the Muslim 
Brotherhood to which the Fatah founders had belonged before they broke away to create 
their own independent Fatah movement, provided them with ample opportunities to 
acquire intelligence experience and skills. The originators of Fatah‘s intelligence organs 
continued to follow the rules and regulations set forth in the Quran and Sunnah
14
 and made 
use of the principle of Ijtihad to develop and improve their intelligence practices.   
 It is perhaps appropriate to point out that despite the great importance attached to it by 
Prophet Muhammed and the early preachers of the new religion, intelligence work was 
despite its significant part, not the only cause of the rapid spread of Islam. It must also be 
mentioned that throughout the thesis, in accordance with the requirements of scientific 
research, I have deliberately disregarded the element of divine intervention, which 
according to Muslim chroniclers and historians lay behind the success of many intelligence 
operations. Nor, despite the apparent similarities between Fatah‘s practices and the Islamic 
security model, is it suggested here that Fatah was in fact the embodiment of the Islamic 
model. Whatever failures or successes Fatah may or may not have scored cannot therefore 
be attributed to the Islamic prototype.  
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1.2 Theoretical Background:  
Despite Sherman Kent‘s assertion in 1955 that ―in most respects the intelligence calling 
has come of age‖15, the question of what intelligence is, what constitutes intelligence and 
whether it is a science or a craft has not yet been settled, but continues to be debated by 
strategists, political scientists and veteran intelligence officers. Part of the difficulty, as 
Michael Warner points out, stems from the fact that intelligence ―means many things to 
many people,‖ so that ―boiling it down to one single definition is difficult.‖ 16 This is why 
the argument has persisted as to what exactly constitutes intelligence.  
 Among the various definitions and characterizations of intelligence which have been 
offered, some stand out as being either too intricate or too short and incomplete. There are 
those who describe intelligence simply as ―the secret collection of someone else‘s secrets‖, 
while others see it as ―the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign 
countries or areas.‖17  
 In The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, Walter Laqueur contends that intelligence is not 
a science and that it is bound from time to time to be marked by mistakes, caused by 
―factors like insufficient knowledge, general incompetence, deception, self deception, or 
bias‖.18 Laqueur further reasons that a major mistake leads to surprise and thus an 
intelligence failure. He sums up the ultimate objective of any intelligence service by 
stressing that it seeks ―to shield those it serves against surprise‖.19 Probing how the 
intelligence machineries around the world go about doing their job, Laqueur provides a 
comprehensive assessment of the performance of the US intelligence community over the 
past few decades. He concentrates on the CIA‘s intelligence-gathering machinery and how 
it has been used, misused and on occasion ignored. From the CIA‘s mistakes, Laqueur 
derives a number of lessons of particular significance to intelligence producers and 
consumers alike. His final judgment of the CIA‘s performance since World War II is 
mixed ―While it pioneered technical means of collection, it has been weak on human 
intelligence. It has been excellent in ferreting out facts and figures, but it has been less 
accomplished in putting them into a coherent picture – analyzing trends, assessing 
situations, and warning of future contingencies.‖20 
 In attempting to fine-tune his definition of intelligence, Laqueur points out that it is a 
discipline which ―Involves competence not only in current affairs, in history and 
geography, in psychology and sociology, in economics, science and technology, but it 
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should include firsthand experience of at least some foreign countries and at least a 
working knowledge of a foreign language.‖21  
 Sherman Kent, widely considered the father of modern intelligence scholarship, defines 
‗intelligence‘ as denoting, above all else, knowledge; not all knowledge, but ―an amazing 
bulk and assortment of knowledge‖.22 He also considers the term to encompass both the 
type of ―organization which produces the knowledge able to give the operating people 
exactly what they want‖ and ―the activity pursued by the intelligence organization‖.23    
Roy Godson and a number of scholars and intelligence specialists discuss the nature of 
intelligence work in an attempt to determine what steps might be taken to improve US 
performance in the future. The attention of these contributors is focused mainly on the 
overall examination of the needs of the USA with respect to the four major elements of 
intelligence: clandestine collection, analysis and estimates, counterintelligence and covert 
action. Although they are not of one mind as to what must be done to meet the challenges, 
there is nevertheless general agreement that the past performance in the evaluation of 
collected data has been inadequate and that there is a need to improve each major area of 
intelligence activity.24 Godson defines collection as ―gathering of valued information, 
much of it by clandestine means‖; analysis as ―the processing of information, and its end 
product‘‘; counterintelligence as ―the effort to protect their secrets, to prevent themselves 
from being manipulated, and (sometimes) to exploit the intelligence activities of others for 
their own benefit. To protect their secrets, states rely, in part, on security procedures and 
countermeasures‘‘; and covert action is ―the attempt by a government or group to influence 
events in another state or territory without revealing its own involvement‘‘.25 Godson‘s 
schema has been applied in a number of studies on intelligence notably by Angelo 
Codovilla in his Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century in which he asserts 
that ‗the best way seeing the (form) of intelligence through its various manifestations is to 
break it down into its four functional components: collection, counterintelligence, analysis, 
and covert action.‘‘26 
  John Bruce Lockhart used a similar schema in which he defined the five main 
areas of intelligence as follows: 
1. The laying down by governments of their information requirements 
and priorities  
2. The gathering of information, as required by the government, by 
overt, secret and technological methods. 
3. Counterintelligence and security. 
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4. Covert action: the extension of government policy by secret and non-
attributable means. 
5. The analysis and evaluation of all the information gathered.27 
 Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt also attempt to define intelligence and categorize it 
within the taxonomy of human knowledge. They discuss at length Sherman Kent‘s 
threefold description of intelligence as knowledge, activity and organization. Unlike Kent, 
however, Shulsky and Schmitt regard the denial of information to others as a major 
component of intelligence.
28
 They explain the concepts, philosophies and procedures of 
intelligence-gathering, analysis and management, emphasizing the dual nature of 
intelligence whereby one part is governed by the fact that it deals with information, the 
other by the fact that it contributes to the conflict among nations or ―with other adversaries 
such as transnational groups or criminal organizations‖. They contend that the first part, 
taken to its logical extreme, ―gives rise to the notion of intelligence as a universal, 
predictive social science that completely meets the needs of policy makers for information 
about other countries, including their futures.‖29 Shulsky and Schmitt further point out that 
the second part, which is concerned with the struggle among nations, leads in another 
direction.  
 Because intelligence is part of a struggle, the obstacles to understanding do 
not arise simply from the difficulties of the subject matter; the more important 
of them, and those that are potentially the most dangerous, are put there by 
one‘s adversary, in the form of either information denial or deliberate 
deception.
30
  
 
 While the Silent Warfare abounds with references to the activities of Western 
intelligence agencies, especially the CIA‘s fierce competition with the KGB throughout the 
Cold War, it hardly shows any interest in the intelligence warfare on the Arab-Israeli front, 
let alone the paramilitary groups, Palestinian or non-Palestinian. There is, however, a very 
brief reference in the US press to the claim that King Hussein of Jordan had received 
subsidies from the CIA.
31
   
 In discussing whether an intelligence mission relates to theory, or whether there is or 
ought to be a theory of intelligence, Philip Davies points out that while there is some sort 
of agreement in the US as to what the term ‗intelligence‘ denotes, it is more difficult to 
locate a ―formally constituted‖ idea of intelligence in British thinking32. He concludes that  
 how we define what it is we think we are doing when we are doing 
intelligence shapes how we do intelligence. And the cornerstone of any theory 
of intelligence culture has to be the idea of intelligence, or more accurately, the 
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many different ideas of intelligence and their institutional and operational 
consequences.
33
  
 
 In another work, Davies elaborates on the different ways in which intelligence is 
conceptualized by the British and American governments and shows that despite the 
existence of ―similar joint bodies for collating similar raw information, and with a common 
combined assessment as the goal, the two systems can be seen as moving in different 
directions because of essentially cultural rather than structural or circumstantial reasons‖.34 
 Michael Herman, a former ―professional intelligence practitioner‖, to use the author‘s 
own words, also attempts to probe the intelligence community, not only by drawing upon 
his own thirty-five-year career with British intelligence, but also by engaging in academic 
research in the USA, Canada and Britain. Herman‘s Intelligence Power In Peace and War, 
describes the various components of intelligence, discusses its uses, considers issues of 
accuracy and efficiency and offers several recommendations intended to improve its 
performance under the new world order. The picture he draws of the Western intelligence 
agencies is more positive than that offered by Laqueur. In assessing the systems governing 
their inner workings, Herman argues that one of the strengths of the UK and US systems is 
that the specialist collectors of secret intelligence do not normally have the responsibility 
of assessing the significance of their own material. He further stresses that ―the all-source 
melding of all available evidence provides a much broader concept of intelligence than the 
Soviet idea that it was essentially the product of secret collection‖.35   
 Rad Al-Barhawi's Spies and Agents in the Islamic State 
36
 provides a general survey of 
espionage work in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia as well as in ancient China, Greece 
Persia, the Byzantine Empire and Islam. This book is useful although its author is not an 
intelligence specialist. Al-Barhawi attempts to provide a comprehensive review of 
intelligence work throughout 132 years. The wide scope of the book and the lengthy time 
framework rendered the study somewhat lacking in analysis. The author nevertheless 
exerted a great deal of effort on collating and comparing different versions of intelligence 
events. As Al-Barhawi is not initiated in intelligence studies, whether on the theoretical or 
practitioner level, he has fallen into a number of pitfalls, especially when attempting to 
classify intelligence operations or when providing analytical views on this branch of 
human endeavour. Far from approaching intelligence operations by way of tackling the 
elements which constitute an intelligence concept, Al-Barhawi adopts statistics-based 
criteria to assess intelligence operations and judge their success and failure. This approach 
has obviously negatively impacted the results arrived at in his work.  
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 AL-Daghmi's Espionage: Its Legal Punishment in Islamic Jurisprudence 
37 focuses on 
the position taken by a number of Islamic Ulemas and schools of thought vis-à-vis 
intelligence. He also touches upon the desirable qualities of the secret agent and the early 
methods of training and initiating fresh recruits into the world of espionage. Despite its 
scholarly value, the study does not adopt a clear-cut methodology. Nor does it follow a 
chronological order when discussing historical events. Sweep generalizations and 
exaggerations pervade it‘s the appraisals and conclusions arrived at.  
 
1.3 Fatah and intelligence 
Because of the wide political, financial and even military support it has received from 
Arab and Muslim countries, as well as from the ex-Eastern bloc, Fatah developed a well 
organized intelligence apparatus, which it has cloaked in almost total secrecy. Known until 
the mid nineteen-seventies as Jihaz al-Rasd (Observation Apparatus), this agency is the 
primary intelligence and counterintelligence arm of Fatah. The Jihaz was, according to 
Israeli intelligence sources, a competent intelligence unit that was both resented and feared 
within the Fatah structure, partly, as Neil Livingstone and David Halvey point out in Inside 
the PLO, because of the success that characterized some of its performance.
38
  
 Halvey and Livingstone provide revealing information on the structure of the PLO and 
its covert units, and fascinating intelligence details of a number of the operations carried 
out in the Middle East and throughout the world. They point out that PLO‘s intelligence 
units have planned and carried out many assassinations and other acts of violence against 
Yasser Arafat‘s rivals inside and outside Fatah. However, many of their claims about 
military activities, intelligence work and terrorism—subjects where confidentiality is 
paramount—remain unsubstantiated.39 
 Another writer on the organization and activities of the Palestinian intelligence 
apparatus, Abdullah Issa, asserts that in the Middle Eastern intelligence community, it is 
common knowledge that Palestinian intelligence officers were trained during the 1970s 
and 1980s by specialists from the Soviet Union and East European countries, especially 
Bulgaria and East Germany.
40
 Issa further claims that the Unified PLO Intelligence 
Coordination Section (Maktab Al-Tanseeq) organized a number of visits during which 
intelligence officers met and coordinated efforts with their counterparts in France, Spain 
and West Germany, with whom agreements were signed. One outcome of this 
coordination was that a number of terrorist attacks were uncovered and subsequently 
foiled.
41
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 In his voluminous memoirs, Abu Dawood, a leading Fatah intelligence officer, relates 
how the Jihaz al-Rasd was tasked with gathering intelligence crucial for the personal 
safety of PLO Chairman Arafat and other leaders. Abu Dawood further states that the 
intelligence apparatus was directed to seek out and destroy enemy agents who had 
penetrated the PLO. In his recently published book, Palestine: from Jerusalem to Munich, 
he recounts how as early as 1971, elements of the Fatah counterintelligence unit succeeded 
in capturing a number of Israeli agents and collaborators, and how they handled their 
double agents.
42
 
 Even the relatively small splinter groups which broke with Arafat and Fatah had 
special intelligence units. In his Abu Nidhal, A Gun for Hire, Patrick Seale devotes a whole 
chapter to the organizational structure of Abu Nidhal‘s ―Revolutionary Brigade‖. Beside 
the Secretariat, Political Section, Membership Committee, Technical and Scientific 
Committee, Revolutionary Justice Committee, etc., there was the Directorate of 
Intelligence, which was the object of Abu Nidhal‘s special attention. The Directorate was 
formed with four subdivisions: Special Missions, the Foreign Intelligence Committee, the 
Counterespionage Committee and the Lebanon Committee. The Directorate of Intelligence 
was concerned with undercover agents abroad, establishing secret arms caches, gathering 
intelligence about potential targets, carrying out assassinations, and monitoring and 
penetrating hostile services. It is elements of this Directorate who handled the operation to 
kill Heinz Nittal, Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreiski‘s friend, in Vienna in May 1981.43 
 Organized armed resistance and underground groups normally engage in some sort of 
intelligence activities. Among other reasons, they do so in order to monitor and target their 
enemies and to defend their organizations against both enemies and compatriot rivals.
44
 
Some paramilitary organizations entrust the task of scouting and intelligence to a special 
branch, devoted entirely to this specific activity. Others may, for lack of human or material 
resources, combine intelligence-gathering and analysis with the other tasks carried out by 
the organization‘s operatives. The fact that ―resisting espionage networks, uncovering the 
enemy‘s sabotage operations and providing the Revolution with information‖ was one of 
the primary aims of establishing such organizations as the PLO attests to the great 
importance which paramilitaries attach to the question of intelligence, counter-intelligence 
and security.
45
 
 Most authors who have addressed the Palestinian question in general and the PLO in 
particular have commented, with varying degrees of focus, on Fatah‘s involvement in 
violence and terrorist activities. One such study is that of Yonah Alexander and Joshua 
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Sinai who, in Terrorism: the PLO Connection, provide a vivid historical background to the 
Palestinian struggle after the British Mandate of Palestine after World War I. The authors 
clearly recognize the relationship between the structure of the organization and its mission, 
detailing the different departments of the PLO, each headed by a member of the Executive 
Committee. While the book contains valuable information on a variety of aspects related to 
the PLO‘s development, growth and performance, there is precious little discussion of its 
intelligence activities. The authors do, however, shed some light on PLO strategies to 
encourage ―Arab and Muslim radical states to sponsor and support terrorist activities‖. It 
further emphasizes the role of Fatah as ―the oldest, largest and wealthiest of the Palestinian 
terrorist groups and organizations‖, noting that ―from the date that Arafat became 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, the history of Fatah has tended to 
merge with that of the PLO, as Arafat tightened his control of the organization.‖46     
 Yezid Sayigh‘s Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National 
Movement, 1949-1993, provides a wide and very detailed account of the Palestinian 
struggle for statehood. Tracking the historical development of the Palestinian cause is the 
main focus of this book, which also pays considerable attention to the military tendency of 
that struggle. Because Sayigh‘s emphasis in the research is basically political, intelligence 
and military details receive little attention, despite their organic relationship with the main 
theme of the book. Sayigh, a Palestinian who was quite close to the PLO decision makers 
and to Arafat himself, affords useful insights into the internal workings of the Palestinian 
movement. He stresses that the 1967 war, which displaced hundreds of thousands of West 
Bank residents, also forced the centre of gravity in Palestinian nationalism out of Palestine 
itself, so that until the Oslo agreements, the political elite which led the struggle for 
Palestinian nationalism was operating in exile. The flight to Jordan and Lebanon allowed 
remarkable growth and increased popularity for the PLO, which fell under the control of 
Fatah and Arafat. In commenting on the PLO‘s attempt to win Arab and Muslim public 
opinion, Sayigh shows that Arafat was especially obsessed with the necessity of carrying 
out successful operations against Israeli and Western targets, considering this an important 
factor in the PLO struggle to achieve political gains. Sayigh‘s ambitious book provides 
useful but scattered information about some of Fatah‘s intelligence apparatus, operations 
and commanders. He does not, however, devote a specific section or chapter to this aspect 
of the clandestine Palestinian struggle
47
. 
 In The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Jillian Becker 
gives an extensive historical account of the Palestinian movement from 1915 to the 
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aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Although the main focus of the study is 
to show where the PLO succeeded and where it failed in the political arena, it nevertheless 
provides glimpses of two important aspects of the Palestinian struggle: the intelligence 
work carried out by the PLO at different stages and the use of propaganda as a tool in this 
conflict. Becker also discusses the role of Arab oil money in financing the Arab 
propaganda machine:   
 Money was spent on propaganda against Israel by the Arab states, bypassing 
the PLO. The Arab perception was that Israel was strong and victorious because 
of United States support. United States administrations were necessarily 
sensitive to public opinion. To turn American public sympathy away from Israel 
and towards the PLO‘s cause was therefore imperative. 48 
 
 Some information on PLO intelligence activities is contained in an Israeli Foreign 
Ministry document, The Threat of PLO Terrorism
49
 by Brigadier-General Amos Gilboa. 
The document considers ―Palestinian terrorism‖ and refers, if briefly, to the intelligence 
activities carried out by Fatah. It also describes the PLO‘s organizational structure and 
profiles its leadership. It makes specific mention of two of Fatah‘s intelligence 
apparatuses, "Force 17" and the ―Western Front‖ (by which it no doubt means ―Western 
Sector‖). Reference is also made to Fatah‘s network in Europe, but the document hardly 
touches upon the internal processes of either of these intelligence apparatuses.
50
 
 Despite the large mass of information on the PLO in general and Fatah in particular, 
there remains a serious gap in the literature concerning the clandestine intelligence 
activities of the paramilitary organization which dominated the national Palestinian 
movement from the Six-Day War until the death of its founder, Yasser Arafat, and the 
subsequent rise to prominence of its rival, Hamas. It is hoped that the present full-length 
investigation will contribute to narrowing this gap in the scholarship on a vital issue which 
has direct implications for contemporary life. Through the investigation of the intelligence 
activities of Fatah, it is further hoped that an understanding of how large, well organized, 
Arab-Islamic paramilitary groups can conceptualize intelligence and become 
simultaneously both producers and consumers of intelligence. 
 Researchers have in the past mainly focused on such matters as the military doctrines 
of the paramilitaries, their organizational structures, financial resources or weapons 
suppliers.
51
 Not enough attention has been paid to these organisations as intelligence 
producers or consumers. The 9/11 attacks have changed that. The atrocities of September 
2001 have led to the widespread realisation that such multiple attacks would not have been 
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possible without careful planning, target surveillance and the painstaking and detailed 
collection and analysis of intelligence.     
 There are a number of factors which have hampered serious attempts to study these 
paramilitary groups over the past decades. Chief among these is the sensitivity of the 
subject itself, which has prompted many academics to avoid the risks associated with such 
research. Another is the fact that most ex-paramilitary cadres and others affiliated with 
clandestine organizations are loath to provide information, fearing violent or even lethal 
reprisals at the hands of their former commanders. Paramilitary organizations regard any 
attempt to divulge secrets as a very serious crime, no less than betrayal of trust or treason, 
which is punishable by death. Beside the refusal or unwillingness of cadres and operatives 
in general to provide information on their groups, paramilitary organizations normally act 
in a very secretive way, whereby each member of a team may not even know what the 
others are assigned to do. Furthermore, they tend to conceal their movements and contacts 
so well that it is in most cases quite difficult to infiltrate them.  
 The first open discussion in the U.S.A of intelligence goes back to the 1940's after the 
Japanese surprise attack against the American base at Pearl Harbor. Such an attack, left a 
controversial issue, about whether or not Washington knew that Pearl Harbor was likely 
going to be attacked and failed to pass the information to the U.S.A Navy commanders at 
Pearl Harbor.
52
 More recently, it was after the September 11 atrocity that the intelligence 
debate grew in intensity, practically everywhere in the free world but especially in the US 
and Britain. In general, the shocked world started to speak openly about intelligence and 
more specifically about the failure of Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
to track and pre-empt the perpetrators. Since 2001 and the subsequent military invasion of 
two countries, the subject of intelligence collection and analysis has become widely 
discussed, not only in the US Congress and Britain's Parliament, research centres and 
national security agencies, but also in the media and among ordinary people. In the UK, the 
Hutton's and Butler's Enquiries are a case in point.
53
 This unprecedented interest, which 
became even more intense after the Iraq War, Madrid and London bombings, has resulted 
in the accumulation of a variety of sources of information of value to the present research. 
Despite the wide interest in the paramilitary organizations, their operations, strategies and 
intentions, there has been no full-length academic or non-official study of their intelligence 
work and tactics in term of strategy, tasking, and intelligence cycle. Most works on this 
subject have not gone far beyond the description or analysis of a terrorist operation here 
and there, or the publication of details of popular and political reactions towards such 
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attacks. Investigating the nerve centres of these organizations, especially the apparatuses 
through which the intelligence process is carried out, will not only lead to a better 
knowledge of the nature of these groups, but will also ultimately help in the efforts to 
combat terrorists and thwart their plans. In examining the clandestine methods of the 
paramilitaries, it is necessary to adopt a comparative approach. We need to know how far 
the intelligence operations of these organizations are similar to or different from those 
carried out by the specialized national intelligence services. This knowledge is vital if we 
are to be better equipped to deal with the devastating threat posed by international 
terrorism. 
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1.4 Methodology 
The aims of the present research are to examine Fatah as a producer and consumer of 
intelligence and to elucidate the characteristics of the intelligence doctrine to which it 
adheres. The first of these is addressed in the light of the intelligence elements which Roy 
Godson applied to test the intelligence activities and functions of the CIA.  
Scarcity of open-source literature on this delicate subject is admittedly a major 
obstacle confronting any researcher in this area, but a careful and patient search through 
such open sources as publications, blogs, e-books, websites, etc. would nevertheless 
produce a few hints, suggestions and indeed some (if scanty) information on paramilitary 
intelligence and its methods of operation. With regard to Fatah, there are some authors, 
including ex-Fatah members, who have referred to some of the operations carried out by 
the organization, but who for understandable reasons have not dwelt on this aspect of 
Fatah‘s activities. It was therefore necessary that interviews and questionnaires be carefully 
designed, in order to cover the aspects of the intelligence work on which Godson focuses. 
The questionnaire was designed to elicit as much information as possible on how many 
secret intelligence apparatuses Fatah had and how they operated. Because of the scarcity of 
information on the subject at hand, it was felt advisable to choose an open-ended 
questionnaire.
54
  
 Philip Davies, 2001, argues that ―elite interviewing is a central tool in the study of 
intelligence and security services.‘‘55 He stresses the importance of applying a multi- 
methodological ‗triangulation‘ in which information gathered through ―primary sources 
(interviews, published first-hand documentary sources), documentary sources (published or 
archival) and published secondary-source information can be cross-referenced both 
between and within the data types employed‖. 56 He also discusses the difficulties involved 
in applying the triangulation method and points out that the greatest difficulty in this kind 
of triangulation process is not the process of substantiation and verification through 
multiple sources but the incorporation of additional information from first-hand accounts.  
Because of the high degree of secrecy surrounding the intelligence community in 
general, the task of arranging interviews with intelligence officers, past or present, can 
prove quite tasking. The most practical strategy to adopt ,when embarking upon this task 
however is to ask each interviewee to suggest names or recommend one or more other 
potential contacts. In adopting this strategy which Davies calls ―snowballing‖, a researcher 
can then multiply the initial set of interviewees and consequently increase the chances of 
finding proper answers to their queries. Davies also points out that it is advisable and 
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sometimes even necessary for respondents to be interviewed on two or more occasions, 
either in person, by phone or in writing. There are two important reasons for this. The first 
is to eliminate any ―uncertainties and ambiguities‖ in the information obtained in the first 
interview. Secondly, as new and unexpected information almost always appeared it 
becomes necessary for the respondents to be contacted again for clarification, elaboration 
and of course verification purposes.  
Although there are basically two types of interviews, structured and unstructured, it 
is best in intelligence studies to conduct ‗semi-structured‘ interviews when dealing with 
former intelligence officers. This type of interviewing is normally composed of three 
distinct stages. The initial stage is relatively unstructured in which the respondents are 
invited to talk about their career and experiences. This is followed by two more highly 
structured stages in which certain questions intended to elicit further information are then 
put to the interviewee. The questions may be selected from the prepared general purpose or 
supplementary ―shopping list‖. To ensure secrecy without appearing vague and 
unnecessarily opaque each informant was assigned a serial number by which s/he is 
identified.
57
In assessing the validity of information gained through the interviews I 
conducted, three main criteria were adopted: the level of access the informant had, whether 
the information provided is reported, hearsay or first-hand and thirdly the reliability and 
what Philip Davies calls the "track record‖ of the interviewee. 58 In view of the fact that 
most of the published literature on intelligence has been written by journalists ―with very 
little in the way of a rigorous methodology for collection, interpretation and evaluation‖59, 
the triangulation strategy becomes quite necessary if accuracy is sought.  
  The next step was to define the population sample to whom the questionnaire 
would be sent. As might be expected when taking up a subject related to clandestine 
activities, some of the respondents, including strategists, political analysts and academic 
scholars, were not fully forthcoming or willing to respond to all of the questions put to 
them. On the other hand, not all Fatah members or ex-members were knowledgeable 
enough to provide secret and/or accurate information. Indeed, not all Fatah members, 
regardless of their membership level, knew all the secret dealings of their organization. For 
security or other reasons, there were of course those who may have had more knowledge 
than they were prepared to divulge. There were furthermore those who had worked closely 
with the PLO but who belonged to groups inimical to Fatah and who tended to belittle 
their rivals, casting doubt on their alleged achievements. 
23 
 
 Ten heads of PLO diplomatic missions accredited to various countries in the Middle 
East, Europe and America were approached. It is well known that the diplomatic staff of 
the PLO abroad are normally, although not always, chosen from among veteran Fatah 
members who had rendered acknowledged services to the PLO or to Arafat. Their email 
and postal addresses and telephone numbers were obtained through friends and contacts 
among the Palestinian community and also through the PLO mission in London. Much 
time and effort was spent on following up contacts by telephone and email; weeks elapsed 
before a few responses began to be received. Many indicated that the information asked 
for in the questionnaire was beyond their knowledge. Others extricated themselves by 
referring me to distinguished Fatah members who they said were better equipped to 
provide answers. Because some of the people contacted were still in government or held 
diplomatic positions, they were less than enthusiastic or forthcoming in their responses.  
 Six weeks after I had first sent out the questionnaire, I intensified my efforts to 
locate ex-Fatah members among the Palestinian community in London. Luckily, I 
managed to find men who had worked as Fatah security officers, two of whom had 
excellent access to the required information. I was also introduced to two members of 
Fatah engaged in academic research in the security field, who provided invaluable 
assistance but preferred to remain anonymous. For those located in London, personal 
interviews were arranged; with others, contact was achieved mainly by telephone. When 
the information gathered from the interviewees was collated and compared it was found 
that the responses were not identical but complementary. I was of course aware of the 
problems involved in conducting interviews with individuals whose reliability was for a 
number of reasons open to question either because of fear,  memory failure, the lapse of 
time  or their attempt to " adjust their interpretation of an event in order to avoid being seen 
in a poor light." 60 In conducting the interviews therefore three main criteria were adopted: 
the level of access the informant had, whether the information provided is reported, 
hearsay or first-hand and thirdly the reliability and what Philip Davies calls the "track 
record" of the interviewee. 
61
  
 Because the research topic is still deemed to be quite sensitive by many Palestinians, 
Arabs and other informants, stringent procedures and precautions had to be followed in 
order to ensure credibility while protecting and preserving the trust of the sources who had 
agreed to contribute to the research. I was quite fortunate to have been able to access a 
number of very high profile primary sources who are considered to be highly placed policy 
and decision makers by many of those within the Fatah movement or studying it. There 
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remain, however, a number of concerns regarding their cooperation and the accuracy or 
credibility of their accounts, which naturally have a direct bearing on the value of their 
contribution to the present research. The first is that they were members of what was at one 
time considered a terrorist organization and as such would be considered by many not to be 
the most innocent of people and certainly not the most trustworthy. By applying the 
triangulation method, I endeavoured to check the accuracy of their information by 
comparing their versions against other testimonies and also by consulting as many relevant 
secondary sources, reports and historical accounts as possible. In so doing I was guided by 
the "triangulation" approach to elite interviewing which relies on the triad of: primary, 
documentary and published secondary sources.
62
 In other instances, where it was 
impossible to corroborate the accuracy of an informant's account, there was felt to be a 
marked absence of any motive to lie and this is duly pointed out.
63
 No effort has been 
spared to ensure that the confidentiality and trust of the sources is not compromised. 
Furthermore, I have made sure that the sources are clear about their own involvement in 
the research and are aware of what is being written and its implications. I also maintain 
that the use of these sources is vital to any study in this field, particularly one that aims to 
be objective and analytical.  
 The present case study relies largely on primary sources which were not hitherto 
available to researchers and academics. The research will also be based largely on personal 
interviews and details voluntarily provided by informants who were at one point in their 
careers active operatives or leaders in one or another paramilitary group, especially Fatah, 
which dominated the Palestinian political scene for four decades. 
 Literature on the intelligence services in the Middle East in general and the Arab world 
in particular is still quite rare and scanty.
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 Some changes have, however, taken place 
during the past few years and have enhanced research opportunities in this sensitive 
subject. From the early 1990s onwards, it has become less difficult for researchers and 
interested specialists to conduct intelligence studies and research projects, as the new 
international climate has made it possible for information to flow more freely. The past 
few years have been marked by the gradual lifting of many restrictions on the freedom of 
information. 
 A number of important books and papers some of which may be considered significant 
primary contributions have also been published recently.
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 The memoirs of Abu Dawood, 
the mastermind and leader of the group which carried out the notorious Munich attack on 
the Israeli Olympic team in 1972, provide a rare insight into the workings of Fatah's 
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intelligence and security apparatus. Some Arabs and Palestinians who had worked for one 
intelligence service or another have begun to talk relatively openly about their roles and 
experiences, revealing information which had previously been closely and jealously 
guarded by the operatives, their handlers and the organizations. The material contained in 
these publications, TV interviews and newspaper articles provides an important source of 
first-hand data on these organizations and their strategies and operations during the last 
four decades of the twentieth century. It must be pointed out, however, that some 
Palestinian activists who have made public such information are not to be entirely trusted, 
as they have sought to justify past deeds, to aggrandize their own achievements or to serve 
a specific agenda.  
 It must also be borne in mind that this research was conducted at a time of great change 
within the PLO and Fatah itself. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dismantling 
of its satellite Eastern Bloc, the main political and military backers of Fatah, forced the 
Palestinians to adapt to the demands of the new world order. Among other things, many 
felt compelled to distance themselves from violence and terrorist operations, engaging 
instead in a political process to achieve their goals. Furthermore, many governments in the 
Arab region have, under international and domestic pressure, become less unwilling to 
capitulate to popular demands for change. This has affected even the PLO, which has come 
to soften its heretofore brutal attitude towards those who divulged secrets or chose to talk 
publicly about any aspect of Fatah‘s activities, especially its involvement in past terrorist 
operations. Layla Khalid, for example, gave numerous TV interviews about the role played 
by ‗Carlos the Jackal‘ in planning and executing numerous operations during the 1960s 
and 1970s, while Abu Dawood has been a frequent guest on Arab satellite channels, 
speaking freely about his own exploits in Munich, Amman and elsewhere.
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 In order to address the second aim of the present study, i.e. to examine the nature and 
characteristics of Fatah‘s concept of intelligence, an investigation of the religious, 
intellectual and social background of the founders of each of the intelligence apparatuses 
was carried out. It will be seen that their religious beliefs played a significant role in 
shaping their thinking and their ideological frame of reference. In tracing the origin and 
development of intelligence activities in the Arab world, there is evidence that intelligence 
activities being were carried out as early as the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 centuries; but no significant 
activities were recorded during the period immediately preceding the rise of Islam, known 
to the Arabs in general as Jahiliya (Age of Ignorance), which Arab historians normally 
consider to cover the 5
th
 and 6
th
 centuries. As the Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula were 
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not under any threat of conquest by any foreign invaders during this period, their 
intelligence activities were largely directed towards each other, since they were continually 
engaged in inter-tribal fighting because of revenge and vendettas, or warring over water 
resources, hegemony and  pasture. Beside the ancient chronicles and lives of the makers of 
Arab history, numerous literary works including prose fiction and poetic anthologies 
proved to good sources of information on ancient intelligence activities besides their value 
as a literary and intellectual output encapsulating the community's manners, customs, 
beliefs and practices.   
 But the most important sources which have been constantly consulted are the Quran 
and Prophet Muhammed‘s sayings and practices, known as "Traditions". For the Muslims, 
the Quran represents the word of God as revealed to Prophet Muhammed through the angel 
Gabriel. Its most valuable contribution remains as a source of Prophet Muhammed‘s words 
and deeds in those instances where they are relevant to intelligence activities.
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 Among the 
most useful sources of information on Prophet Muhammed‘s life are the biographies 
written by Al-Waqidi and Ibn Hisham less than a century after his death. These two 
biographies are based on oral narratives by individuals who were contemporaneous with 
Prophet Muhammed and who transmitted what they saw and heard to posterity. From these 
and other records we learn that the early period of Islam abounded with intelligence 
activities, especially during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammed. A careful investigation of 
the many accounts of the battles of Prophet Muhammed has shown that the early Muslims 
were indeed impressive intelligence actors and that their tactics and strategies were not 
without sophistication. Fortunately, practically all accounts of these battles and 
commentaries on Islamic scriptures, as well as most historical and literary texts, are now 
readily available in digital form.  
 One of the difficulties encountered was how to translate archaic or highly technical 
terminologies from Arabic into English. This problem was surmounted by consulting a 
number of specialized dictionaries, especially those published by the Arab League 
Translation and Arabization Commission. Unless otherwise stated all Quranic texts in 
English are from Yusuf Ali‘s The Meanings of the Holy Quran. The historical figures and 
place names have been spelt as they are often encountered in modern works; 'Mecca' for 
instance and not 'Makka', 'Saladin' not 'Salah Aldeen'. The more common form 
'Muhammed' is preferred to 'Mohammed' or 'Muhammad', while the Arabic definite article 
which precedes most names has been spelt as 'Al' rather than 'El'. But a more serious 
difficulty was how to reconcile the many different versions and accounts of some events 
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uncovered during the research. I tried to resolve any discrepancies or inconsistencies by 
basing my judgments and preferences on the logic of events, on the reputation of the 
authorities involved and of course on the scholarly opinions of specialized researchers. In 
so far as the interpretation of the Islamic scriptures is concerned I have accepted the 
prevailing weight of evidence as posited by such Quranic commentators as Ibn Kathir, Al-
Tabari, and Al-Qurtubi.   
 Despite the fact that a number of studies have been written on Fatah these however 
either wholly or partly focused on the rise of the movement, its organizational structure, 
military activities, its impact on political decisions in the Middle east, and the support it 
has received from regional and international powers. The intelligence doctrine to which 
Fatah adhered and its intelligence activities in general have received very little attention. 
This may be attributed to the scarcity and difficulty of accessing primary sources of 
information. It is for this reason that considerable efforts were exerted to arrange personal 
and/or telephone interviews with a number of Fatah‘s elite and others close to the 
movement. For those with whom conducting a personal interview proved difficult, a 
questionnaire was then used. In exploring the intelligence concept followed by Fatah‘s 
intelligence workers it was quite necessary to delve into the  vast history of Islam and Arab 
heritage, especially the Quranic studies and Prophet Muhammed‘s life and practices in this 
particular field which will be taken up in the following chapters.     
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Chapter Two 
Intelligence terminologies and the early Arab records of intelligence. 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
In his epistle ―Secret Keeping and Mincing Words‖ Al-Jahiz says that it is in man‘s nature 
―to seek news and intelligence‖.68 According to this prolific 9th century writer and 
philosopher, man‘s search for news is as old as history. The reason is not difficult to see. 
Life or rather survival requires constant responses to questions and queries which must be 
answered if one is to protect oneself and prepare for unforeseen eventualities. Arabs, like 
other nations of the world, used intelligence and engaged in a variety of espionage 
activities during peace time as well as war time.  
     This chapter will review the Arabic terminologies used in the field of intelligence 
throughout Arab history and will discuss in some detail the use of intelligence actors: 
guides, scouts, information gatherers, watchmen, sentinels, secret agents and others. 
Special attention will be paid to intelligence activities in pre-Islamic times.   
 
2.2 Intelligence Terminologies in Arabic 
The Arabic equivalent of the English word ‗intelligence‘ is ‗mukhabarat‘ or ‗istikhbarat‘, 
both of which are derived from the same Arabic trilateral root ‗khabar‘. As a noun, this 
word can be used in a wide variety of contexts, meaning, for instance, any of the 
following: ‗news‘, ‗account‘, ‗advice‘, ‗hearsay‘, ‗message‘, rumour‘, ‗knowledge‘, 
‗answer‘, ‗response‘, ‗reply‘, ‗predicate‘, ‗report‘, ‗story‘. It can also be used to mean 
‗having a great deal of news‘, or ‗having great depth of knowledge and expertise‘. This 
noun may also refer to one‘s final story or news, i.e. death. The subject noun ‗mukhbir‘, a 
derivative of ‗khabar‟, means ‗he who transmits news‘ or ‗he who spies on others‘ for 
whatever reason, although the term is normally associated with state-sponsored agents.
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The present-day term „mukhabarat‟ is almost exclusively used to mean ‗intelligence‘, 
although it was also used during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphate (7
th
-15
th
 century)  to 
mean ‗correspondence‘, ‗reports‘, ‗letters‘, ‗writing‘ and ‗contacts‘.70 In the Arab world 
today, both „mukhabarat‟ and „istikhbarat‟ may be used interchangeably to mean 
‗intelligence‘, although the latter is commonly reserved for military intelligence, while the 
former is used for all types: domestic, foreign, military, non-military and counter-
intelligence.
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 While in English the word ‗spy‘ can variously be used to describe foreign or local 
agents who observe, investigate or engage in secret observation and espionage for or 
against their own interests or countries of origin, Arabic makes a clear distinction between 
those who spy for their own people, state or interests and those who are employed by an 
enemy, a rival or a foreign power. The Arabic word „jasous‟ is reserved primarily for those 
employed to act as agents and spies for foreign rivals, adversaries and enemies in general, 
those of the individual as well as those of the tribe or state. On the social and popular 
levels, it is used to describe those who seek unflattering, debasing or embarrassing 
information about others, for the purpose of defamation, embezzlement, blackmail or any 
such ignoble purpose.
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 In the collective consciousness of the Arabs, the word is therefore 
laden with negative and derogatory implications. „Namous‟, on the other hand, is normally, 
although not exclusively, reserved for those who are especially aware, conscious, 
knowledgeable and cognizant of the deep and hidden secrets of others. In its broader 
implications, ‗namous‘ is used to describe men of wisdom, learning and sagacity. The 
word is sometimes used as a synonym of ‗integrity‘ and ‗honour‘. In a special sense, in 
Islam, it is universally used to denote the greatest source of  ‗news‘ and ‗intelligence‘: the 
angel Gabriel, whom Muslims believe to have been sent by Allah to the Prophet 
Muhammed in order to convey Divine commands and reveal the words of the Quran.
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To distinguish spying for a good cause from ‗sniffing out‘ information for evil ends, Arabs 
use two different words. „Tajassasa‟ is normally used to describe the act of attempting to 
acquire any secret or covert information. While the noun ‗jasous‘ (spy) does not appear in 
any Quranic text, the verb ‗tajassasa‘ appears in a verse in the Surah (chapter) of Hujurat 
(Chambers) where Muslims are enjoined not to engage in this activity; it is normally 
associated with, but not confined to, the undercover work of anyone who spies for 
someone else, especially for an enemy or a foreign power
74. ‗Jasous‘ is also used to refer 
to the act of detecting private information for selfish reasons, material gain or any other 
non-benevolent purpose. ‗Tajassasa‘ is used in the Quran in this sense  
   Oye who believe! 
Avoid suspicion (as much
 
as possible): for suspicion in some 
cases is a sin: and spy not on each other, nor speak ill of 
each other behind their backs. Would any of you like to eat 
the flesh of his dead brother? Nay, ye would abhor it. But 
fear Allah: For Allah is oft-returning, most merciful.
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 On the other hand, the verb ‗tahassasa‘, is used specifically to denote the act of 
acquiring information for one‘s own use, for a good cause, or for some generally 
30 
 
benevolent or benign purpose. It is in this sense that Jacob uses the verb in the Quran, 
when he asks his other sons to search for their brother Joseph. 
       O my sons!  
Go ye and enquire about Joseph and his brother, and 
never give up hope of Allah's Soothing Mercy: Truly no 
one despairs of Allah's Soothing Mercy, except those who 
have no faith.
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 Throughout Arab history, a spy, whether a foreign agent or a local operative, has most 
commonly been referred to as „ain‟ (pl. uyoun), which literally means ‗eye‘. The 
resemblance, both semantically and figuratively, between the Arabic word and its English 
counterpart, the verb ‗espy‘ is quite apparent. ‗Ain‟, which has been in circulation for the 
last two millennia in Arabic, is still used extensively in a variety of contexts, chief among 
which is the intelligence field. It refers, among other things, to a herald, to a person who is 
dispatched to explore a situation, to one who brings back tidings, to a secret observer and 
to a collector of information. Arab historians and lexicographers such as Muhammed 
Murtadha Al-Zabeedi point out that „ain‟ (which also means ‗a bird of prey‘ and by 
extension ‗having very keen vision‘) was applied to spies and informers because much of 
their work depended on what they observed, particularly with their eyes.
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 Other Arabic terms denoting spies or undercover agents include „dasees‟, „daleel‟, 
„talee‟ah‟, „rabee‟ah‟, „muharwil‟, „hawas‟, „fuyouj‟, „sheefa‟, and „baghiyah‟. The noun 
„dasees‟ is derived from the verb ‗dasa‘, which may be used to mean any of the following: 
‗creep in‘, ‗encroach unnoticed‘, ‗blend in‘ and ‗intervene‘. In general, „dasees‟ means ‗he 
who is involved in clandestine reconnaissance', who intervenes‘ or ‗he who enters any 
territory (literally or figuratively) without the knowledge or consent of others‘. The link 
between this sense and ‗espionage‘ is self-evident.78 „Daleel‟, on the other hand, is most 
commonly used in the sense of ‗guide‘, ‗scout‘, ‗lookout‘ or ‗herald‘, but is quite often 
used euphemistically to mean ‗spy‘. As for „talee‟ah‟, which is derived from the verb 
„tala‟, it may refer to any of the following: ‗pioneer‘, ‗he who is at the front‘, ‗pathfinder‘, 
‗forerunner‘, ‗explorer‘, and ‗reconnoitrer‘. This was extended to include ‗the person who 
knows [secrets] first‘, i.e. a spy.  
 „Rabee‟ah‟, which denotes a hilltop or an elevated place, is used figuratively for scouts, 
whose missions would naturally become easier when they operated from a high vantage 
point. The term was quite common, appearing frequently in a number of ancient Arabic 
documents, especially in poetic texts antedating Islam by decades. The pre-Islamic poet 
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warrior, Urwa bin Al-Ward (d. 594) illustrates the vital role played by the rabee‟ah in the 
deserts of Arabia, when, in one of his poems, he writes: ―Before we stealthily descend 
upon a watering place, we (normally) despatch a rabee‟ah (scout), who, like a tall tree, 
stands erect to keep a proper lookout‖.79 In a reference to the terrible conditions under 
which the rabee‟ah operated, another poet, Aws bin Hajar (530-620), describes a dejected 
lover as ―lurking behind the curtains of nature like a spying rabee‟ah, parched and 
frightened‖.80 „Fuyuj‟ literally means ‗he who walks fast or runs from one place to 
another‘. Because speed is of vital importance in the transmission of intelligence, the term 
has come to be applied to spies and agents. A related Arabic term is „muharwil‟, which 
literally means ‗runner‘, or ‗scrambler‘ but was also used for a spy. ‗Sheefa‘ is derived 
from the verb ‗shafa‘, which originally meant ‗yearn for something‘, but came with the 
passage of time to refer to lifting one‘s head in order to see clearly, and to being at the 
front and in a position to see more clearly than others. The connection between ‗yearning 
to know secrets‘ and ‗spying‘ is apparent. As the primary duty of the spy is to seek and 
acquire classified information, the Arabic term ‗baghiya‘, which means ‗the seeker‘, ‗he 
who is on a special quest‘, or ‗he who demands to know or possess something‘ was 
occasionally used to refer to clandestine collectors of information.
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 Another word which 
was widely associated with spies is ‗munafiq‘, which is reserved specifically for Arab 
and/or Muslim spies who operate under the guise of Islam in order to subvert it from 
within through the dissemination of disparaging rumours and falsehoods. The Quran uses 
the word in this sense several times.
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2.3 Early Arab Records of Espionage  
With the weakening position of the Byzantines in Syria and northern Mesopotamia during 
the mid-second century, early migrants from the Arabian Peninsula gradually built the 
independent state of Manathira or Lakhmidi
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 along the Euphrates. They also succeeded in 
establishing another state known as the Ghassanid in Syria, where Jafnah bin Omar was 
the first of a long line of kings who ruled over the north-western corner of Arabia. The 
Byzantines did not view the emerging state of the Ghassanids as a rival power, but as an 
ally against the Persians, with whom they were for a long time locked in a continual state 
of warfare. The Persians, on the other hand, considered the Manathira state, which 
stretched along their western and north-western frontiers, as a kind of buffer zone against 
their Byzantine enemies. For strategic reasons, the Persians nurtured the new state of the 
Lakhmids and ensured that it would not easily fall prey to foreign invaders. In short, both 
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the Byzantines and Persians saw the strategic benefits of maintaining what Sir John Glubb 
calls ―a system of Arab satellite princedoms guarding the desert flanks of both empires‖.84  
 It was inevitable that rivalries and conflicts of interest should arise between the two 
Arab states, supported as they were by the two rival powers in the region. Relations 
continued to deteriorate and the two sides often found themselves locked in engagements 
which were in most cases proxy battles fought on behalf of the Persians and Byzantines. 
The most famous of these confrontations was one in which the Ghassanid, Al-Harith bin 
Jabalah, scored a decisive victory over Munthir III, who was killed. The Byzantines 
considered this outcome a victory for their own cause.85    
 Despite the close military links between these two Arab states and their patron empires, 
there is very little documented evidence of cooperation between them in the field of 
intelligence. One of the earliest references to intelligence activities carried out by the Arab 
states appears in the multi-volume anthology and encyclopaedia, Kitab al-Aghani (Book of 
Songs), compiled in the 10
th
 century by Abu Faraj al-Asbahani, who points out that the 
most important task of the secret agents, the uyoun, was to provide personal security for 
their monarchs and superiors. Al-Asbahani relates the story of a Manathira spy who was 
able to save the life of his king Al-Naman bin Al-Munthir (AD 582-610).86 The spy, who 
was based deep inside the Ghassanid state in northern Arabia (Syria), wrote to his master, 
warning that a rival had sent an agent for the purpose of assassinating the king. With this 
vital intelligence, Al-Naman  bin Al-Munthir ordered his men to track down and shadow 
the newly arrived would-be assassin, who was caught preparing for his deadly mission and 
killed before he could carry it out.87 
 There is evidence that the Qahtani Arabs of southern Arabia engaged in intelligence 
activities as early as the second century BC. Extant inscriptions from the time contain 
references to such activities, which despite the primitive methods and tactics were in many 
ways quite well organized. A recent study in old south Arabian epigraphy shows that a 
high proportion of the ancient Qahtani army was charged with intelligence-related duties. 
Ten percent of all fighting men were assigned to such activities as skirmishing, scouting, 
and reconnoitring. The study by A. F. Beeston also shows that the Qahtanis recruited 
nomadic Bedouins and a variety of mercenaries to carry out espionage missions, despite 
the fact that these sources were not fully trusted or deemed reliable by their handlers.88  
 With the possible exception of those living in Mecca and Medina, who mainly worked 
as traders, the majority of the population of Arabia comprised nomadic Bedouins, who 
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moved from one place to another in search of water and pasture. The general system which 
governed their social relationships was based on total allegiance to the leader of the tribe or 
clan. These Bedouins, whose main occupation was keeping camels, goats and sheep, lived 
―in semi-isolation from the rest of the world … in a state of perpetual war‖.89 Totally 
unmindful of the outside world, these nomads produced a culture which responded to the 
needs and demands of their own environment and circumstances: 
 The raid or ghazwa… otherwise considered a form of brigandage, is raised by 
the economic and social conditions of desert life to the rank of a national 
constitution. It lies at the base of the economic structure of Bedouin pastoral 
society. In desert land, where the fighting mood is a chronic mental condition, 
raiding is one of the few manly occupations. An early poet gave expression to 
the guiding principle of such life in two verses: ‗Our business is to make raids 
on the enemy, on our neighbour and on our own brother, in case we find none to 
raid but a brother!
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 These raids were prompted either by keen competition for pasturage and water, by 
attempts by a stronger tribe to plunder a weaker one, or by revenge and score settling.
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The protracted armed confrontations, however, cannot be described as wars proper, but as 
forays or clashes, as they involved relatively small numbers of fighting men, normally 
between twenty and a hundred.
92
 Besides these inter-tribal clashes, there were also the 
frequent attacks on caravan routes and wayfarers. These were so common that a new 
Arabic term, ‗su‟louk‘, was coined to describe those involved in this specific form of 
attack, in which numerous Arab poets took part. These poet brigands often boasted about 
their exploits, which frequently involved scouts and spies. One such poet warrior was 
Urwa bin Al-Ward, who is cited above likening the rabee‟ah (scout) to a tree.  
 Despite the fact that the armed confrontations in ancient Arabia were not full-scale 
wars, but sudden raids, ambushes and speedy retreats, scouting and intelligence gathering 
were always an organic part of these skirmishes and clashes. The duties of the rabee‟ah 
were well defined and were quite independent of those of other fighting men. Before an 
attack was launched, one or more rabee‟ah elements would be called upon to scout the 
area and report any sightings of the targets or any unusual happenings. The work carried 
out by desert scouts and reconnoitres was considered more critical and perilous than that of 
the ordinary fighting men. Their worst fear was discovery by enemy tribes or those whom 
they were targeting. Severe punishments were meted out to those captured. The poet Aws 
bin Al-Hajar describes the rabee‟ah as living ―in perpetual fear, chronically thirsty. So 
scared are they of the light, that when the sun shines, they turn their faces the other way‖.93 
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 The literary history of Arabia contains numerous records of battles between various 
tribes, who boasted of their military exploits in long poems handed down from generation 
to generation. These eulogistic verses were often recited at special events, traditionally 
held on certain feasts and market days. Both poets and traders were keen to attend these 
occasions, which provided each tribe with opportunities to retell its past history in 
hyperbolic terms. The most important of these literary competitions was the Ukadh 
Market, made famous by the intense competition of the two literary satirists Jareer and 
Farazdaq, whose intense sense of pride in their own tribes and cutting satirical invective 
are as popular today as they were fifteen centuries ago.
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 The poems recited at these 
festivals attest to the ubiquitous presence of the secret agent or spy. Among the battles 
immortalized in these enthusiastic rallies was that of ‗Dahis and Ghabra‘, which was 
fought between the tribes of Ghatfan and Fazarah over the result of a horse race. The two 
mares, Dahis and Ghabra‘, finished so close together that each tribe claimed that its own 
horse had won. The dispute could not be resolved peacefully, so the two tribes went to war 
to settle it. In the first armed confrontation, the leader of the Ghatfan tribe was killed, 
triggering a protracted vendetta in which many lives were lost. These confrontations, 
which ebbed and flowed for many years, are known in Arab history as the ‗Days of 
Mudhar‘.95   
 In order to secure victories against their rivals, each tribe engaged in espionage 
activities in which, in addition to the experienced spies, temporary informers were 
occasionally recruited. During the Days of Rabee‟ah, better known as the Basous War 
(494-534) between the Taghlib and Bakr tribes, the employment of secret information 
gatherers was quite common. In his mammoth anthology of Arabic prose and poetry from 
pre-Islamic times until the 10th century, Al-Asbahani writes of the efforts each tribe 
exerted to trace and uncover the spies working in its midst. He also recounts how the 
agents of the tribe of Bakr bin Wa‘el managed to infiltrate the ranks of the Ka‘ab bin 
Rabee‘ah tribe during the Falj War.96    
 A primitive early warning system was often used by the warring tribes of Arabia. 
These tribes used a variety of methods to communicate amongst themselves and to send 
warning signals in times of war or crisis. Smoke signals and drums were often used to send 
specific urgent warnings and messages. Because drums can be heard by all, while smoke 
and fire signals were visible to both friend and foe, the signals sent through these media 
had to be codified in such a way as to be understood only by the sender and the recipient. 
To do this, it was necessary to decide the exact meaning of each signal in advance. An 
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early example of the use of smoke and fire by an Arab tribe is recounted by the 13
th
 
century historian Ibn Al-Atheer (1160-1241) in his narration of the Khazar War (AD 450), 
in which the leader of the Ma‘ad tribe, Salamah bin Khalid, dispatched an agent to 
reconnoitre the movements and preparations of a rival tribe, the Madhaj, which was 
advancing towards them. The agent was instructed to light fires in two different spots when 
the enemy arrived at a place called Madhaj. Thus Salamah bin Khalid succeeded in 
frustrating the enemy plan, which had depended on the element of surprise. When the 
Madhaj men arrived at the place where the Ma‘ads were camped, they were themselves 
surprised to find their enemy quite prepared and battle-ready. The result of the Madhaj 
attack was a rapid and humiliating retreat.
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 Similarly, during the Bardan War (AD 600), 
the chieftains Dhalee‘bin Abd Ghananam and Sadous Sheiban dispatched secret agents to 
spy on the army of their rival, Ziad bin Al-Haboulah.
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 Despite the fact that most of the intelligence operations carried out during these early 
times were not recorded or fully documented, historians, as well as some chroniclers and 
poets, do make a few allusions to such clandestine activities. Where these observations 
occur, they are normally brief, general and often ambiguous. Such wording as: ―it came to 
the knowledge of so and so that …‖, ―a spy told so and so that …‖, ―he (a ruler, a tribal or 
military leader, etc.) dispatched a secret agent to …‖ or ―they employed spies in order to 
learn about…‖, is quite common. While such statements record the fact, they nevertheless 
omit vital details related to documentation and substantiation.     
 Because of the dearth of unambiguous, clear-cut accounts of espionage activities, it is 
quite difficult to write with any certainty or precision about the covers, recruitment 
strategies or actual methods employed by the early Arabs when engaging in these 
undercover operations. But espionage and clandestine collection were not the only methods 
to which the early Arabs resorted when attempting to unlock the mysteries of the future, 
the unknown, or the intentions and plans of their adversaries. During pre-Islamic times, the 
Bedouin communities, whatever their religions and beliefs, practised astrology, augury, 
divination and sorcery. Many of the early wars would not have been waged without the 
blessing of the oracles and soothsayers.    
 Early Arab literature and historical accounts show that the early Arabs had great 
respect for those tribal leaders who were strong, able-bodied and knowledgeable, and who 
spared their followers the risks and miseries of wars. Such a status, however, would not be 
attainable without resort to the use of informers and secret agents and the maintenance of a 
constant state of preparedness for the unexpected. Victory is rarely achieved through 
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reliance on power alone, or the prophesies of the soothsayers. Tribal wars, whether waged 
for pillage, revenge or expansion and hegemony, cannot be won without the element of 
surprise and accurate intelligence regarding the targets to be attacked. It is therefore no 
wonder that throughout Arabia, each tribe had its own ―intelligence network‖. A large tribe 
might have a number of uyoun, unknowingly carrying out the same intelligence mission at 
the same time.  
 The early war records of the Bedouins of central Arabia contain numerous references 
to the use of “ain”,99 “rabee‟ah”100 or ―talee‟ah”.101 This indicates the existence of some 
sort of tactical intelligence, albeit in an undeveloped and primitive form, which can be seen 
as a two-pronged concept. The first is based on reconnaissance and surveillance. The task 
of the talee‟ah, which may be translated into English as ‗advance scout‘ or ‗secret herald‘, 
involved infiltrating enemy ranks in order to collect as much tactical information as 
possible about the targets, their exact location, state of preparedness, terrain, provisions 
and water resources, the numbers of camels, horses and other livestock, and their strengths 
or weakness. The talee‘ah enjoyed some sort of recognition as an elite group, in that they 
carried out their duties independently and reported directly to the commander of the army. 
Their most desired qualities were speed and sharp eyes; they did not have to be master 
horsemen or swordsmen. The duties of the rabee‘ah, on the other hand, involved observing 
enemy movements and reporting any developments to the army commanders. Such 
observation was normally carried out from a vantage point such as a hill in a neutral zone 
or no man‘s land. The rabee‟ah would then send reports to his commanders through the 
use of one of the methods discussed above, such as drums, fire or smoke signals.
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 An interesting category of rabee‟ah was the naked scout.103 This somewhat odd title 
derives from what such scouts normally did in an emergency when they discovered an 
imminent danger but had no time to communicate a warning to their fellow tribesmen. 
They would remove their clothes, then, mounted on their horses, would wave them as 
improvised warning flags.    
 Detailed information which could be obtained only through planning and careful 
preparation, such as the quality of weapons and military equipment, the number of swords 
and shields and their origins, the resolve of the tribesmen and degree of their loyalty to 
their leader, were the domain of the uyoun
104
, the secret agents, whose duties thus differed 
from those of the rabee‘ah in being more closely related to maintaining the security of the 
tribe.
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 In the closely knit tribal societies of ancient Arabia, suspicion always surrounded 
strangers, newcomers and unexpected arrivals. Obtaining detailed knowledge of who 
arrived in and who departed from the territory of the tribe was therefore a standard 
counterintelligence measure. For this reason, a blood relationship with one or more people 
among the target tribe was among the best deep covers for any penetration agent, as 
relatives were allowed a wide range of freedoms. Travellers, guests, pilgrims, traders and 
wayfarers were rarely free to engage in clandestine collection. To ensure that they were 
fully aware of the arrival of newcomers to their communities, especially under cover of 
darkness, the ancient Arabs entrusted the task of monitoring arrivals and departures to 
special night sentinels or watchmen, called ‗suh-har‟. This Arabic word is derived from the 
verb „sahara‟, which means ‗stay wakeful‘ or ‗watchful‘, especially during the night. The 
vigilant suh-har frequently lurked in the dark, usually at the approaches to a market town, 
a crossroads, or any location where it was believed that a stranger or suspect would be 
arriving.
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  It was customary for the feuding tribes of Arabia to employ uyoun in order 
to spy on competitors or rivals. Before executing a raid or a reprisal attack, a tribe would, 
as a matter of course, deploy a number of lookouts in order to reconnoitre the situation. 
However, spying was not limited to gathering military intelligence in times of war; agents 
would also provide valuable security and economic information in peacetime.  
 On the domestic front, the uyoun or „ruwwad‟ (pioneers)107 were responsible for 
inspecting property, looking for and locating pasture and water, especially during droughts. 
Intelligence relating to the availability or otherwise of water and pastureland suitable for 
the grazing of livestock has always been of vital importance throughout this arid land. 
Many wars, across history, have been waged by the tribes of Arabia for no other reason 
than to control or monopolise wells and water resources. Scouting for water and 
pastureland was not only customary but necessary before a Bedouin group could fold camp 
and move on.  
 Early spies were also entrusted with the vital task of protecting the commercial 
caravans across the vast deserts of Arabia.
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 Intra-tribal routes, overland arteries between 
the Bedouin areas and urban centres, as well as the communication lines between the 
northern parts and the southern frontiers of the Arab Peninsula, were under the close watch 
of the those early intelligence pioneers.
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 The use of uyoun was sometimes dictated by the 
need to honour the Quraishis‘ treaty obligations with the many tribes whose commercial 
caravans bound for Mecca or the north normally passed by Yethrib, a market town later 
renamed Medina. To ensure that caravans and travellers might pass peacefully and without 
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incident in the vicinity of Medina or indeed across the entire region controlled by them, the 
Quraishis made extensive use of scouts, spies and watchmen. Chief among their targets 
were those who violated agreements, conspired against their implementation, or sought to 
incite other tribes to transgress and breach the accords.    
 The early spies of Arabia underwent vigorous training in a range of arts and skills. 
Above all else, they were trained to be patient, resilient, to bear unexpected physical or 
psychological hardships and to blend in with the target community. Camouflage became an 
essential part of espionage. Significantly, the chronicler and commentator Muhammed Ibn 
Al-Tabari speaks of some undercover agents who carried dedication to their profession to 
great lengths, when they underwent voluntary surgery in order to mask their identities, 
deceive the enemy and be in a better position to carry out their duties. Tabari explains how 
primitive surgical or non-invasive procedures were sometimes performed to alter the shape 
of the nose or ears of such agents.
110
  
 Prospective agents were also trained in survival and communications skills. To 
communicate with their base or with each other, the early uyoun used fire at night and 
smoke during the day. They also exchanged coded messages in order to circumvent 
detection or exposure. An important and regular source of information came from 
concubines and slaves,
111
 who were used to gather general information and to provide 
valuable and accurate details about their masters‘ plans, movements, contacts and close 
associates.
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 For verification purposes, the early Arabs normally dispatched two spies on 
any particular mission.
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 Spies were also used to entrap rivals as well as in starting 
disinformation campaigns designed to dispel specific perceptions and rumours and to 
frustrate enemy efforts. Poison was occasionally used to eliminate enemies or those 
deemed to pose a grave danger to the community.
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 Devious methods of dealing with enemies and collecting information about them have 
been used since records began in the Arab world and have since become more diversified 
and sophisticated. While primary sources on early intelligence activities in the Peninsula 
are rare, incomplete and scattered, there is enough evidence to suggest that ancient 
Arabians were able, as early as the second century, to invent and exercise some form of 
intelligence. Put into its proper historical perspective, this early intelligence work was not 
totally crude or undeveloped, although judged by our modern standards it may appear quite 
primitive. The fact that the early Qahtani Arabs of southern Arabia had devoted a whole 
regiment to the skirmishing, scouting, and reconnoitring, attests to their awareness of the 
vital importance of these activities. Nor were the Arabs of central and Northern Arabia far 
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behind; they too developed intelligence tactics in accordance with their own needs and the 
requirements of their short bouts of assaults and raids against rival tribes, water resources 
or passing caravans. These raids, which would sometimes last only an hour, were suited 
not only to the small numbers in the raiding parties but also to the topography of the 
theatre. The use of heralds and scouts was especially common in ancient Arabia, ensuring 
that the routes to or from the battlefields were secure. The installation of observation posts 
where rabee‟ah kept close watch on the movements and military preparations of enemies 
was quite useful in uncovering their intentions and thwarting their designs. Early Arabic 
poetry contains numerous references to the employment of rabee‟ah in times of peace and 
war. Extant Arabic documents indicate that the early Arabs resorted to other intelligence 
tactics, such as the use of deep cover, dissimulation, disguise and deception, as well as 
employment of more violent means in eliminating their adversaries.     
 These activities constitute part of the cultural heritage of the Arabian Peninsula 
inherited by the Muslims, who in turn developed them to serve their own needs and 
requirements in accordance with their own topography and circumstances. We shall see in 
the next chapters how the Muslim Arabs developed and refined these intelligence tactics 
and how they laid the foundations for the discipline of intelligence, which has for centuries 
remained a source of inspiration for many movements and groups.     
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Chapter Three 
The Quran and Intelligence 
3.1 Elements of intelligence in the Quran 
The Quran contains the holy scriptures of Islam and is considered by Muslims, Arab and 
non-Arab alike, to be the most authoritative and revered document in their history. It is 
said that no two Muslim believers differ as to the exact text of the 7
th
 century document, 
which was handed down at first orally then, only a generation after Prophet Muhammed‘s 
death, written down. There are no variant editions at all, so today‘s version of the Quran is 
identical to that collected during the reign of the 3
rd
 Caliph, Uthman bin Affan in the year 
646.
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 To ensure that only the verified version of the Quran, which had been meticulously 
checked and rechecked, would remain in the hands of the faithful, Uthman ordered all 
other versions of the manuscript to be burnt. The Quran is divided into 114 chapters 
(Surahs) and is believed by Muslims to represent the word of Allah to mankind as revealed 
through an angel (Gabriel) to his messenger, Muhammed, the last of the prophets. These 
114 chapters which were revealed to Prophet Muhammed at various stages, from the time 
he was chosen by Allah to spread Islam until his death, are classed either as Meccan or 
Medinan, depending on where they were revealed, Although its primary objective is to 
stress and popularize strict monotheism and the worship of Allah alone, the Quran also 
contains a multitude of specific rulings as to the duties incumbent upon Muslims as 
individuals, on one hand, and upon the state and Muslim society at large, on the other. 
 Far from being just a directory or guidebook of moral and ethical laws, the Quran pays 
great attention to how individuals should lead their lives on earth. To that end, ample 
attention is given to the lessons of history, where the lives of the prophets and past events 
are narrated with a range of criticisms and advice, illustrating their moral value and 
relevance to human society. To transform individuals‘ lives, much instruction is provided 
on various aspects of legal and social issues, economic activities, family law, propriety and 
good conduct. The Quran also contains numerous commendations and strictures pertaining 
to such matters as caring for the poor, administering justice, treatment of prisoners of war, 
health and hygiene issues, and broad guidelines on how best to deal with problems as they 
arise, as well as the acquisition and use of secret information.  
 In the field of intelligence, as in all other fields of human endeavour, the Quran is held 
to constitute the most important source of Islamic law. It has provided an ideological frame 
of reference for Islamic paramilitary groups, which continue to base the claimed legitimacy 
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of their activities on the tenets contained in the Quranic text. The adoption of a Quranic 
frame of reference is not only intended to win the support and sympathy of the Muslims at 
large but is according to Islam an act of obedience to Allah‘s teachings and commands. On 
a close examination of the Quran one can identify references to and a discussion of all 
major elements of intelligence articulated by Roy Godson, Angelo Codvilla, and John 
Lockhart. In point of fact there are numerous Quranic verses which elucidate the 
fundamentals of intelligence to which little attention has been given by scholars or 
researchers.  
 First, the Quran contains a number of verses referring to and exemplifying the 
clandestine collection of information. These are either direct references or indirectly 
embedded in the narration of contemporaneous events or historical accounts taken from the 
distant past.  While it relates numerous stories about prophets and other biblical figures, the 
character of Moses, in particular, reappears in a number of Surahs, such as Al-Qassas 
(Stories), which relates that the Pharaoh, having decided to kill the young male children of 
the Israelites,  
 verily elated himself in the land and broke up its people into sections, 
depressing a small group among them: their sons he slew, but he kept alive their 
females: for he was indeed a maker of mischief. And We wished to be Gracious 
to those who were being depressed in the land; to make them leaders (in Faith) 
and make them heirs; to establish a firm place for them in the land, and to show 
Pharaoh, Haman, and their hosts, at their hands, the very things against which 
they were taking precautions. So we sent this inspiration to the mother of 
Moses: ‗Suckle (thy child), but when thou hast fears about him, cast him into 
the river, but fear not nor grieve: for We shall restore him to thee, and We shall 
make him one of Our messengers.‘ Then the people of Pharaoh picked him up 
(from the river): (It was intended) that (Moses) should be to them an adversary 
and a cause of sorrow: for Pharaoh and Haman and (all) their hosts were men of 
sin. The wife of Pharaoh said: ‗(Here is) joy of the eye, for me and for thee: slay 
him not. It may be that he will be of use to us, or we may adopt him as a son.‘ 
And they perceived not (what they were doing)! But there came to be a void in 
the heart of the mother of Moses: She was going almost to disclose his (case), 
had We not strengthened her heart (with faith), so that she might remain a (firm) 
believer. And she said to the sister of (Moses), „Follow him‟ so she (the sister) 
watched him in the character of a stranger, while they did not perceive. And we 
ordained that he refused suck at first, until (His sister came up and) said: „Shall 
I point out to you the people of a house that will nourish and bring him up for 
you and be sincerely attached to him.‘ Thus did We restore him to his mother, 
that her eye might be comforted, that she might not grieve, and that she might 
know that the promise of Allah is true: but most of them do not understand.
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 It is significant that Moses‘ mother, according to the Quranic narrative, asks her 
daughter to follow and report on her baby brother, who had been cast adrift in a basket and 
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left to face his fate alone in the Nile. The choice was especially discerning and informed. 
Moses‘ sister was first and foremost reliable and trustworthy. On account of her blood 
relationship with Moses, whatever information she managed to collect about him would 
therefore be quite reliable. Furthermore, because of her work connection with the palace, 
she also had access to information that others did not. The commands given to the sister 
were quite clear. She was to stealthily ‗follow‘ and ‗watch‘, taking great care that she 
would not be discovered by Pharaoh‘s men. Moses‘ sister carried out the mission very 
well. She not only kept her eyes on the target, but quite significantly, she also took the 
initiative to infiltrate the palace community and cleverly convince the queen to send the 
baby to a certain nurse (Moses‘ own mother) to suckle him. This Quranic example 
illustrates how Moses‘ sister clandestinely collected information on her brother, followed 
him until he was safely dispatched to Pharaoh‘s palace and then provided first-hand 
information to her mother about the infant.   
 The Surah of Yousuf (Joseph) contains a significant reference to clandestine collection 
when Joseph‘s father, Yaqub (Jacob) addresses his sons:   
 O my sons!  
Go not in by one gate; go in by different gates. I can naught avail you as against 
Allah ….Go ye and enquire about Joseph and his brother, and never give up 
hope of Allah‘s Soothing Mercy: truly no one despairs of Allah‘s Soothing 
Mercy, except those who have no faith.
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 The fact that Jacob asks his sons to engage in an elaborate clandestine ‗tahasus‘ 
operation, to approach their target separately rather than jointly, and to enter Egypt not 
from the same entrance but through different gateways, attests to his acute sense of 
security, which requires utmost discretion and secrecy. In dispersing across the land in 
search of intelligence on the whereabouts and welfare of their brother, the scouts would 
also be better equipped to carry out their mission, as they would cover a much greater area 
and at the same time would also have many more sources of information, or would perhaps 
find him at one of Egypt's Gates.
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 It is noteworthy that the Quran refers to information collection either explicitly or—as 
in the previous example—in the course of a narrative. An example of another type of 
implicit reference occurs in the Surah of Women where Muslims are enjoined to be alert 
and cautious at all times: ―O you who believe! Take your precaution‖119. Such a state of 
preparedness would not be possible without resort to constant collection of information on 
enemies or any party, internal or external, which might pose a threat to the nation.  The 
Quran occasionally resorts to the use of allegory and imputes human qualities to animals in 
43 
 
the retelling human history. In the Surah of The Ants, for example, where King Solomon 
and a bird, the hoopoe are the protagonists, much use is made of the literary device known 
as personification in which animals and inanimate objects are given human qualities. In 
this Surah Solomon is endowed with the ability to communicate with and have full control 
over all animals, birds and sprites (jinn). The events narrated in this Surah begin when 
Solomon notices that one of the birds, the hoopoe, was absent: 
 And he [Suleiman or Solomon] took a muster of the Birds; and he said: 
‗Why is it I see not the Hoopoe? Or is he among the absentees? I will certainly 
punish him with a severe penalty, or execute him, unless he brings me a clear 
reason (for absence).‘ But the Hoopoe tarried not far: he (came up and) said: ‗I 
have compassed (territory) which thou hast not compassed, and I have come to 
thee from Saba‘ with tidings true.120 
 
 But the crisis is defused when the hoopoe explains that the absence was unavoidable as 
it was ‗compassing‘ Solomon‘s territory, i.e. collecting vital information. The  hoopoe 
starts his address to the King on a dramatic note, stressing that he has come with 
knowledge of something which even the wise Suleiman does not possess. Continuing his 
oral report, the hoopoe then establishes the source of the information as being the speaker 
himself. He then specifies the location of the new developments, the city of ‗Saba‘, in 
southern Arabia (modern Yemen). In referring to the new information he has acquired, the 
hoopoe skilfully uses the word ‗naba‘ rather than ‗khabar‘ as the former means ‗news of 
things to come‘ rather than ‗of things past‘. In assessing its authenticity and degree of 
accuracy, the bird confidently describes his report as being absolutely accurate, being based 
on his own first-hand observations and reconnaissance. 
 The hoopoe then goes on to talk about Queen Belqis of Saba‘: ―I found (there) a 
woman ruling over them and provided with every requisite; and she has a magnificent 
throne.‖121 Referring here to the political system in ‗Saba‘, the hoopoe points out that 
Belqis is at the head of a thriving monarchy and that her hold over the general affairs in her 
country is quite firm. There is, however, one specific observation of which the mountain 
cock strongly disproves: Belqis‘s subjects were not believers in Allah  but pagans deluded 
by Satan into worship the Sun: 
 I found her and her people prostrating before the sun, instead of Allah. 
The devil has adorned their works in their eyes, and has repulsed them from 
the path; consequently, they are not guided. They should have been 
prostrating before Allah, the One who manifests all the mysteries in the 
heavens and the earth, and the One who knows everything you conceal and 
everything you declare.
122
 
  
44 
 
 A closer examination of the Quranic version of the story of King Suleiman will show 
that more than any other Surah, it gives lessons in intelligence reporting. It contains the 
major fundamental elements of an intelligence report. There is first of all the source of the 
report, which was given as the hoopoe. The report, which deals with a specific matter, the 
developments in Saba‘, is addressed to King Solomon. The degree of credibility of the 
report is the highest, as it was entirely based on personal observations rather than rumours, 
hearsay, gossip or any form of anecdotal evidence. The main point contained in the report 
was the discovery by the source of the existence of an influential woman (Queen Belqis), 
who was in common with her subjects a sun worshipper. This discovery was quite 
disturbing to Solomon, as paying homage to any being in the universe directly contradicted 
his mission as a prophet, sent to preach the worship of Allah alone. The hoopoe‘s report 
also contained information on the military, security and economic situation in Queen 
Belqis‘s kingdom.  
    [Solomon] said: we shall see whether you speak the truth or you are (one) of 
the liars. Go ye with this letter of mine and deliver it to them then draw back 
from them and see what answer they return… Then she [Belqis] said: Oh 
Chiefs! Verily here is delivered to me a noble letter. Verily, it is from 
[Solomon] and it reads: In the Name of Allah the Most Gracious, the Most 
Merciful. Be you not exalted against me, but come to me as Muslims.123 
   
 According to the Quran, information collection is not the only element upon which 
decisions are made: verification is essential. The Quranic story of King Suleiman affords a 
case in point. When the hoopoe finishes its report, Suleiman declares: ―We will see 
whether you have told the truth or whether you are of the liars‖124. The King then indicates 
that he is going to verify the information provided by the hoopoe against that from other 
sources. 
 Moreover, we also learn from the story details of the various stages through which the 
information provided by the hoopoe had passed, i.e. the intelligence cycle. It starts with the 
collection of raw information and ends with the dissemination of the finished product to 
the decision maker.  In the story of the hoopoe, the intelligence cycle begins with King 
Solomon debriefing the bird by listening to its answer regarding the cause of his sudden 
disappearance. The second stage, that of verification, i.e. when the King commands 
corroboration of the initial reports, is followed by the analysis and decision-making stage 
at which the king has to weigh two alternatives: either wage an all-out war against Queen 
Belqis in order to subjugate her kingdom or resort to negotiations and peaceful means. 
Solomon decides to adopt the second alternative and sends the Queen of Sheba a message 
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requesting her to believe in Allah and to recognize Solomon as a prophet sent by Allah to 
mankind. After long deliberations with her wise men, Belqis finally decides to declare her 
faith in Allah‘s messenger; thus, Solomon‘s aim is accomplished.  
 As pointed out earlier, the verses of the Quran were not revealed to Prophet 
Muhammed at one and the same time but in instalments and in response to the historical 
events and the circumstances through which the call to Islam was passing. Some of these 
events which the Quran singled out for specific attention required utmost attention to the 
verification of reports before any decision is made.  
 The question of validation is of course critical to any intelligence system. In the Surah 
of Al-Hujurat (the Chambers), the faithful are enjoined to ascertain the truth of what they 
hear, lest they regret the consequences of unjustified haste and heedlessness ―O you who 
believe! If an evil-doer comes to you with a report, look carefully into it, lest you harm a 
people in ignorance, then be sorry for what you have done.‖125 
 Most major commentaries on the Quran point out that this verse refers to a specific 
historical incident involving one of Prophet Muhammed‘s followers, Al-Walid bin ‗Uqba 
bin Abu Mua‘it, whom the Prophet had sent as an envoy to the clan of Al-Mustaliq‘ in 
order to ascertain their loyalty and faith in Islam. Abu Mua‘it was especially apprehensive 
as to how he would be received, because there existed an old enmity between him and the 
clan. When he approached their territory and saw his former enemies coming out to greet 
him in dozens, he panicked and returned to Prophet Muhammed, claiming that the Al-
Mustaliq‘ clan had refused to give voluntary alms and that they were intent on killing the 
prophet of Islam. Just as the Muslims were preparing to punish them, the Al-Mustaliq' 
came to Prophet Muhammed to explain what had happened. Prophet Muhammed later sent 
Khalid bin Walid to their homeland in order to provide a first-hand report on the actual 
situation there. Upon his return, Khalid reported having observed nothing but obedience 
and goodness in these people.
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 The Quran also attaches great importance to the analysis and dissemination of 
information. This is evident in a verse in which Muslims are directly instructed to report 
any security information to those in charge of the security of the state, who, the Quran 
asserts, are better equipped to understand and deal with its implications:  
 When there comes to them some matter touching security or fear, they divulge 
it. If they had only referred it to the Prophet or to those charged with authority 
among them, the proper analysts would have been able to extract (yastanbitoun) 
it from them.  Were it not for the Grace and Mercy of Allah unto you, all but a 
few of you would have fallen into the clutches of Satan.
127
 
46 
 
 
In the Quranic text, then Arabic verb (yastanbit) is used. This verb is most commonly 
translated as ‗to extract‘ or ‗draw an inference‘ and is normally used to refer to any 
process which seeks that which is hidden or not readily visible. More specifically, the 
verb is used to describe the action involved in digging up and extracting water from the 
earth. This is an especially apt metaphor for the work carried out by intelligence agents, 
investigators and analysts, all of whom strive to extract and infer results from whatever 
sources available.  
 According to the verse, Muslims were furthermore encouraged to quietly pass on these 
reports, whether true or otherwise, to the Prophet himself or to those who were in a position 
to investigate them. The ‗proper authorities‘ could then sift, verify and analyse the 
information and recommend an appropriate course of action. 
 The Quran makes numerous references to counter-intelligence activities. There are 
several references to ‗hypocrites‘ in the Quran, using the term ‗munafiq‘, which may also 
be translated as ‗dissembler‘, ‗dissimulator‘, ‗deluder‘, ‗deceiver‘ or ‗sly dealer‘. There is 
indeed a whole chapter entitled Al-Munafiqoon, devoted to the discussion of the serious 
threats posed to Islam by these ‗Muslims in name‘, who also figure in numerous of the 
Traditions of Prophet Muhammed. The term ‗Munafiq‘ is still in use in our own time. 
Iranian and Taliban officials use it to refer to spies.
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 The Quran also expressly forbids the 
faithful from allying themselves with enemies of the faith or rendering them any form of 
service whatsoever ―O you who believe! You shall not ally yourselves with the 
disbelievers, instead of the believers. Do you wish to provide Allah with a clear proof 
against you? The Munafiqoon (hypocrites) will be committed to the lowest pit of Hell, and 
you will find no one to help them.‖129  
 It was the Munafiqoon who constituted the ‗fifth column‘ of the polytheists, allowing 
them to infiltrate the Muslim community in order to sow the seeds of dissention and 
division. The Munafiqoon were therefore willing agents of the anti-Muhammed camp who, 
because of their apparent acceptance of Islam, were in an advantageous position to acquire 
knowledge unavailable to non-Muslims, let alone the enemies of Islam.
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 Islam therefore 
treated the Munafiqoon as traitors who would not be tolerated ―O Prophet! Strive against 
the disbelievers and the hypocrites! Be harsh with them. Their ultimate abode is hell, a 
hapless journey‘s end‖.131 
 The Quran also, stresses the need to take all precautionary measures in order to prevent 
and uncover agent recruitment: 
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 O ye who believe! Choose not My enemy and your enemy for allies. Do ye 
give them friendship when they disbelieve in that truth which hath come unto 
you, driving out the messenger and you because ye believe in Allah, your Lord? 
If ye have come forth to strive in My way and seeking My good pleasure, (show 
them not friendship). Do ye show friendship unto them in secret, when I am 
Best Aware of what ye hide and what ye proclaim? And whosoever doeth it 
among you, he verily hath strayed from the right way.
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 The verses quoted above are almost unanimously said by Quranic commentators to 
refer to a specific incident in which Prophet Muhammed was betrayed by one of his own 
close followers. One of the few of Prophet Muhammed‘s associates who were privy to the 
actual plan was Hatib bin Abi Balta‘ah who, no sooner had he learned of the plan to 
conquer Mecca than he asked a female messenger to carry a secret letter to the Meccans, 
warning them of the impending attack and dispelling the Khaibar assault rumour. When 
Prophet Muhammed discovered Balta‘ah‘s treachery, he immediately sent a number of 
horsemen, led by his cousin Ali, who managed to capture the carrier and retrieve the 
concealed message. 
 According to the chronicler Al-Wahidi, Prophet Muhammed personally pursued this 
serious breach of security and confronted Balta‘ah, asking him whether he recognized the 
letter. When Balta‘ah answered in the affirmative, Prophet Muhammed then asked: ―What 
drove you to do it?‖ Balta‘ah responded by swearing that he had  
 Not disbelieved since I became Muslim, nor did I betray you since I took 
your side, nor did I love them [the idolaters] since I departed from them. 
However, there is not a single person among the Emigrants except that he has 
someone to defend his closest relatives [in Mecca]. And since I am stranger 
among them, and my family lives amongst them, I feared for them, and so I 
wanted to have some assistance from them, even though I knew that Allah will 
send his harm upon them and that my letter will be of no avail to them.
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 Despite the insistence of Umar bin Khattab, Prophet Muhammed‘s lieutenant for 
intelligence to kill Balta‘ah because of his betrayal, Prophet Muhammed was quite 
magnanimous. He forgave Balta‘ah and accepted his explanation. Balta‘ah it might be 
pointed out had defended the Muslim cause in the first battle between the Muslims and the 
Quraishis at Badr. He was among those Muslim warriors who fought well in that historic 
confrontation. As a reward for their bravery and sacrifice the Quran affirms that Allah has 
graced all of them with full forgiveness.    
 The Surah of Anfal (Spoils) refers to a significant incident in the early history of Islam, 
during which Prophet Muhammed and his followers were labouring to build an Islamic 
state. Their efforts included the dispatch of envoys to the tribes around Mecca and Medina, 
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asking them to recognize and submit to the authority of Prophet Muhammed. One such 
envoy was Abu Lubabah bin Abdul Munthir, whom Prophet Muhammed sent to the Jewish 
community of Banu Quraidha, known to have been very hostile to Prophet Muhammed.
134
 
Before conversion, Abu Lubabah had close links with the Jewish community and was loyal 
to them, ―for his property, wife and children were with them‖.135 During the negotiation of 
an agreement, the elders of Banu Quraidha were unsure what course of action to take. At 
one point, they indicated they might accept whatever counsel they received from Saad bin 
Ma‘ath, one of Prophet Muhammed‘s close companions, who had been close to Banu 
Quraidha before his conversion. At this juncture Abu Lubabah made a gesture to his throat, 
indicating that they should not do it, for they would be slaughtered. Al-Wahidi recounts 
that Abu Lubabah was immediately stricken by a sense of guilt; he quotes the Muslim 
negotiator as saying: ―I straightaway realized that I had betrayed Allah and His 
Messenger‖. According to Al-Wahidi, the Quranic verse ―O ye that believe! Betray not the 
trust of Allah and the Messenger, nor misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you‖ 
refers to him.
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 The Quran also enjoins the faithful, on several occasions, to beware of the presence of 
enemy agents amongst them. The Surah of Al-Tawbah (Repentance) draws attention to the 
evils which enemy agents could inflict on the faithful, since their aim is to subvert Islam 
and sow the seeds of division, hatred and discord among the believers. Although 
discerning Muslims would not be deceived by them, some innocent souls might listen to 
and even obey them. Such heedless and unmindful Muslims would, according to the 
Quran, go so far as to give preference to their speech and words and ask them for advice, 
unaware of the true reality of these hypocrites ―Had they gone forth among you they had 
added to you naught save trouble and had hurried to and fro among you, seeking to cause 
sedition among you; and among you there are some who would have listened to them. 
Allah is Aware of evil-doers.‖137  
 It is noticeable that in countering enemy intelligence, the Quran expresses an 
unambiguously severe attitude towards rumour-mongers and spreaders of falsehoods and 
alarmist reports. Especially singled out are agents planted by the enemy in order to wage 
psychological warfare intended to sap the morale of the Muslims. Those whom the Quran 
calls ‗dissemblers‘ and ‗hypocrites‘ were feared because of their continued attempts to 
inflict damage on Muslims in many ways, their ultimate aim being seen to be to discourage 
and dispirit them at a very critical period in the history of Islam, when their state was still a 
fledgling entity in need of nurturing. The Surah of Al-Ahzab (Parties) states ―A group of 
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them said, ‗O people of Yathrib, you cannot attain victory; go back.‘ Others made excuses 
to the prophet: ‗Our homes are vulnerable,‘ when they were not vulnerable. They just 
wanted to flee.‖138 
 It is stated that these agents, who are variously described as ‗hinderers‘, or those 
‗whose hearts are diseased‘, will be called to account on the Day of Judgment ―Allah will 
surely recompense the truthful for their truthfulness, and will punish the hypocrites, if He 
so wills, or redeem them. Allah is Forgiver, Most Merciful.‖139 It is also said that they will 
be punished during their lifetime if they do not desist from spreading malicious rumours 
and alarmist reports: ―If the hypocrites, and those in whose hearts is a disease, and the 
alarmists in the city do not cease‖, warns the Quran, ―we verily shall urge thee on against 
them, then will they not be able to stay in it as thy neighbours for any length of time:.‖140 
 Spreading rumours or engaging in irresponsible talk about military secrets, especially 
in times of war, are dangers against which the Quran constantly warns. Just as in Second 
World War posters, the British were told to ―keep mum‖ and that ―careless talk costs 
lives‖, the Muslims were always reminded to ―lend a hand on the land‖141, by cooperating 
with those entrusted with the security of the state. 
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 Most authoritative commentators, including Muhammed Ibn Jareer Al-Tabari and Al-
Fakhr Al-Razi, point out that the dissemblers, "Munafiqoon", who falsely embraced Islam 
for selfish reasons and who harboured deep resentment and hatred of Prophet Muhammed, 
were quite willing to collaborate with his enemies in order to weaken the fledgling Islamic 
state and undermine the new religion by targeting its head. They often spread rumours to 
influence the faint-hearted, collaborated with the anti-Muhammed camp and acted as 
uyoun (spies) for the forces hostile to Prophet Muhammed.
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 Finally, the oft repeated assertion that intelligence is above all else knowledge and 
power
144
 is well borne out by a Quranic text, which enjoins all believers to be vigilant and  
prepared for all eventualities in order to thwart the schemes of their enemies: 
 Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, 
including steeds of war to strike terror in the hearts of the enemies of Allah and 
your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know but whom Allah doth 
know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah shall be repaid unto you 
and ye shall not be treated unjustly.
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 A number of exegeses of the Quran agree that although the verse does not mention any 
specific form of power which believers are enjoined to muster, the reference here is to any 
contribution that may enhance Muslim power in any field of human endeavour. In this 
context, covert action operations may therefore be rightly considered as part of the power 
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which the Quran enjoins Muslims to acquire. According Al-Fakhr Al-Razi and Muhammad 
Al-Fihri commentators, the reference to the enemies ―whom ye may not know but whom 
Allah doth know‖ is to the ―secret machination of dissemblers and miscreants who are not 
easily recognizable‖, including enemy spies and covert agents.146  
 
3.2 Conclusion 
Besides being the main sources of the Islamic law, the Quran and Prophet Muhammed‘s 
Sunnah constitute major wellsprings to which intelligence workers turn for inspiration and 
guidance. In Islam, the Quran and Sunnah (Prophet Muhammed‘s deeds and hadith) 
contain not only what is held to be the law given by Allah through Prophet Muhammed, 
but also numerous stories and parables. While some references to intelligence work are 
clear and direct, many are somewhat circuitous and indirect. All, however, are considered 
by the faithful to be part of the ultimate truth.   
 The major elements of intelligence are in varying degrees present in the holy book of 
the Muslims. It is hoped that the foregoing pages have provided sufficient examples in 
illustration of this premise. In so far as clandestine collection is concerned, reference has 
been made to the Quranic story of Joseph, where Jacob is quoted as saying: ―O my sons! 
Go ye and enquire about Joseph and his brother...‖.147 Verification of information is no less 
important; ―If an evil-doer comes to you with a report, look carefully into it, lest you harm 
a people in ignorance, then be sorry for what you have done‖148. To analyse reports, 
hearsay or rumours to establish their immediate and future implications, the Quran enjoins 
all Muslims to refer whatever they hear to decision makers and those entrusted with the 
burden of government. In the Surah of Women we read a solemn Quranic warning 
addressed to all believers, commanding them to be cautious and alert at all times
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, while 
in the Surah of the Spoils Allah commands the faithful not to ―betray the trust of Allah and 
the Messenger‖150. Among the forms of betrayal referred to here is spying for the enemies 
of Islam, attempting to undermine the authority of the Muslim state and passing 
information, either knowingly or unknowingly, which might aid the enemies of the 
Muslims. These warnings about serving or befriending non-Muslims or working with them 
attest to the great importance Islam attaches to preventive security, clandestine operations 
and the need to do all that is necessary to safeguard the interests of the state.  
 The Quran therefore sanctions intelligence work and also provides a number of 
illustrative cases where intelligence activities were carried out. It furthermore provides a 
number of instances, as in the story of King Solomon, on how to deal with reports, analysis 
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and decision making. The early period of Islam, especially during the lifetime of Prophet 
Muhammed, abounds with activities in which the Quranic precepts with regard to 
intelligence work were closely adhered to. It is these practices in the field of security and 
intelligence, which many of the present day paramilitary groups attempt to emulate, that 
will be taken up in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four 
The Legacy of Islam: Prophet Muhammed’s Sunnah and Intelligence 
   
4.1 Introduction  
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, intelligence activities were practised in the 
Arabian Peninsula long before the advent of Islam. It was customary for the ancient 
Arabians to resort to intelligence in order to control their frontiers, or when preparing for 
wars or engaging in raids, intra-Arab vendettas, retaliatory campaigns or revenge attacks. 
We have discussed a range of these activities and illustrated the importance of intelligence 
work to the tribes and their leaders. The tactics, methodologies and crafts employed were 
admittedly quite primitive compared to modern intelligence activities, but they suited the 
circumstances and needs of the day. With the passage of time, some of these activities 
were developed and improved, while others gradually disappeared, except for a few 
references scattered here and there in some chronicles, biographies, epigraphs and other 
literary works.  
Because the early Muslims inherited much information related to intelligence activities 
as practiced by their predecessors, Islam sought to lay down rules to regulate these 
activities, which were and remain fraught with many risks. Before Islam, spying was 
practiced in order to achieve certain goals or interests for an influential individual or a 
tribe. A tribal leader might resort to intelligence tactics in order to tighten his grip, 
eliminate a potential rival or, in accordance with the ethics of the time, achieve fame and 
greatness in the land of his own tribe and beyond. In times of crisis and water shortage, an 
envious tribe would spy on other tribes before launching a raid aimed at gaining a 
geographical advantage, such as acquiring pasture or controlling water resources. 
 The Quranic legislation and rulings governing the practice of espionage and 
intelligence, handed down from generation to generation constitutes an ideological frame 
of reference on which Islamist groups can draw freely. Just as the Quran is the most 
important source of intelligence legislation, Prophet Muhammed‘s sayings (Hadith) and 
Sunnah (way of life), constitute the second most important source. Prophet Muhammed's 
intelligence operations are viewed by Muslims as the embodiment of Quranic legislation. 
They also afford a model and practical lessons to new and established Islamist groups on 
how best to implement the Quranic rules governing intelligence work. Away from 
attempting to pass judgments on the objectivity of the accounts of early Islamic religious 
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history, this chapter will discuss the Islamic discourse as recorded and communicated to us 
through a variety of Islamic and Arabic texts and chronicles. 
 Besides laying down the general principles and rules which govern the practice of 
intelligence, the Quran provides numerous examples of intelligence work drawn from 
history and the lives of the prophets, in which it is not difficult to see the intelligence cycle 
at work. The Quran makes it clear that intelligence operations carried out against the 
enemies of Islam and in the interests of the Muslims at large are quite legitimate and 
admissible. This explains why contemporary Islamic groups, which base their ideology on 
Islam and which strive to achieve a specific aim in the interest of Muslims, such as 
liberating occupied lands, expelling colonialists or spreading Islam, view any attempt at 
undermining the enemy as not only legitimate but also a religious duty. On the other hand, 
spying on the private lives of individuals is illegal and inadmissible according to the 
Quran. Islam also accentuates the negative impact of espionage against the Muslim Umma 
(community), describing those planted amid the Muslims who work for the enemies of 
Islam as munafiqoon, who are to be detested and severely punished. 
 The Arabic term „Sunnah‟, in common everyday usage, literally means ‗method‘, 
‗course of action‘, 'clear path' or ‗trodden path‘. In Islamic jurisprudence, however, it is 
restricted to Prophet Muhammed‘s manners, actions, commandments and way of life in 
general. In Islam Prophet Muhammed is viewed as the supreme guide and teacher in theory 
and practice.  Faithful Muslims believe that he led an exemplary life and laid down the 
ideal standards of leading a life that would guarantee Allah's approval and blessing. 
Together, the Quran and the Sunnah constitute the most important sources of legislation in 
Islam.
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     Throughout Islamic history, Prophet Muhammed‘s edicts and sayings 'Hadith' have 
been carefully collated, studied, indexed and discussed by various Islamic schools of 
thought. They have also been thematically and chronologically catalogued. While scholars 
and religious authorities are not unanimous as to the authenticity of some of the sayings 
attributed to Prophet Muhammed, the bulk of these have as far as the available  sources 
would permit been minutely checked, verified and carefully written down by specially 
trained scribes. In sanctity, legal and moral force, these sayings are considered to rank 
second only to the Quran. Some of them, which have permeated Islamic thought and 
attitudes, touch upon Prophet Muhammed‘s own personal life, his general activities, 
battles, negotiations, agreements and all that he did in order to spread Islam beyond Mecca 
and Medina. Some of the Traditions deal with intelligence work, collection, covert action 
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and other measures he himself adopted or ordered; they have become an essential part of 
Islamic life. To the 1.5 billion Muslims around the world,
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 Prophet Muhammed‘s life and 
sayings afford an exemplary model which the faithful attempt to follow and emulate 
wherever possible.  
 Beside his lofty place in Islamic history as the ultimate spiritual leader and most 
revered prophet, the military historian Richard Gabriel has also described Prophet 
Muhammed as  
 a tactician, military theorist, organizational reformer, strategic thinker, 
operational-level combat commander, political-military leader, heroic soldier 
and revolutionary, inventor of the theory of insurgency and history‘s first 
successful practitioner.… He was truly a great general and tactician, fought 
eight major battles, led eighteen raids, and planed another thirty eight military 
operations where others were in command but operating under his orders and 
strategic direction… He proved to be a master of intelligence in war, and his 
intelligence service eventually came to rival that of Rome and Persia, especially 
in the area of political intelligence.
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 The remainder of this chapter will use the modern intelligence perspective to examine 
Prophet Muhammed‘s intelligence activities before and after the establishment of the first 
Muslim state in Medina. These activities will be assessed from a modern intelligence 
perspective in the light of the criteria introduced by Roy Godson: clandestine collection, 
counterintelligence, analysis and dissemination, and covert action. 
 
4.1.1 Clandestine Collection 
First, more than any other discipline or human activity, intelligence depends almost 
entirely on the collection of accurate and reliable information about intended targets of 
interest to leaders and policy makers. What distinguishes the methods of collection is 
secrecy. The value of the information obtained is therefore directly linked to the credibility 
of the information-collector and to the methodology employed in the process. These 
crucial elements constitute the backbone of practically all intelligence reports. In the 
Islamic world, clandestine collection dates back to the inception of the new religion. 
Prophet Muhammed started his call to Islam by patiently and silently collecting 
information on those whom he was hoping to win over to Islam. Chief among the qualities 
which Prophet Muhammed was seeking in prospective converts were honesty, 
trustworthiness and the ability to keep a secret. Besides his wife Khadeejah, Prophet 
Muhammed‘s young cousin Ali bin Abi Talib and his closest friend and confidant, Abu 
Bakr, were the first to respond surreptitiously to Prophet Muhammed‘s call and provide 
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him with much-needed moral and material support. The first Muslim to carry out 
clandestine collection was Abdullah, son of Abu Bakr, whose secret reports in the first 
days of the Hijra to Medina were of paramount significance to the survival of Prophet 
Muhammed and Abu Bakr. This young man was directed by Prophet Muhammed to 
mingle with the Quraishis of Mecca during the day and then report to him at night on what 
he saw and heard in the then hostile land. For three successive nights, this young „ain‘ 
would slip out quietly from Mecca to the cave where Prophet Muhammed was hiding 
following the attempt on his life. There, Abdullah would provide his detailed reports about 
the goings on in Mecca and the intentions of its leaders towards Prophet Muhammed: 
 Abdullah … would go to see [Muhammed and Abu Bakr] after dusk, stay 
the night there, apprise them of the latest situation in Mecca, and then leave in 
the early morning to mix with the Meccans as usual and not to draw the least 
attention to his clandestine activities.
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 Abdullah was assisted in his mission by two people: his sister, Asma bint Abi Bakr, 
and a trusted shepherd, Amir bin Furaihah. Besides updates on the situation in Mecca, 
Furaihah, who tended his master Abu Bakr‘s flock, offered Prophet Muhammed and his 
master an additional vital service. He would ―steal away unobserved, every evening, with a 
few goats to the cave and furnish its inmates with a plentiful supply of milk‖.155 During the 
day, Furaihah would mix with other shepherds in the area, carefully listening and 
memorising details of the stories and rumours they related to each other. These details 
would reach Prophet Muhammed and Abu Bakr by nightfall. Abdullah‘s sister Asma may 
be said to be the first female spy in Islamic history, as she too carried out clandestine 
collection and reported to Prophet Muhammed, when her brother was for one reason or 
another unable to deliver his reports.  
 The practice of clandestine collection continued after Prophet Muhammed emigrated to 
Medina, where he started to preach Islam openly. Reports from inside Mecca continued to 
reach him even after he had imposed an economic embargo on this important religious and 
commercial centre. To tighten the grip around the Meccan polytheists, Prophet Muhammed 
had to rely on the reports of lookouts and agents who were well dispersed in and around 
Mecca and Medina. The raiding operations which were planned and executed on the 
strength of their reports brought all Meccan foreign trade to a standstill. Describing the 
tight blockade on Mecca, Thumamah bin Athal al-Hanafi tells his fellow Meccans: ―By 
Allah, not a single grain of wheat reaches you, unless the Messenger of Allah, peace be 
upon him, permits it‖.156 
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 The great importance Prophet Muhammed attached to Humint is amply attested by the 
directives he normally issued to his lieutenants and field commanders before they set out 
on their military missions. On one such occasion, he enjoined Zaid bin Haritha, whom he 
ordered to lead a battalion against the Byzantines, ―to go forth in the name of Allah 
almighty to avenge the death of your father… Make sure to march speedily towards [the 
Byzantines] and remember to take the guides with you, and let the uyoun and the scouts go 
before you‖.157 
 The success of Prophet Muhammed‘s military and intelligence operations shows that 
the intelligence sources on which he based his strategies were quite credible. These sources 
were of various origins, backgrounds and ethnicity. They included people from all walks of 
life: men and women, young and old, rich and poor, close relatives and freed slaves, 
Muslims, Jews and polytheists, Arabs and non-Arabs. Despite the many differences which 
existed among these precursors of modern intelligence, what united them all was 
dedication to the cause, adherence to secrecy and respect for the unity of command.
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 The Mecca station, for example, headed by Prophet Muhammed‘s own uncle, Abu Al-
Fadhl Al-Abbas, was undoubtedly the most important source of intelligence during the 
period prior to its conquest by the Muslims. But there were many other intelligence-
gathering stations, which were dispersed over most parts of Arabia. There was indeed 
hardly a tribe or a clan that did not have a secret agent reporting on its general affairs, its 
alliances and intentions. But Prophet Muhammed had other sources of information: recent 
converts to Islam, travelling Copts and Syrians, as well as local merchants and traders. 
These often acted as valuable sources of information, either voluntarily or for some form 
of material reward, such as cash or weapons. The early Muslims also resorted to envoys 
and couriers for information on the lands and people to whom they were dispatched. The 
immunity conferred upon these men afforded them an opportunity to move from one place 
to another with relative ease and to mingle more freely with their targets.
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 Prophet Muhammed‘s secret agents were also important in the economic war that the 
Muslims launched against hostile Mecca. During the period in which Prophet Muhammed 
was planning to impose a total economic blockade on his religious adversaries, he did all 
he could to hinder and intercept caravan routes linking Mecca to the outside world, 
especially the desert overland routes from Mecca and Syria in the north to Yemen in the 
South. When he once learnt of the approach of a Mecca-bound caravan belonging to Abu 
Sufyan, one of the wealthiest and most influential Quraishi chieftains and a bitter enemy of 
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Prophet Muhammed, he immediately ordered three men to go to Mecca in order to seek 
details of its exact destination.
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 In another episode, when news reached Prophet Muhammed that one of Abu Sufyan‘s 
caravans, said to consist of a thousand camels, was returning from Syria to Mecca, he 
dispatched two of his agents. They journeyed until they arrived at a place called Juhaina, 
not far from the sea, where they discretely gleaned from the locals valuable information 
about the merchandise, route and destination of this huge caravan. This was relayed to 
Prophet Muhammed, who took it into account in planning the Battle of Badr. 
Muhammed‘s Meccan enemies, however, did not lag behind the Muslims in terms of 
intelligence. When security-minded Abu Sufyan enquired if anybody had spotted strangers 
or heard of any spies working for Prophet Muhammed, he soon learnt about the two men 
who had been sent to spy on him. When Abu Sufyan was shown the spot where the two 
men had tied their camels, he ordered his men to bring him a sample of their dung, in 
which he discovered some palm date stones. ―This‖, he declared, ―is the fodder of 
[Medina]. The two men must be Prophet Muhammed‘s spies‖. He then ordered the caravan 
to change course and make haste.
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 Before the conquest of Mecca, Prophet Muhammed wanted to perform a minor 
pilgrimage or Umrah to Mecca.
162
 He set out on the journey accompanied by over 700 
followers. When they arrived at a place called Thi Al-Haleefah, he dispatched a spy to 
head for Mecca and mingle with the Quraishis in order to collect information on their 
intentions and plans and to concentrate specifically on the Meccan reaction to the Umrah. 
The spy did so and then reported back to Prophet Muhammed at a place called Al-Ashtat: 
 O Prophet of Allah! Your people [the Meccans]… have heard about your 
march and terror seized them. They are quite apprehensive and fear that you 
might storm their city and bring them to their knees. They have therefore sought 
succour from the allies and their friends, who have fortified themselves by 
putting on the skin of tigers. Their aim is to prevent you from visiting the holy 
shrine [the Kaaba]…They have also amassed two hundred horsemen, whom 
they placed under the command of Khalid bin Al-Waleed. Their horses have 
now reached Al-Ghameem. The Meccans have also positioned their spies on the 
mountains, where they have erected observation posts.
163
 
 
 Military intelligence was Prophet Muhammed‘s priority during the early stage of Islam. 
On the eve of the Battle of Hunain in February 630, Prophet Muhammed ordered one of 
his agents to spy on the enemy, to sound out the people and bring back word as to what 
their military commander, Malik bin Awf, was saying about the impending encounter. The 
agent was able to overhear Malik saying to the chiefs of the Hawazin tribe: 
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 Muhammed has never been to a real fight before. All those whom he met in 
the battlefield before were inexperienced young boys, who knew nothing about 
war. It was only natural that he would vanquish them. However, at dawn, you 
have to advance. Consolidate your ranks and keep behind you the arrays of your 
cattle, women and children. You must attack and fight as one man. Unsheathe 
your sharp weapons, which are equal to twenty thousand swords. Remember, 
victory is won by those who attack first.
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 Malik bin Awf was only one of a large number of chieftains and tribal leaders whom 
Prophet Muhammed targeted. The assassination of Aseer bin Zarim was another example 
of the Prophet‘s determination to eliminate those who stood in his way or attempted to 
defame him. To that end, he gave orders to one of his agents to infiltrate the Jewish tribe of 
Ghatfan in order to monitor the activities of Aseer, their chieftain, who was widely 
reported to have spearheaded a smear campaign against Prophet Muhammed in which the 
prophet was portrayed as having no other mission but to exterminate the Jews. ―But,‖ said 
Aseer, ―I know how to deal with him, and I can do what no other fellow Jew has attempted 
before‖. ―What,‖ asked his people, ―can you do that others could not?‖ He told them that 
he would incite the whole tribe of Ghatfan and enjoin them to march against Prophet 
Muhammed to fight him in his own territory. ―It is well proven that the assailants at least 
gain part of their demands, while those who are attacked are bound to sustain losses‖.165  
 Not content with just one report, Prophet Muhammed dispatched another agent to spy 
on the Jewish leader. The second agent verified the information received earlier when he 
confirmed that as he was leaving the territory of the Jews he did indeed see Aseer, ―at the 
head of the Jewish brigades which were advancing towards you [Muhammed]‖.166  
4.1.2 Counterintelligence 
In taking up the question of the role played by security and counterintelligence in 
safeguarding the interests of the first Muslim state, it has to be borne in mind that Prophet 
Muhammed‘s call to the new faith was shrouded in secrecy. During the first three years, 
known in Islamic history as the Secret Stage, all his movements, contacts and meetings 
with his followers were carried out clandestinely. This difficult period was followed by 
what Arab historians call the Open Stage, when the Muslims embarked upon a vigorous, 
open campaign aimed at spreading the word of Allah to their fellow Arabs. Concentrating 
on pilgrimage seasons, market days, public feasts and other important occasions, Prophet 
Muhammed and his followers never tired of introducing the new faith, first to the Meccans 
and then to the rest of the communities populating the Arabian Peninsula.   
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 Going public with the new faith, however, did not mean the end of secrecy as a tactic. 
Given the savage resistance to Prophet Muhammed‘s message and the fact that Muslims 
were in a hostile environment, where they were shadowed everywhere and closely watched 
by Quraishi agents, it was necessary for Prophet Muhammed to seek ways of responding. 
Early Islamic records indicate that through implementation of a number of effective 
countermeasures the Prophet succeeded in uncovering a number of spies and foiling many 
operations. 
 A notable example is afforded by an incident which occurred at the Battle of Al-
Muraisi‘, where just before the military engagements, Prophet Muhammed‘s advance 
platoons captured an enemy spy, who refused to divulge his mission or the whereabouts of 
his masters. When the spy was taken to Prophet Muhammed‘s deputy for security and 
intelligence, Umar bin Al-Khattab, the latter gave him a grim warning:  
  Listen, tell us the truth, or else I will give your neck a fatal blow‘. Upon 
hearing this, the man said: ‗I am from Balmustaliq. I left behind me Al-Harith 
bin Abi Dharar, amassing a multitude of men to fight you. In point of fact, it 
was he who dispatched me to spy on you and see if you have already left 
Medina‘. Umar then took the man to the Prophet of Allah, Peace be Upon Him, 
and told him what the secret agent had said. The Prophet…. invited the man to 
embrace Islam, but the man refused, saying: ‗I will not embrace your religion 
until I see what my people decide. If they accept Islam, so will I. But if they 
decide not to, I will of course do what they do‘. Umar then asked: ‗O, Prophet 
of Allah, shall I give his neck a fatal blow?‘ Prophet Muhammed agreed and 
Umar struck him in the neck.
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 News of the death of the spy soon reached the Balmustaliq territory, the result being 
exactly as had been intended by the Muslims. According to the daughter of the head of the 
tribe, whom Prophet Muhammed later married upon her conversion to Islam, ―…[Because 
of the alarming news of the beheading], all our people and their allies were dumbfounded 
and seized with terror. Those who had earlier come to help my father … deserted him and 
he was left all alone, with none to offer him any help‖.168 
 In attempting to ward off threats and consolidate the gains of the Islamic state in 
Medina, Prophet Muhammed followed the maxim that the internal security of the realm 
often required a state of continued alertness with regard to what might be schemed against 
it outside. In concrete terms, this meant that those caught contacting non-Muslim elements, 
entering the state illegally or attempting to help parties hostile to Prophet Muhammed were 
arrested, interrogated and penalized. Whoever was found collaborating with anti-
Muhammed forces was dealt with severely, and state security and counterintelligence 
measures would then be implemented against him. While Prophet Muhammed himself was 
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the overall commander-in-chief of state security in Medina, Umar bin al-Khattab was in 
charge of running the counterintelligence machinery, implementing day-to-day orders and 
following up security policies.
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 An instructive example of the state of counterintelligence tactics employed by the early 
Muslims, which were by no means backward or inefficient, may be found in the case of 
Abbad bin Bishr, one of Prophet Muhammed‘s secret agents. Before giving the final order 
to assault the Jewish fortified city of Khaibar, Prophet Muhammed had dispatched this 
experienced agent at the head of a platoon to scout the area and check for snares or 
ambushes laid for the advancing Muslims. Prophet Muhammed directed this agent to do all 
he could to infiltrate deep into Khaibar in order assess the general situation and report on 
the degree of preparedness of the Jews for the defence of their city. In their search for 
evidence of enemy military or intelligence activities, Abbad‘s men came across a lone 
Bedouin outside Khaibar, who told them that he was a camel keeper looking for some of 
his camels which had strayed. When asked if he knew anything about the Jews of Khaibar, 
he said that his knowledge was scanty, as he had only recently come to know them,
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he was able to report that two of the Jewish leaders had travelled far and wide to assemble 
fighters against Prophet Muhammed and had also contacted their allies in the Ghatfan 
tribal area and secured their help in return for a year‘s supply of palm-tree dates. The 
camel keeper added that the Ghatfanis had provided the Khaibar Jews with ten thousand 
fighting men, who were heavily armed and laden with provisions, livestock and foodstuffs, 
and that they had already arrived in Khaibar and were now ready to resist any attack, 
pointing out that they could easily withstand any siege, even if it were to last for several 
years.
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 Upon hearing this, Abbad, without uttering a word, lifted his whip and gave 
the Bedouin a few lashes. He then confronted the camel keeper: ‗You are but a 
spy; tell me the truth or I kill you‘. The Bedouin then said: ‗Will you promise to 
save my life, if I say the truth?‘ When Abbad responded affirmatively, the 
Bedouin then said: ‗The people of Khaibar are truly terrified of you, especially 
after what you have done to the Jews of Yathrib [Medina]…. I was dispatched 
by Kinanah [one of the two Jewish leaders] to spy on you, but my main aim is 
to pass on exaggerated stories to you about the number of fighting men, their 
arms, and preparedness for battle in order to discourage you from launching an 
assault against Khaibar.
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 In assigning missions to counterintelligence personnel, it was crucial that operatives, 
whether ordered to collect information or execute covert operations, would go to great 
lengths in order to execute their missions without revealing their true identities. To conceal 
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their movements, those ordered to carry out secret missions always preferred to make use 
of the cover of darkness. When, for example, Prophet Muhammed dispatched a detachment 
under the command of Ali bin Abi Talub to execute a pre-emptive strike against the tribe 
of Ghatfan, who were allies of the Jews of Khaibar and were providing them with fighting 
men, weapons and provisions, Ali‘s men advanced to their target, riding at night and 
hiding during the day. When the detachment reached a place called Hamaj, Ali‘s men 
spotted and then captured a Ghatfani tribesman. 
 The captive was taken to Umar bin Al-Khattab, Prophet Muhammed‘s lieutenant for 
security affairs, who started to interrogate him by asking him first to identify himself and 
say where he came from and what he was after. The man was quite economical in his 
responses. But after a while he was pressurized
173
 into revealing that he was actually a spy. 
He also told his interrogators that he was carrying a message from the Ghaftanis to the 
Jews of Khaibar in order to barter military help for palm-tree dates. When asked if there 
were any fighting men on their way to succour Khaibar, the spy then told them that there 
were two hundred men under the command of Wabar bin Oleim. To avoid death, the man 
then cooperated with Ali‘s men and led them to the area where they had kept their cattle. 
He led them to the Ghatfan camp, but when Ali‘s detachment arrived, they discovered that 
the camp had been totally deserted.
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 Counterintelligence measures often required executing diversionary or pre-emptive 
attacks. An example of such an attack may be found in Prophet Muhammed‘s decision to 
march against the army of the tribal leader, Da‘thour bin Al-Harith bin Muharib Al-
Muharibi. Upon learning that tribesmen from Tha‘labah and Muharib had planned an 
assault on Muslim positions, Prophet Muhammed responded by leading an army of four 
hundred and fifty, which included infantry and cavalry. On their way, they came across a 
man who said that he was going to Medina for recreational purposes. When asked what he 
had heard or seen in the area, the man reported that a certain Da‘thour bin Al-Harith was 
travelling with a group of unarmed men. After the interrogation, the man was led to 
Prophet Muhammed, who called upon him to embrace Islam.  
 The man did and spoke thus: ‗O Muhammed! They [the Gatfanis] do not 
have the courage to meet you. If they hear you are marching towards them, they 
will flee to the mountain tops… I will now be your guide and lead you to their 
most vulnerable positions…‘ When the Muslims finally reached the area in 
which the Gatfanis were supposed to be camping, there was nobody there. All 
the fighting men who had been amassed by Da‘thour had fled the scene, taking 
refuge in the nearby mountains.
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 On the eve of the battle of Mecca, immortalized in the Quran as the Fatah
176
 (opening 
up) of Mecca, Prophet Muhammed took exceptional measures to deceive enemy intelligence 
and mask his military plan to march towards the Quraishis. He also introduced very strict 
precautionary measures, which may be described as a declaration of martial law or a state of 
emergency. He ordered the closure of all roads leading to Mecca, multiplied the number of 
patrols and gave the sentinels extraordinary powers to prevent arrivals in and departures 
from Medina: no one was allowed to enter or leave unless they provided an agreed 
password. Those who were heading towards Mecca without proper authorization were 
detained until they were security-checked and cleared.
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 These precautionary measures also necessitated concealment of the battle plan from all 
of Prophet Muhammed‘s companions and military commanders, except Abu Bakr and 
Prophet Muhammed's lieutenant for intelligence and security Umar bin Al-Khattab.. 
However, one of Prophet Muhammed‘s inner circle managed somehow to discover the real 
aim of these manoeuvres. Hatib bin Abi Balta‘ah came to realize that the Muslims were in 
fact planning to take Mecca by storm and catch the Meccan army unawares. Hatib then 
approached a woman and handed her a secret note to three prominent Quraishis in Mecca: 
 The Messenger of Allah has given his orders to attack. He intends to attack 
none but you. I wish to cooperate and extend a helping hand. [Hatib] then sent 
the secret message with a woman, who concealed it in her thick plaited hair. 
Hatib asked the woman to avoid taking the main road leading to Mecca, as it 
was closely watched by the guards. Accordingly, she took a different less taken 
route. But Prophet Muhammed was soon to uncover the secret attempt to 
provide sensitive intelligence to Quraish and later intercepted the woman 
messenger before she could reach Mecca.
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Although historical sources make no mention of how the woman was discovered, it is 
no wild conjecture to assume that she was under close surveillance from the moment she 
requested an audience with Prophet Muhammed until her departure from Medina. 
During the days before the conquest of Mecca, not only the Quraishis but also all other 
tribes felt insecure and feared that they might be targeted by Prophet Muhammed. Besides 
creating an atmosphere of confusion, anxiety and suspense in and around Mecca, the 
Prophet‘s counterintelligence apparatus succeeded in uncovering and capturing a number of 
spies, who were collecting information about Prophet Muhammed‘s army and military 
plans. The Medina intelligence, for example, succeeded in capturing a Quraishi spy, Furat 
bin Hayyan, who was working for Prophet Muhammed‘s arch enemy, Abu Sufyan. Furat 
was condemned to death, but his life was spared when he embraced Islam Through his 
network of informers, Prophet Muhammed, as pointed out elsewhere in some detail,
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succeeded in uncovering the Quraishi plan to kill him just before the clandestine attempt on 
his life was due to be executed. Had it not been for his well-placed spies, Prophet 
Muhammed would not have been able to make his exit from Mecca safely.  
Foiling the attempt of Omeir bin Wahab Al-Jamhi to murder Prophet Muhammed was 
another example of the apparent professionalism and thoroughness of the intelligence work 
carried out by those in charge of Prophet Muhammed‘s security. The 8th-century chronicler, 
Al-Waqidi, dwells on a significant incident in which a spy from the hostile tribe of Hawazin 
was caught by Prophet Muhammed‘s security men. They led the man to Prophet 
Muhammed and gave details of the way in which he was captured: 
 When we realized that he [the spy] was continuing to evade and prevaricate, 
we threatened to give a fatal blow to his neck, if he did not tell us the truth. 
‗Will [the truth] help me?‘ he asked. We assured him it would. Then he said: ‗I 
come from the clan of Nadhr of the tribe of Hawazin, who dispatched me to spy 
on Muhammed and his allies. I was specifically ordered to enquire if 
Muhammed will himself lead the army or delegate others to carry out the attack. 
I was told: ―Check if he is planning to attack us and follow his army until you 
get to Batn Sarif. If he intends to assault us, he will then veer off the route to 
march towards us. But if he continues the journey, he will not go off the road‖.‘ 
The Messenger of Allah then asked: ‗Where are the Hawazin fighters stationed 
now?‘ The spy answered: ‗I left them at Baq‘a, where they have asked the tribe 
of Thaqif for help. ... They also asked the tribesmen of Jursh to supply them 
with Mangonels180 and armour.‘ .... The Prophet then asked: ‗What has the 
Hilal tribe decided?‘ to which he answered: ‗Only a few of them were willing to 
join. The Meccans are quite frightened and alarmed.181  
 
 Prophet Muhammed‘s counterintelligence work was not restricted to unveiling and 
aborting operations planned by his local enemies or the hostile tribes of the Peninsula. His 
men also succeeded in uncovering foreign plots designed to establish undercover spying 
stations on the Muslims. In one such operation, Prophet Muhammed‘s agents in the Islamic 
stronghold of Medina unmasked an elaborate Byzantine plan to spy on the Muslims. Just 
nine years after Prophet Muhammed had established his rule in Medina, the Byzantines 
instructed one of their priests, Abu Amie Al-Khazraji, to declare that he had converted to 
Islam. He was also directed to build a new mosque in order to provide a secure venue for 
his agents. The choice of its location was quite significant, in the same neighbourhood and 
very close to the Qiba' mosque which Prophet Muhammed‘s men had constructed earlier. 
The ‗Muslim‘ monk asked Prophet Muhammed to inaugurate the place of worship and 
bless it with his presence. Prophet Muhammed responded by saying he was quite busy and 
requested postponement of the ceremony until he had accomplished a mission with which 
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he was preoccupied at the time. Meanwhile, Prophet Muhammed‘s men, whose suspicions 
had been raised, watched closely what happened in and around the newly built mosque. 
When sufficient evidence was obtained, Prophet Muhammed ordered the mosque to be 
demolished.
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 The Quraishis were not to be outdone by the Muslim intelligence agents. Just as 
Prophet Muhammed continually attempted to collect information and foil clandestine 
operations, the Quraishis carried out their own counterintelligence work. In one of their 
successful operations, mentioned above, they were able to uncover two secret agents whom 
Prophet Muhammed had dispatched to spy on the movements of their caravans across the 
desert, by examining the dung left by the spies‘ camels. This attempt at obtaining 
intelligence information by quantitative and qualitative analysis of substances represents an 
early form of measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).
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4.1.3 Analysis 
Policy makers cannot take optimal decisions unless they are in possession of a clear 
analysis of the intelligence collected. In times of war or crisis, acquisition of relevant data 
becomes crucial, as any intelligence failure or lack of cogent assessment might indeed put 
the whole security of the state at risk. Prophet Muhammed appears to have fully 
understood this fundamental and generally accepted truth, being particularly careful not to 
embark upon any project or initiate any campaign until he had verified and analysed the 
information provided by his intelligence network. Admittedly, the analysis process, during 
times of war, did not require a great effort, in that practically all that was needed was the 
verification of reports with regard to ascertainable facts and events. These might include 
monitoring such activities as troop deployment, the hoarding of provisions, the making of 
weapons, the rerouting of caravans and any other activity related to war preparations. 
There are many examples of operations in which Prophet Muhammed needed debriefing 
and verification techniques, analysis and the ability to draw the right conclusions.  
 One such example occurred on the eve of the Battle of Badr. Prophet Muhammed 
dispatched three of his close confidants and eminent companions, Ali bin Abi Talib
184
, Al-
Zubair bin Al-Awwam
185
 and Sa‘d bin Abi Waqqas,186 to reconnoitre the area that was to 
witness the first major armed confrontation with his Quraishi enemies. The three men 
headed towards a place known to be water-rich and frequented by caravans as well as 
inhabitants of nearby lands. The scouts spotted two young boys drawing water from a well, 
captured them and led them to Prophet Muhammed‘s headquarters, where it was hoped 
that Prophet Muhammed would extract useful information from them. Finding that Prophet 
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Muhammed was busy performing his prayers, the three men began interrogating the 
captives themselves. When asked for whom they were carrying the water, the boys gave 
what sounded like an evasive answer, that they were working for the Quraishi army 
advancing towards Medina. This answer was not to the liking of Prophet Muhammed‘s 
companions, who had been under the impression that the boys belonged to Abu Sufayan‘s 
caravan, which had suddenly changed course and vanished in the desert. To force the boys 
to tell the truth they started to beat them severely.
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 The beatings compelled the young boys to say that they were in fact working for Abu 
Sufyan
188
, leader of the richly laden Quraishi caravan which was on its way from Syria to 
Mecca. Upon this admission, they were then left alone. When Prophet Muhammed finished 
his prayers, he was advised of what had happened and how the boys had changed their 
story. Examining the details carefully, Prophet Muhammed disapproved of what the three 
scouts had done to the boys and felt that something was amiss. Censuring his companions, 
Prophet Muhammed said: ―When the boys utter the truth, you beat them, and when they 
tell a lie, you release them!‖ He then decided to conduct the interrogation of the water 
carriers himself. Without resorting to violence or the threat of force, Prophet Muhammed 
managed to extract crucial information about three areas of interest to the Muslim army: 
the whereabouts of the Quraishi army, the number of fighting men deployed by Quraish 
and the names of their commanding officers.
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 Prophet Muhammed started by asking the boys where the Quraishis had camped. He 
was told that they were behind the sand dunes at Adwa Quswa. When he asked them how 
many fighting men there were, they said that they did not know. To extract this vital 
information, Prophet Muhammed then asked the young boys how many camels were 
slaughtered each day. They said ―9 on one day and 10 on another‖. As camels were the 
main source of sustenance for tribesmen during raids and battles, and as it was common 
knowledge to all desert dwellers that a camel can feed between 90 and 100 people, Prophet 
Muhammed indirectly learnt that the advancing army numbered between 900 and 1000 
men. He then enquired about the leaders of the Quraishi army. He was told that among the 
commanding officers were Utbah bin Rabee‘ah, Sheebah Akhah, Umayya bin Khalaf, Al-
Abbas bin Abdul-Muttalib and Sahl bin Amru. These names gave Prophet Muhammed a 
relatively clear picture of what to expect, as he knew these men, their backgrounds, their 
points of strength and their tribal connections. Prophet Muhammed also realised that the 
opposing army was three times larger than his own. When he finished the interrogation, 
Prophet Muhammed turned to his companions and said: ―Mecca has deployed the cream of 
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Quraishi fighters against you‖. He then made his battle plans in the light of the information 
obtained from the water carriers.
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 The early Muslims made good and sometimes crucial use of the age-old, primitive 
method of collection and spying through eavesdropping. On the eve of the battle of Badr, 
Prophet Muhammed needed as much intelligence as he could muster about the movements 
of his enemies‘ commercial caravans, which he had been planning to ambush. From a 
casual conversation between two women who were drawing water from a well near Badr, 
where a battle would soon rage between Prophet Muhammed and the Quraishis, a Muslim 
agent was able to learn the location and the expected time of arrival of a large commercial 
Mecca-bound caravan returning from Syria. One of the women had apparently lent some 
money to her companion, who promised that she would be paid up as soon as the 
approaching caravan arrived, which would be either the next day or the day after. This 
information, from ordinary women who were unmindful of the Muslim spy, proved 
invaluable to the plan to attack the caravan.
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 The value which Prophet Muhammed appears to have placed on intelligence can best 
be seen following the Battle of Uhud: he continued his intelligence activities even after 
hostilities had ceased, when he ordered that the Quraishi retreat be closely followed and 
watched. Prophet Muhammed specifically wanted details of the means of transportation 
used by the Quraishis, especially the numbers and types of draft animals they employed. 
His orders to his secret agent, Saad bin Abi Waqqas, were quite clear: 
 Bring us news of their movements. If they have mounted the camels rather 
than the horses, then this signifies that they have decided to depart. But if they 
have mounted their horses rather than their camels, then most likely they are 
bent on attacking Medina. By Him, in whose hands is my soul, if they march 
towards Medina, I shall advance towards them and give them battle.
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 Through analysis of secondary or collateral reports on the general activities of the 
Quraishis, Prophet Muhammed was able to arrive at important conclusions, with regard to 
the actual capabilities of his foes. On the eve of the Battle of Uhud, he sent two agents to 
scout the area around Medina and Mount Uhud and to collect as much information as they 
could on the Quraishis, especially the number of fighting men deployed against him and 
the areas in which they were concentrated. They reported that the enemy had arrived at a 
place called Al-Aridh, north east of Medina, famous for its wide expanse of rich 
agricultural soil, but that its fields and orchards had almost vanished and that the green 
areas had turned into a wasteland. The sudden disappearance of the rich foliage, which was 
devoured by the livestock and draft animals of the Quraishis, provided a clear indication as 
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to the size of the Quraishi battalions. As the  number of  beasts of  burden and other 
animals was in direct proportional to that of the advancing armies, Prophet Muhammed 
and his men concluded that they were facing a very large army.  
 
4.1.4 Covert Action 
As for Godson‘s fourth element, the early Muslims resorted to covert operations in order to 
protect the fledgling Muslim state in Medina, by eliminating those who were perceived to 
threaten the security of the nascent state. Not all clandestine operations were initiated by 
the Muslims, however; many were carried out as a retaliatory response to operations 
executed by the polytheist Quraishis or the Christian Byzantines. During the early period 
of Islam, the theatre of covert operations extended far beyond Mecca and Medina to 
include areas as far as Yemen to the south and Abyssinia to the west. In advancing his 
cause, Muhammed, as Richard Gabriel points out,  
Used political alliances to deprive his enemy of a source of military 
manpower and erode the enemy‘s popular base of support. Political manoeuvre 
and negotiation, intelligence, propaganda, and the judicious use of terror and 
assassination were employed to wage a psychological warfare campaign against 
those potential sources of opposition that could not yet be won by calculation of 
self interest or ideology.
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 It was of course only natural that in the beginning these covert operations suffered from 
a lack of tactical intelligence. Prophet Muhammed‘s followers were ―mostly townspeople 
with no experience in desert travel‖,194 so that on some of the early operations Prophet 
Muhammed had to rely on desert dwellers and Bedouin guides. Then, as his foothold in 
Medina grew firmer, 
 His intelligence service became more organized and sophisticated, using 
agents-in-place, commercial spies, debriefing of prisoners, combat patrols, and 
reconnaissance in force as methods of intelligence collection. Muhammad 
himself seems to have possessed a detailed knowledge of clan loyalties and 
politics within the insurgency‘s area of operations and used this knowledge to 
good effect when negotiating alliances with the Bedouins.
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 A close look at some of these operations will show that neither Prophet Muhammed 
nor his adversaries in Arabia embarked upon covert operations until they had carefully 
collected intelligence, defined their targets, scouted the theatre of operations and chosen 
the right operatives for the mission. To silence detractors and eliminate instigators and 
those whom Prophet Muhammed considered enemies to Islam, he launched many covert 
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operations, which were also intended to boost the morale of the Muslims, influence the 
military decision of their enemies and deceive his enemy‘s intelligence. 
 Among the first to be targeted by the early Muslims were the poets, whose role was 
equivalent to that of journalists today and who were greatly venerated by their fellow Arab 
tribesmen and townsfolk alike, as great men of eloquence and sagacity. Islam, however, at 
least during the early stages, placed certain constraints on them and ultimately denigrated 
their status. In pre-Islamic Arabia, each tribe had at least one poet, who, more than the 
national bards or poets laureate of the West, acted as a general spokesman of his tribe. The 
role of the ancient Arab poet was quite complex. Besides promoting and defending the 
tribe‘s image, the poet was also a military spokesman. His judgments would sometimes 
―assume the strength and authority of the judiciary‖196 and his influence might occasionally 
exceed that of the tribal leader himself. On account of the rhyme, rhythm and other musical 
and linguistic devices used, a poet‘s utterances were strongly etched on the collective 
memory of the tribe.  
 Poets played an important role in times of public calamity, crisis or war. They were the 
providers of verbal tools which could be used to soothe the pains of the public and calm 
their anxieties, commemorate the fallen, heap scorn on the enemy and extol the virtues, 
honour and bravery of fellow tribesmen. The Quraishi leaders, who were intent on wiping 
out the new faith and countering Prophet Muhammed‘s increasing popularity, naturally 
enlisted the help of their tribal poets, who obliged by writing various poems attacking 
Prophet Muhammed and fuelling hatred against Islam. At first, the Muslims tried to win 
those eloquent men and women over to their side, or at least to avoid being the object of 
their attacks. When these efforts failed to produce the desired results, and when the damage 
inflicted upon the Muslims was too great to tolerate, Prophet Muhammed had to respond 
violently. He decided that those who attacked Islam and sought to undermine it should be 
physically eliminated. 
 The poetess Asma‘ bint Marwan was among the first to be silenced. This woman, who 
belonged to the Aws tribe in Medina, was especially outspoken in her tirades against 
Prophet Muhammed and the Muslims. Her razor-sharp jibes against the new religion 
gained wide popularity amongst the tribes. In one of her poems, Asma‘ attacks Muslims 
and those tribes which embraced Islam, ridicules the character of the ―stranger‘, Prophet 
Muhammed, and calls upon her fellow tribesmen to end the Muslim question by murdering 
Prophet Muhammed: 
I despise Banu Malik and al-Nabit 
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And Auf and Banu al-Khazraj. 
You obey a stranger who is none of yours, 
One not of Murad or Madhhij.  
Do you expect good from him 
After the killing of your chiefs 
Like a hungry man waiting for a cook‘s broth? 
Is there no man of pride who would attack him by surprise? 
And cut off the hopes of those who expect aught from him?
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 The man who eliminated this sharp-tongued satirist was Omeir bin Wahab Al-Awsi, 
who managed to enter her home and stab her while she slept.
198
 When Al-Awsi met 
Prophet Muhammed and asked if he would be taken to task for what he did to the poetess, 
he was assured that ―no two goats would butt over her death‖.199   
 Another poet who met the same fate was Abu Afak, who had attained the age of 120 
years and was notorious for incitement against the person of Prophet Muhammed, for his 
venomous denunciations and for his denigration of Islam and the Muslims. A very intricate 
plan was prepared to silence him in the courtyard of his own house.200 The man assigned to 
carry out the operation was one of the poet‘s own tribesmen, so that when the murder was 
uncovered, it would not lead to any tribal repercussions or start an endless cycle of 
revenge.    
 A number of assassinations and covert operations were aimed at influential figures.  
The early Muslims singled out such important elements as tribal leaders, men of military 
prowess or those of great affluence or social status, who wielded great influence among 
their followers and shaped their attitudes, not only to Islam and the Muslims but also to life 
in general. Foremost among those who were targeted were the men who incited the 
Quraishis against Prophet Muhammed and those who financed efforts to resist the Muslims 
and fanned the flames of hatred towards the new religion. They were in the main 
polytheists, but there were also a number of Jews and Christians among them, including 
Abu Rafi‘, one of the most influential Jews of Khaiber, who played a significant role in 
financing those who were plotting against Prophet Muhammed, especially the Ghatfan 
tribesmen, whom he encouraged to attack the newly established Islamic state in Medina. 
Abu Rafi‘ also played a vital role in what is known in Islamic history the Battle of the 
Trench. He spent much time and resources to inciting the tribes against Prophet 
Muhammed and mustering support for the anti-Islamic camp.
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 The squad which carried out the operation was led by Abdullah bin A‘teek Al-
Khazraji, who had recently embraced Islam.
202
 Abdullah, whose mother was Jewish, knew 
Hebrew, which stood him in good stead in the execution of the clandestine operation.
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With him were Al-Harith bin Raba‘í (Abu Qutada), Khuzai bin Al-Aswad, Masoud bin 
Sinan and Abdullah bin Anas.
204
 The plan depended to a large extent on the information 
provided by Abdullah‘s mother as to the whereabouts of the target. She also suggested that 
the best time to launch the attack was at night and that the squad should pretend to be 
visitors who had come to present Abu Rafi‘ with a gift. Taking advantage of darkness, the 
team disguised themselves and headed for the Jewish fortress, which they managed to enter 
with relative ease. When they reached the target‘s mansion, Abdullah said in Hebrew that 
he had come to offer Abu Rafi‘ a present. As soon as the gate was opened, the team forced 
their way in, put him to the sword and left hurriedly. What helped the attackers escape the 
scene of the assassination was the fact that the gates and entrances of the fortress were all 
fitted with locks and bolts. This provided the assailants with valuable time to make their 
getaway, while the victim‘s family raised the alarm and while the gatekeeper or watchman 
was located and waken up. The killers first lurked in a small shrub-covered ravine outside 
the fortress, then managed to sneak out and start their 190-kilometre journey back to 
Medina.
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 Another example of covert operations is afforded by the elimination of the tribal leader 
Sufiyan bin Khalid al-Hathli. When confirmed reports reached Medina that he was actively 
involved in preparing an attack on the Muslims and instigating other tribes to muster 
support for the imminent assault, Prophet Muhammed turned to one of his most trusted 
followers, Abdullah bin Unais, whom he instructed to eliminate Al-Hathli. When Unais 
asked Prophet Muhammed to describe the target to facilitate identification, he was given 
minute details of his looks and physical features. Then he was assured that ―the moment 
you set eyes on this horrible looking man, you will shudder at the sight‖.206 As a cover, 
Unais was instructed to claim to be a member of the Khuzaai tribe. Armed only with a 
sword, he began searching for Al-Hathli, telling everybody he met that he hated the 
Muslims and that he wished to join Al-Hathli‘s campaign against Prophet Muhammed. 
When finally he reached his target, Unais did all he could to win his trust. He was so 
successful and convincing that Al-Hathli invited him to his own residence, where Unais 
stabbed him fatally. He then hid until the hot pursuit died down, before returning to 
Medina.
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 A further example is the assassination of Rifa‘ah bin Rafi‘ Al-jashmi, which was 
planned when reports reached Medina that he was planning to attack some Muslims. These 
reports were confirmed by the uyoun, who spotted Rifa‘ah and a number of his followers 
north of Medina. Prophet Muhammed then ordered three of his men to ―Go for this man. 
71 
 
Don‘t come back until you have either captured him or brought back news of his death‖.208 
The three men then went out, laid a night ambush for the target and eliminated him.
209
  
 The assassination of Kaab bin Al-Ashraf provides yet another example of the early 
covert operations of the Medina Muslims, who were intent on defending their faith at any 
cost. Al-Ashraf, an eminent Jewish merchant and poet who was extremely wealthy and 
influential, not only among the Jewish community but also among the tribes in the Medina 
region, played a very active role in resisting the new religion and inciting the Quraishis to 
rise up in arms against Prophet Muhammed. He also wrote many satires against Islam and 
the Prophet. Just as his criticism of Prophet Muhammed was seen by the Muslims as 
destructive and toxic, his resounding eulogies of the Quraishis were honeyed and 
laudatory. To make matters worse, he also wrote love poems laden with insinuations about 
Muslim women.
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 Al-Ashraf once met Abu Sufyan, the most eminent Quraishi tribal leader and arch-
enemy of Prophet Muhammed before the conquest of Mecca. At that meeting, Abu Sufyan 
asked the Jewish merchant if Islam or the religion of Quraish was more humane and closer 
to his faith (Judaism). Al-Ashraf was in no doubt that the Quraishis were truly enlightened, 
better guided and were following the right path. On account of his vociferous antagonism 
to Islam, Prophet Muhammed felt it necessary to eliminate him at once. To that end, he 
summoned some of his followers and asked: ―Who could silence Kaab bin Al-Ashraf, who 
is avowedly declaring enmity towards us and has joined forces with the Quraishis against 
us?‖ Prophet Muhammed then recited the following verse from the Quran: ―Have you not 
seen those unto whom a portion of the Scripture has been given, how they believe in idols 
and false deities, and how they say of those (idolaters) who disbelieve: ‗These are more 
rightly guided than those who believe‘?‖211  
 One of those present, Salakan bin Salameh, rose and asked: ―Is the Messenger of Allah 
ordering the assassination of Kaab bin Al-Ashraf?‖ Upon receiving the answer in the 
affirmative, Salakan then said: ―Would the Messenger of Allah give me leave to say what I 
choose to Kaab in order to carry out this mission?‖ Prophet Muhammed agreed. Salakan 
then hid his squad close to Kaab‘s fortress and shouted: ―Oh Kaab… Will you open the 
gate?‖ When asked who it was, he replied that it was Salakan, Kaab‘s foster brother. 
Kaab‘s wife sensed danger and forbade her husband to open the gate, but Kaab overruled 
her, insisting that ―nothing but good can come out of my brother‖. Explaining why he had 
come to Kaab at that hour, Salakan said that he and his people had grown tired of Prophet 
Muhammed and his demand for ‗Zakat‘ (alms). Salakan then asked if he could borrow a 
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"camel-load or two" of foodstuffs from Kaab in order to give to that ―troublesome 
Muhammed‖. He also assured Salakan that Muhammed‘s followers would soon grow tired 
and rebel against him. Kaab agreed to the loan provided that it was made against some sort 
of surety or mortgage. Asked what he wanted as surety, Kaab replied ―your women‖, to 
which Salakan jokingly responded: ―What! Mortgage our women to the most handsome of 
men?‖ Kaab then demanded that Salakan and the other borrowers should mortgage their 
sons instead. But that was not acceptable either: ―If we mortgage our sons to you, they will 
be a laughing stock of all and will always be taunted as the men who were mortgaged 
against a load of foodstuffs‖. Kaab finally agreed to accept weapons as the required 
mortgage.  
 To implement the assassination plan, Salakan had agreed with his hidden companions 
that they should emerge to attack Kaab as soon as they saw his hands firmly locked round 
Kaab‘s head. Salakan‘s stratagem began by flattering the vain Kaab profusely: ―What a 
glorious perfume you are wearing! I have never smelt anything like it in my whole life!‖ 
Taking the bait, Kaab boasted that the perfume he used was far superior to those used by 
women. Salakan then asked if he could smell Kaab‘s hair, grabbed his head and shouted 
for his men to advance. In the confusion that followed, Salakan was wounded, but the 
group did not leave until they had severed Kaab‘s head.212  
 Among the most daring operations executed during the Medina period was the attempt 
on the life of Abu Sufyan bin Harb, one of the most respected tribal leaders in Quraish. 
Renowned for his courage and calculating mind, he was behind many attempts at 
subverting Islam and oppressing the Muslims. As leader of the anti-Muhammed camp, he 
posed the most serious threat to Islam from the dawn of the new faith to the conquest of 
Mecca. To liquidate him, Prophet Muhammed used two men, a Muslim called Amru bin 
Ummaya Al-Dhamri
213
 and a non-Muslim, Salama bin Aslam.
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 The former was chosen to 
carry out the mission because he was renowned for his courage and physical prowess, and 
was also an extremely fast sprinter. Another advantage was the fact that he knew all about 
the byways and shortcuts of the desert. It was decided that the best weapon to use against 
Abu Sufyan was a small poniard, which could easily be concealed by its bearer. It was also 
decided that the two men should travel by camel and head for a place called Wadi Bajaj, 16 
kilometres from Mecca.
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 The plan also demanded that the two should tie down their 
camels there and head for their target in Mecca. In the event of discovery or unforeseen 
developments, Salama would then hurry back to his camel, while the fast-footed Amru 
would take whatever measures he deemed appropriate to escape. The two men spent a 
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week in Mecca, moving from one place to another in pursuit of their target, but their plot 
was discovered. When the retreat plan was implemented, Amru was chased by the 
Meccans but managed to reach his base in Medina safely.
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 Covert operations were not limited to those against poets and influential figures, but 
were also conducted against leaders of rival religious movements. Among those who were 
assassinated for propagating what the Muslims considered a revisionist brand of Islam was 
Al-Aswad al-Ansi, who claimed to be a prophet sent by Allah.
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 Prophet Muhammed‘s 
followers, however, considered him to be nothing more than a magician or a fortune-teller: 
 But he was no minor magician or fortune-teller….  He was powerful and 
influential and possessed a strange power of speech that mesmerized the hearts 
of his listeners and captivated the minds of the masses with his false claims. 
With his wealth and power he managed to attract not just the masses but people 
of status as well. … Al-Aswad‘s tribe were the first to respond positively to his 
claims to prophethood. With this tribal force he mounted a raid on San'a. He 
killed the governor, Shahr and took his wife to himself. From San'a he raided 
other regions. Through his swift and startling strikes, a vast region from 
Hadramawt to At-Taif and from al-Ahsa to Aden came under his influence.
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 To silence Al-Aswad al-Ansi and stop his movement before any further damage 
occurred, Prophet Muhammed ordered his execution.
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 He commanded Wabrah bin 
Yahnus to head for Yemen secretly in order to prepare an assassination plan. Wabrah 
devised an intricate plan in which a number of Muslims of Persian origin were to take part. 
Most crucial was the role played by al-Ansi‘s wife Mirzabanah, who was known to 
harbour nothing but disdain and hatred for Al-Ansi, who had killed her first husband and 
forced her to marry him. Mirzabanah provided vital intelligence on Al-Ansi‘s movements 
and facilitated the killers‘ entrance to her castle, where the operation was successfully 
carried out.
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 The assassination of Tulaiha bin Khuwailid Al-Asadi illustrates the length to which the 
early Muslims went in order to carry out their covert operations. Tulaiha was an 
outstanding tribal leader and brave warrior, who was most revered among his tribe. 
Because of his eloquence and leadership qualities his authority grew at such a pace that he 
was soon deemed to be a serious threat to the security of the state of Medina.
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 The plot to 
assassinate Al-Asadi was carefully designed to take two important points into 
consideration. The first was the fact that it was customary for him and his tribe to be armed 
with swords at all times. The second was the physical qualities and military prowess of Al-
Asadi himself. To ensure success of the assassination attempt it was decided that whoever 
was tasked with that dangerous mission should have some sort of cover under which he 
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could carry out the attempt. The man chosen was Mukhnif bin Al-Saleel Al-Haliki, a 
master bladesmith who travelled the desert forging, mending or sharpening swords and 
other utensils. The choice was considered most appropriate, as it ensured that Al-Asadi 
would surrender his sword to the agent if he were to have any dealing with him. The 
undercover agent managed to establish contact with the target, who did indeed ask him to 
sharpen his sword. When the bladesmith had hold of the sword, he lifted it and struck his 
target on the head, but failed to kill him and was himself captured and killed. Instead of 
silencing Al-Asadi, the news of the failed attempt only gave his movement wider 
popularity. His followers seized this opportunity to present him as an invincible prophet, 
able to withstand direct sword blows.
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 Al-Asadi was soon to recant, however, and 
abandon his claim to prophethood. He re-embraced Islam and played an active role in the 
military campaign to wrest Iraq from the Persians.
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 Prophet Muhammed used also tactical deception to beguile his enemy‘s intelligence. 
On the eve of marching to Mecca he masked his military plans by ordering three battalions 
to march in different directions in order to keep the Quraishis guessing as to what his next 
target was. The first of the three diversionary battalions, of three hundred men, was 
ordered to head towards Najd, the second towards Ghatfan and a third smaller detachment 
in another direction. As conflicting reports of Prophet Muhammed‘s intentions spread, the 
Meccan leaders did not know which of them to believe. Prohet Muhammed achieved his 
plan by surprising the Quraishis in Mecca.   
 Some covert action was intended to boost the morale of the Muslims. An illustrative 
example of this may be seen in the operations aimed at retrieving the body of Khabeeb bin 
Uday. Khabeeb was among the early Muslims who vigorously supported Prophet 
Muhammed and fought under his banner in the decisive Battle of Badr, where he was 
reported to have killed a number of Meccan polytheists. Soon after this Battle, Prophet 
Muhammed sent him on a reconnaissance mission to observe the movements of the 
Quraishis and check whether they were, as reported, engaged in any military preparations. 
But Khabeeb and his nine fellow scouts were discovered, tracked and surrounded. Seven of 
them died in the engagement that followed, while Khabeeb and two other men were tricked 
into surrendering in the hope that they would be set free. Instead, they were sold to the 
Meccans, who in order to exact revenge on Khabeeb for killing so many of their men at 
Badr, crucified him and left his corpse to rot in the desert.  
 Khabeeb‘s fate grieved Prophet Muhammed, who immediately ordered one of his 
uyoun,  Amru bin Ummaya Al-Dhamiri, to head for Mecca and retrieve his body. As long 
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as the decomposing corpse of the renowned fighter remained on the cross, the morale of 
the Muslims was low, while that of the Quraishis was boosted. Amru stealthily went to the 
spot where Khabeeb‘s cross was erected, scaled it and hastily detached the crucified 
corpse. He then sped back to Medina, stopping only briefly to provide a proper burial for 
his fallen comrade. When the Quraishis later discovered that the corpse had vanished, they 
were at a loss as to what had happened. The operation impacted negatively on their morale, 
while boosting that of the Muslims.
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 Freeing captured Muslims in Mecca is another example of morale-boosting operations. 
In one such action, Prophet Muhammed tasked Khalid bin Al-Waleed
225
 to prepare a plan 
to rescue two of the earliest Meccans to embrace Islam: Ayyash bin Abi Rabi‘a and 
Salameh bin Hashim. As a punishment for abandoning the faith of their forefathers, these 
two men were imprisoned by the Quraishis. To help Khalid prepare a proper plan, Prophet 
Muhammed provided him with other vital details of the location where these two 
companions were imprisoned. He also asked him to contact one of the Muslim agents 
stationed in Mecca, whose name was Al-Qain and whose residence would be used as a safe 
house from which Khalid would launch the operation.
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 With the help of the agent, Khalid 
managed to rescue the two men and despite the hot pursuit that ensued he was able to 
ensure their safe arrival in Medina.
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 Another goal of covert action was to influence the military decisions of Prophet 
Muhammed‘s enemies. This may clearly be seen in what is now known as the Hamra‘ Al-
Asad operation. One result of the Battle of Badr was the growing awareness amongst the 
Quraishis that their commerce and caravan routes were under constant threat as long as 
Medina remained in Muslim hands. Despite successes scored by the Quraishis against 
Prophet Muhammed‘s army, the Battle of Uhud was far from decisive. Both sides suffered 
heavy losses and retreated from the battlefield, the Muslims towards their base in Medina 
and the Quraishis towards Mecca. But each side kept a watchful eye on the other; just as 
the Muslims had numerous uyoun in Mecca, the Quraishis had their own amongst the 
Muslims.  
 When the leader of the Quraishis, Abu Sufyan, ordered his troops to camp at a place 
called Al-Rawha‘, 14 kilometres from Medina, his military commanders met to discuss and 
review the events at Uhud.
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 On their performance appraisal, they were quite divided:  
 One group said to another: ‗You did nothing. Although you broke down 
their [the Muslims‘] force, you made no use of your achievement. …. There are 
still some distinguished men among them who will probably gather people up to 
fight you again. So let us go back and annihilate them and crush their forces.‘ It 
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was in fact a hasty decision taken by shallow-minded people who misjudged the 
potential power and morale of both parties, which is why an eminent leader of 
Quraish, Safwan bin Omaiyah, tried to dissuade his people from pursuing that 
venture, saying: ‗O people. Do not do such a thing! For I fear that he 
[Muhammed] will gather up those who had stayed behind and did not fight in 
Uhud. Go back home as victorious. I am not certain about the outcome or about 
the turn events might take if we return to re-engage the Muslims in the 
battlefield.
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 Through his own network of uyoun, details of these deliberations reached Prophet 
Muhammed. Fearful that a second Quraishi assault might have an undesired result, he 
decided to launch a campaign aimed at shaking the morale of the Quraishis and deterring 
them from attacking. To that end, he summoned all his troops and, following on the heels 
of the Quraishi army, he led them to a place called Hamra‘ Al-Asad, where he met one of 
his uyoun, Ma‘bad Al-Khuzai. Ma‘bad, who was not a Muslim, was commanded to catch 
up with Abu Sufyan‘s army in order to pass on some disinformation and propaganda 
reports about Prophet Muhammed‘s preparedness for war, the condition of his troops, their 
psychological state and their impatience to avenge themselves. When he found the 
opportunity to speak to Abu Sufyan, he reported that 
 Muhammad … is marching to meet you with a large host of fighters; I have 
never seen anything similar before. He has mustered all the troops who have 
tarried and did not join in [the Battle of] Uhud. They surely regret what they 
have missed and want to compensate for it now. Their hearts are filled with hate 
and resentment.‘ Abu Sufyan said: ‗Woe to you! What do you suggest?‘ He 
said: ‗By Allâh, I see that you would not leave till he comes and you see the 
heads of their horses; or till the vanguard of his army appears from behind that 
hill.‘ Abu Sufyan said: ‗By Allâh, we have reached a common consent to crush 
the Muslims and their power.‘ The man, once more with an implied warning, 
advised to the contrary. In the light of this news, the resolution and 
determination of the Meccan army failed. Panic and terror took firm hold of 
them. They consequently deemed it safest to complete their withdrawal to 
Mecca.
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Prophet Muhammed‘s choice of the agent was quite appropriate. First, Ma‘bad was 
from a very large tribe which occupied much of the land between Mecca and Medina. His 
presence in the area was therefore quite normal and did not raise any suspicion. The fact 
that Prophet Muhammed arranged for the meeting with his agent, not in Medina, but in an 
out-of-the-way location, Hamra‘al-Asad, was a precautionary measure. Meeting the agent 
at his headquarters in Medina in full view of his troops would most likely have destroyed 
Ma‘bad‘s cover. Furthermore, as an ordinary non-Muslim tribesman, unrelated to Prophet 
Muhammed or his tribe, Ma‘bad was likely to be believed. In taking the initiative and 
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launching a psychological operation through the clever use of the agent, Prophet 
Muhammed was able not only to influence his targets‘ emotions and state of mind, but also 
to manipulate their behaviour. Prophet Muhammed thus succeeded in averting a disaster by 
frustrating his enemies‘ battle plans and discouraging them from launching a second 
assault against him. The disinformation relayed by Prophet Muhammed‘s agent to Abu 
Sufyan was carefully calculated to have maximum impact on the Quraishis. Another 
element which contributed to the success of this psychological operation was the fact that 
the agent‘s message was delivered within a framework of urgency, which left Quraishi 
leaders no time to double-check or verify the highly sensitive information from a second 
source. The agent‘s exclamation, ―By Allâh, I see that you would not leave till Prophet 
Muhammed's cavalry has arrived" and his assertion that it would be too late to manoeuvre 
or redeploy once   "the vanguard of Muhammed's army appears from behind that hill‖, was 
quite dramatic and effective, in that it left Abu Sufyan no time to make an alternative plan 
to retreat.  
 On the other hand, the covert operations of the Quraishis against the life of Prophet 
Muhammed increased as they adopted a variety of strategies to resist his new religion. At 
first, they tried to win him over by tempting him with money and tribal power, but Prophet 
Muhammed spurned these attempts. He famously declared to his paternal uncle, through 
whom the Quraishis made their offers: ―O my uncle! By Allah, if they put the sun in my 
right hand and the moon in my left on condition that I abandon this course, until Allah has 
made me victorious, or I perish therein, I would not abandon it.‖ The Quraishis then 
escalated their resistance by launching a severe psychological campaign aimed at 
undermining his call and frustrating his efforts to spread the new faith. Among other 
things, the campaign involved the dissemination of a variety of rumours and calumnies 
about him. It also included the composition of satires and lampoons which ridiculed and 
belittled Prophet Muhammed, insulting all that he held sacred. This campaign of hatred 
included accusations that the propagator of Islam was nothing but an impostor, a charlatan, 
a crazed poet and a magician. With the verbal and psychological campaign went physical 
abuse: Prophet Muhammed was several times beaten and trampled by the gangsters and 
thugs of Mecca.
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 When these and other measures failed to stop his preaching, the 
Quraishis started thinking seriously of physically eliminating one whom they saw as an 
exponent of dissent and rebellion, but this proposition was fraught with risks. To decide the 
fate of Prophet Muhammed, a meeting was held at Dar al-Nadwa, the Council or 
Parliament House of Mecca, during which, after careful deliberations, the archenemy of 
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Islam, Abu Jahl
232
, who had earlier attempted to kill Prophet Muhammed by throwing a 
heavy rock at him while he was in prostration to Allah, put forward a plan to assassinate 
him. He suggested that a band of young men, one from each tribe, should strike Prophet 
Muhammed simultaneously with their swords so that the blood-money would be spread 
over them all and therefore could not be exacted, and his people would seek a mind-based 
recourse for settlement.
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 To that end, eleven able-bodied men representing most of the tribes in Mecca were 
duly chosen, but despite the tight siege which the would-be assassins laid on Prophet 
Muhammed‘s house, the operation proved a total disaster. Prophet Muhammed had learned 
of the plot against him and left Mecca for Medina, avoiding detection by taking an 
unconventional route. In a desperate attempt to seize the prophet, the Quraishis ―blocked 
all avenues leading out of Mecca and imposed heavy armed surveillance over all potential 
exits‖.234 Despite these drastic measures, Prophet Muhammed managed to break out of the 
siege and march towards Medina, where many enthusiastic new converts to Islam had 
pledged to provide him with a safe haven and welcome his followers.  
 Attempts at a military solution were also unsuccessful. Despite the vast numerical 
superiority of the Meccans, they were routed by the zealous followers of Prophet 
Muhammed on the battlefield of Badr. During the weeks of soul-searching which followed 
this humiliation, a Meccan, Omeir bin Wahab bin Omeir, whose son was captured by the 
Muslims at Badr, expressed a strong desire to avenge himself on Prophet Muhammed. He 
told his best friend and confidant, Safwan bin Omaiyah, a secret: had it not been for the 
debts he had to pay back and the large family he had to support, he would have rushed to 
Medina and shed Prophet Muhammed‘s blood. Safwan, who was quite wealthy, shared a 
resentment and hatred of Prophet Muhammed. He readily agreed not only to look after 
Omeir‘s family if anything should happen to him, but also to pay off his debts. The two 
men took a solemn oath not to divulge the plan to anyone. Having applied a lethal poison 
to his sword, Omeir departed for Medina, but, thanks to Prophet Muhammed's dedicated 
network of Muslim agents, his intentions were discovered and he was immediately taken to 
Prophet Muhammed, who asked on what errand he had come to Medina. He said that he 
was worried about his son and wanted to be reassured that he was well treated in captivity. 
When Prophet Muhammed asked him about the sword, Omeir gave a vague response, 
saying that swords brought men nothing but misery. Pressed further about the real reason 
for bearing the sword, he again said nothing about his true intention. Exasperated by the 
continued denials, Prophet Muhammed finally confronted him with details of his 
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clandestine rendezvous with his friend Safwan and of his real reason for travelling to 
Medina. Astonished by Prophet Muhammed‘s accurate knowledge of his mission, Omeir 
immediately indicated his willingness to embrace Islam and to be one of Prophet 
Muhammed‘s followers. Prophet Muhammed then ordered that Omeir be taught the Quran. 
As a result of his conversion, his son was released from captivity.
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 Covert action was sometimes resorted to in order to deal with a grave social or tribal 
crisis or settle problems arising from long-standing feuds and vendettas. An example of 
this is afforded by the incident in which a Muslim killed two men by mistake. To settle the 
matter, their tribe demanded blood money. Unable to raise the sum required, Prophet 
Muhammed, in accordance with a treaty signed with the Jewish tribe of Banu An-Nadheer, 
sought their help to raise the money. The Jews invited Prophet Muhammed to pay them a 
visit, ostensibly to  discuss the matter further, but he learned through one of his covert 
agents that they were planning to assassinate him upon arrival. Details of the assassination 
plot were leaked by a Banu An-Nadheer woman to her sister, who had converted to 
Islam.
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 Finally, the tribal leader Abu Sufiyan recruited an anti-Muslim zealot to kill Prophet 
Muhammed in Medina, providing him with a sum of money and a good horse. Because of 
the sensitive nature of the mission, the agent was especially warned to keep all his 
movements and contacts secret, but as soon as he entered Medina, the Muslims‘ suspicions 
were raised.  Upon his capture he confessed and when he was offered the chance to 
embrace Islam, he did so readily and was forgiven.
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4.2 Conclusion 
It is clear that from the start of his mission Prophet Muhammed was fully aware of the vital 
role of intelligence in securing success for his operations and in achieving tactical and 
strategic goals. Throughout the various stages of his call to Islam, Prophet Muhammed 
carried out all sorts of intelligence activities. During the early Secret Stage of his mission, 
which lasted three years, Prophet Muhammed felt it necessary to keep his movements and 
contacts confidential. To that end, he approached only those whom he knew well and 
trusted. Certain strict criteria had to be met before a person was invited to embrace the new 
faith. Once he had secured their allegiance, Prophet Muhammed would embark on training 
and educating new recruits in the ways of Islam without fearing that he would be betrayed. 
This period was characterized by extreme secrecy, alertness and caution so that the new 
religion was not crushed before it could grow. 
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 During the following Open Stage, the tactic of secrecy was abandoned. Having 
established a small but firm base in Meccan society, Prophet Muhammed took fewer 
precautions and openly advocated his new faith, not only to his fellow Meccans but also to 
those who came to Mecca for business, religious or personal reasons. The third stage began 
with Prophet Muhammed‘s emigration to Medina, where he succeeded in establishing the 
first Muslim state. This last stage witnessed intense and bloody confrontations between the 
converts to the new faith and those who adhered to their ancestral religions and sets of 
values. It was during this stage that Islamic intelligence work may be said to have come of 
age. New tactics and methodologies were employed to protect the fledgling state and 
spread the new faith outside the confines of Medina.           
 These intelligence activities, categorised in this chapter as clandestine collection, 
analysis, counterintelligence and covert operations, strongly affected the course of Islamic 
history, especially in the struggle between Prophet Muhammed and his followers on one 
hand and the enemies of Islam on the other. Prophet Muhammed appears to have managed 
within a relatively short time to rejuvenate Bedouin society and to create a new state based 
on a new faith. If we exclude the spiritual dimension and divine intervention, to which the 
Muslim faithful attribute Prophet Muhammed‘s successes, Muslim intelligence activities 
may be seen as having played a decisive role in instilling, nurturing and spreading Islam in 
the deserts of Arabia. The activities, operations and tactics employed during the three 
stages of Islam have firmly established themselves in Islamic history as part of the Sunnah 
and the heritage of Islam, which all Muslims continue to seek to emulate.   
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Chapter Five 
 
Early Islamic Military and Operational Intelligence 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The essential activities of military intelligence such as procuring the data necessary for 
evaluating and analyzing threats, assessing intentions and keeping a close watch on the 
enemy were all, with varying degrees of professionalism and sophistication, carried out  
during the first few years of the new Islamic state which Prophet Muhammed founded in 
Medina in AD 623. Details of battles recorded in Ibn Is-haq‘s Al-Seerah wa Al-Maghazi 
(The Biography and the Battles of Prophet Muhammed) show that before each battle, 
Prophet Muhammed and the military commanders of the new state consciously and 
consistently sought to acquire strategic and tactical information about their enemies in 
order that appropriate plans might be laid. This chapter will discuss the intelligence 
activities practiced by the Muslims in the most important battles led by Muhammed 
himself: Badr, Uhud and Khandaq.   
As soon as the Islamic state was established, Prophet Muhammed and his military 
council embarked upon the first steps of a long-term strategic plan to strangle Mecca 
economically. They sought to sap Meccan strength and force the Quraishis to succumb to 
pressure through the imposition of a tight embargo and a total blockade of Mecca‘s lines of 
communication with the outside world. For this they needed reliable intelligence. The first 
clandestine mission to gather information on the commercial activities of the Meccans was 
entrusted to one of Prophet Muhammed‘s cousins, Abdullah ibn Jahsh, who was among the 
first Meccans to embrace Islam. Ibn Jahsh, the first Muslim to be called an emir in the 
original sense of the term (leader), was instructed to lead a group of eight men and scout a 
specific area between Mecca and Medina. They were instructed to target the commercial 
activities along the caravan route that leads to Mecca. The mission was quite successful, 
resulting in the seizure of a whole Mecca-bound caravan and the capture of some of the 
men guarding it.
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Later in the same year, a second clandestine mission was carried out and resulted in a 
resounding victory in the first battle between the Muslims and the polytheists of Quraish. 
The secret Muslim network in Mecca played a crucial part in making this victory possible. 
Those who clandestinely dispatched intelligence reports to Prophet Muhammed in Medina 
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were, as Al-Barhawi points out, a mixed medley of people. Some were 'Mustadháfoon' (the 
oppressed) who had no tribal connections, others were non-Arabs who had  secretly 
embraced Islam. These had the advantage of moving about freely and thus were better 
placed to collect and relay information. Another group of collaborators were non-Muslim 
Arabs who have blood or tribal relations with some Muslims who had emigrated to 
Medina.
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  Those assigned by Prophet Muhammed to reconnoitre the overland routes 
around Mecca and Medina brought news that a large commercial caravan was coming 
from Sham (Damascus) to Mecca, headed by the wealthiest and most influential Quraishi 
merchant, Abu Sufyan. With the loss of the first Quraishi caravan still fresh in his mind, 
Abu Sufyan and his fellow merchants were also seeking information about the intentions 
of the Muslims and their preparedness to ambush or intercept his caravan and seize it. The 
highly charged atmosphere and the tense relations between the Muslims and the Quraishis 
required both sides to exert intensive efforts in the fields of reconnaissance, clandestine 
collection, elicitation techniques and acquisition of tactical information. The subsequent 
battle, at a place called Badr, was indeed of far-reaching consequences. This first serious 
encounter between Prophet Muhammed‘s followers and the Meccans was as significant as 
Lepanto was to Christian Europe of the 16
th
 century in that it ended the myth of Meccan 
superior might and established Islam as a power to reckon with.
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 The successes scored in 
the engagements, which lasted only one day, were a great boost to the Muslims‘ morale. 
The battle, soon to be known in Arab history as ‗the battle of destiny‘ also provided a 
practical test of the military strength of the Muslim fighting men and consolidated the 
ranks of the zealous worshippers of Allah. But above all else, it inspired confidence that 
the fruits of a long-term commercial embargo on Quraish would soon be reaped. The 
following sections examine in detail this battle and those of Uhud and  Khandaq (the 
Ditch).  
 
5.2 The Battle of Badr (16 March 624) 
The battle of Badr, which took place on 15
th
 March 624, was named after an important 
well where desert travellers and caravans would stop for water supplies. Details of this first 
major military encounter between Prophet Muhammed and the Quraishi polytheists have 
been amply narrated by Arab and Muslim biographers, historians and commentators. 
Among the main reasons for the outbreak of hostilities was the Meccans‘ increased anxiety 
over the rise of the Muslims and the fear that their new entity in Medina would grow 
bellicose and aggressive. The Meccans‘ greatest fear was that the Muslims might one day 
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disrupt the overland caravan routes linking Mecca with the rest of the Arabian Desert, or 
indeed strangle Mecca economically. Another reason for the confrontation was a Quraishi 
attempt to avenge themselves for the murder of one of their chiefs, Umar bin Al-
Hadhrami,
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 who was killed while leading a commercial caravan outside Medina. The 
Muslims, for their part, were waiting for an opportunity to hit back at the Quraishis, who 
had grossly ill-treated them, tortured them and forced them to flee their homes, for no 
reason other than embracing a new faith.   
 Prophet Muhammed‘s attempts at persuading his fellow Quraishis peacefully to accept 
his new faith were constantly frustrated by the Meccans, who continued to ignore his calls 
and inflict grievous psychological and physical torture upon them. Having realized that 
danger could not be fended off peacefully, he resorted to the imposition of an economic 
blockade on Mecca, by intercepting and banning any commercial caravan movement to 
and from the city.
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 In order that the blockade might succeed and produce the desired 
effect, it was imperative that detailed information should be collected about these caravans: 
their size, merchandise and itinerary, as well as the protection squad accompanying them. 
To that end, Prophet Muhammed routinely dispatched scouts and information gatherers, 
who roamed the desert looking for any caravans or traders traversing it. On the eve of the 
Battle of Badr, Prophet Muhammed ordered some of his agents to carry out a clandestine 
mission: collecting as much information as possible on a commercial caravan led by Omar 
bin Hadhrami. The eight-man group, known as the Nakhla Platoon, was headed by 
Abdullah Ibn Jahsh Ibn Ri‘ab Al-Asdi.  
 One of the most authoritative and popular accounts of this mission and the famed 
battle in general is Al-Raheeq al-Makhtoom (Sealed Nectar), compiled and edited by the 
contemporary scholar Shaikh Safiur Rahman al-Mubarakpuri. This important work, which 
draws only on original texts and primary sources, is widely accepted as one of the more 
reliable biographies of Prophet Muhammed. Much of Al-Mubarakpouri‘s material is based 
on details provided by an early Arab chronicler, Ibn Is-haq, the first scholar to write a full-
length biography of Prophet Muhammed. Al-Mubarakpouri relates that the prophet once 
commanded Ibn Jahsh to go to a place called Al-Nakhla and handed him a sealed note 
which he was not to read until he had journeyed for two days. Ibn Jahsh was then 
instructed to follow the written orders. Having journeyed for two days, Muhammed's agent 
opened the mission order. The note commanded Ibn Jahsh to lie in wait at Nakhla for a 
Quraishi caravan. He was also commanded to collect information about the movements of 
this and other Quraishi caravans in the area. He did as commanded and after a short while, 
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he spotted a Quraishi caravan. Ibn Jahsh who had shaved his head before he set out on this 
secret mission moved forward towards the caravan. Because of his appearance, the 
Quraishis felt safe as they thought that he and his companions were pilgrims intending to 
visit Mecca. But it did not take long before Ibn Jahsh and his companions made a surprise 
and bloody assault. They killed a few of the caravan men, put to flight the rest of them, 
then took over the caravan and returned to Medina with the spoils and two Quraishi 
prisoners.
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 Although the team leader had exceeded his powers by killing some members of the 
caravan and despite the bloody outcome of the mission, which angered Prophet 
Muhammed,
244
 the fact remains that his information-gathering tactics produced accurate 
intelligence which was of immense significance to the Muslims. The details supplied by 
the agents about the caravan‘s leader, its merchandise and its itinerary, as well as the 
places at which it was scheduled to stop, were vital to Prophet Muhammed. For his part, 
Abu Sufyan, the caravan leader and Prophet Muhammed‘s arch-enemy, was also on the 
utmost alert and most anxious to know about the movements of Prophet Muhammed and 
the strength of his followers. He was regularly provided with reports detailing Prophet 
Muhammed's activities by his own scouts. When he learnt of the assault on the caravan 
outside Medina and the fact that the Muslims were lying in ambush, he dispatched a 
messenger to the Meccans. To draw attention to his urgent message and incite as much 
excitement and curiosity as possible amongst the crowd around the Kaaba, he, according to 
Al-Mubarakpouri, 
 cut off the nose and the ears of his camel, turned its saddle upside down, 
tore off his own shirt from front and behind, and cried: ‗O Quraish! Your 
merchandise! It is with Abu Sufyan. The caravan is being intercepted by 
Muhammad and his companions. I cannot describe what has happened to them. 
Help! Help!‘ The effect of this hue and cry was instantaneous: the news 
stunned Quraish and they immediately remembered how their pride had been 
wounded when the Muslims had intercepted an earlier caravan. They therefore 
swiftly mustered almost all of their forces and mobilized some Arab tribes to 
contribute to the war against Muhammed. Soon, an excited throng of 1300 
soldiers, including 100 horsemen and 600 mailed soldiers with a large number 
of camels, was clamouring to proceed to fight the Muslims.
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Al-Mubarakpouri‘s account continues: 
  They set out, burning with indignation, motivated by a horrible desire 
for revenge and exterminating anyone that might jeopardize the routes of 
their caravans. They moved swiftly northward towards Badr and while on 
the way they received another message from Abu Sufyan asking them to go 
back home because the caravan had escaped the Muslims. Incidentally, Abu 
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Sufyan, on learning the intention of the Muslims, led his caravan off the 
main route, and inclined it towards the Red Sea. By this manoeuvre, he was 
able to slip past the Muslims‘ ambush and was out of their reach. On 
receiving Abu Sufyan‘s message, the Meccan army showed a desire to 
return home. The tyrant Abu Jahl, however, haughtily and arrogantly 
insisted that they proceed to Badr and stay three nights there to make 
festivities. Now they wanted to punish the Muslims, prevent them from 
intercepting their caravans, and impress on the Arabs that Quraish still had 
the upper hand and enjoyed supremacy in that area.
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 Those who were dispatched to reconnoitre the Quraishis reported that a bloody 
encounter with the Meccans was inescapable and that a daring step in this context had to be 
taken, or else they would most likely lose the impending battle. The Muslims were afraid 
that the Meccans would march on and start military activities deep inside Medina, the 
centre of Islam, which would certainly have inflicted irreparable damage. On account of 
these grave developments, Prophet Muhammed held an emergency meeting to review the 
situation and exchange views with the army leaders. He apprised his men of the gravity of 
the situation and asked for their advice. Sa‘d bin Mu‘adh stood up and said:  
 O Prophet of Allah! we declare in unequivocal terms that what you have 
brought is the Truth. We give you our firm pledge of obedience and sacrifice. 
We will obey you most willingly in whatever you command us.‘ ... The 
Prophet (Peace be upon him) was impressed with the fidelity and the spirit of 
sacrifice which his companions showed at this critical juncture. Then he said 
to them: ‗Forward and be of cheer. … I feel as if I now see the enemy lying 
prostrate.‘ In the immediate vicinity of Badr, the Prophet and his confidant 
and cave-mate, Abu Bakr, conducted a scouting operation, during which they 
managed to locate the camp of the Quraishis. They came across an old 
Bedouin nearby, from whom they managed to extract the exact location of the 
army of the Meccans.
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 Prophet Muhammed‘s men realized the importance of protecting the life of their 
leader, as any mishap could have unforeseeable consequences for Islam as a religion and 
for the newly established state in Medina. To that end, ―a squad of guards was chosen from 
amongst the Helpers, under the leadership of Sa‘d bin Mu‘adh, in order to defend the 
Prophet (Peace be upon him) in his headquarters‖.248 Among other security measures, a 
contingency plan was devised to enable Prophet Muhammed, if the tide turned against the 
Muslims, to return to Medina to seek assistance from those he had left behind. But the 
early reconnaissance missions carried out by Prophet Muhammed‘s army gave the 
Muslims an advantage over their Quraishi adversaries in that these operations enabled 
them to acquire accurate knowledge of the topography of the terrain and to place the vital 
water resources under their tight control. No one was allowed to approach the wells 
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without permission. Thus, the Muslims were able to deprive their enemies of water, the 
most vital commodity in the desert, without which neither man nor beast could survive for 
long in the burning sands. As a result of this, ―a few [Quraishis] approached, in a 
provocative manner, to draw water from the wells of Badr, but were all killed except one, 
Hakeem bin Hizam‖.249 Hakeem was most likely one of Prophet Muhammed‘s agents in 
Mecca. Chroniclers point out that because he had provided intelligence, Prophet 
Muhammed had warned his army against killing him,
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 especially as he had secretly 
smuggled foodstuffs to the Muslims when they were besieged in Mecca.  
 The hostilities between the Quraishis and the Muslims were always preceded by 
reconnaissance and scouting missions. The Quraishi military chief, Abu Jahl, who led the 
campaign against Prophet Muhammed at Badr, dispatched a group of scouts led by Umair 
bin Wahab Al-Jumahi in order to assess the power of the Muslims. Upon his return from 
the mission, Al-Jumahi reported to his commander that ―the Muslim army numbered as 
many as 300 men, who were all keen on fighting to the last man‖.251 As the Quraishis were 
more than three times as numerous, their leaders suspected that Prophet Muhammed had 
not deployed all his forces to the battlefield and that he had either laid ambushes elsewhere 
or was keeping more troops behind the lines to fall back on when he needed support. But 
these suspicions were put to rest when a second reconnaissance mission was dispatched to 
scout the areas lying deep behind enemy lines and reported that ―neither were 
reinforcements coming to the Muslims, nor were any ambushes laid by them‖.252  
 Realizing that the Quraishis were numerically far superior to the Muslims, Prophet 
Muhammed spared no effort to uplift the spirit of his fighting men, inspire confidence 
among them and assure them of divine rewards if they were to fall in battle. The 
psychological impact of Prophet Muhammed's exhortation on his fighting men was 
immense. As a result, the Muslims started to fight with great vigour and resolve so much 
so that ―a large number of the polytheists were killed and the others began to waver.‖253 
The humiliating defeat suffered by Prophet Muhammed's enemies incensed the Quraishi 
leaders and pushed them to seek immediate revenge. This attempt to avenge the death of so 
many Quraishi's was the root cause of the Battle of Uhud, which will be taken up next. 
 
5.3 The Battle of Uhud (23 March 625) 
One outcome of the defeat suffered by the Meccan military leaders at Badr was loss of 
their prestige and standing with their own community as well as with non-Quraishis. 
Despite the great numerical advantage Quraish had over Prophet Muhammed's army, the 
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Muslims were able to achieve a resounding victory. The result was the loss of  50-70 
Quraishis killed and a similar number of Quraishis taken prisoner. These figures represent 
20% of the total force of the Quraishis. The Muslims on the other hand lost only 14 men or 
10% of their fighting force. Historical sources make no mention of the number of those 
wounded in battle. The new-found confidence of the Muslims after Badr led them to adopt 
a more vigorous stand and to tighten even further the economic blockade imposed on 
Mecca. In targeting Quraishi trade with the outside world, especially with Byzantine Syria, 
Prophet Muhammed proved himself an effective strategist, especially as the process of 
weakening the economic position of the Meccans would, in a matter of just a few years, 
bring them to their knees. But the embattled Quraishis would not accept defeat easily. They 
were determined to wipe out the stigma of the Badr defeat, resume normal economic 
activity and reopen all overland caravan routes linking Mecca with Yemen and Syria.
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 After a period of soul-searching and finger-pointing, the Quraishis decided that they 
had to do some self-examination to establish what went wrong. They also had to discover 
the factors which caused the Muslims to score such an impressive victory over an army 
that was so greatly superior in numbers, in arms and in provisions. They therefore 
embarked upon a campaign to collect information about the Muslim army in order to see if 
there were any weaknesses or loopholes which they could exploit in their next encounter 
with them. The Muslims, on the other hand, were no less anxious. They wanted to keep 
abreast of the Meccans‘ plans, their intentions and their preparedness for possible 
retaliatory action. 
 It was only natural, during a time of such tension and anxiety, that clandestine 
collection should increase markedly. Reports by uyoun and other covert agents such as 
travellers and merchants were not sufficient to provide an accurate assessment of each 
other‘s capabilities, intentions or plans; reliable and verified military intelligence required 
deeper knowledge and greater detail. Special operations aimed at collecting military 
information were not new to the warring parties, however, as both Muslims and Quraishis 
had practiced clandestine collection even before the battle of Badr. To ensure the success 
of raids against Mecca-bound caravans, the Muslims had developed their own system of 
permanent surveillance. Through their disguised and well-dispersed spies, they succeeded 
in obtaining accurate information on the alternative trade routes which the Quraishis had to 
take to escape the difficulties of the economic blockade. Prophet Muhammed took 
advantage of the intelligence obtained to launch a series of successful raids. Despite 
precautionary measures such as employment of experienced desert guides and frequent 
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changes of itineraries and trade routes, Quraishi caravans were frequently intercepted and 
looted.
255
   
 With violent confrontations between Prophet Muhammed and the Meccans becoming 
inevitable, Abu Sufyan and his fellow tribal chiefs planned a surprise all-out war on the 
Muslims. Just before the secret battle plan was to be implemented, one of Prophet 
Muhammed‘s spies in Mecca smuggled details of the impending assault to Prophet 
Muhammed. The agent, Abu Al-Fadhl,
256
 was in fact one of Prophet Muhammed‘s uncles 
who had been recruited earlier and was directed to remain in Mecca as a kind of ‗sleeper 
agent‘. Abu Al-Fadhl dispatched an urgent message to Medina, reading ―Quraish have 
unanimously decided to march towards you. Now that they are about to reach you, you 
must do whatever has to be done. The Quraishi army numbers 3000 men. They have 300 
camels and 200 horses. 700 of the men are clad in mail. They have ample arms and 
equipment.‖257 This timely intelligence provided Prophet Muhammed with extremely 
valuable time to raise the level of preparedness and to consult with his chiefs of staff on 
how best to resist the assault. 
 Abu Al-Fadhl was not the only secret agent in Mecca to provide Prophet Muhammed 
with much needed information on Meccan mobilization; another was Amru bin Salim Al-
Khuza‘i. By way of cover, Amru joined a number of his fellow tribesmen who were 
travelling from Mecca to Medina, in order to apprise Prophet Muhammed of the impending 
attack.
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 As soon as he had delivered his message he returned to Mecca, but news of his 
speedy journey to Medina reached the military intelligence of Quraish, whose agents had 
spotted him at a place called Al-Abwa. The commander-in-chief of the Quraishi forces, 
Abu Sufyan, was immediately informed of Amru‘s secret mission. He was also told that 
the Quraishis no longer had the advantage of surprise, as the Muslims knew of their 
numbers, movements and intentions.
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 Having received and verified reports of Quraishi mobilization against them, the 
Muslims now began shadowing the enemy and carrying out such necessary routines in 
military intelligence as collecting tactical and field information about them and raising the 
level of preparedness for any unexpected turn of events. Omar bin Al-Khattab increased 
night security guards, while patrols blocked all points of entrance and exit to and from 
Medina. Prophet Muhammed meanwhile ordered two of his agents, Anas and his brother 
Mu‘nis ibn Fadhala, to head for the place where the Quraishis had set up camp in order to 
scout the area and keep watch for the anticipated assault. 
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 Having succeeded in infiltrating enemy ranks, the brothers ibn Fadhala returned to 
Medina without raising the suspicions of their target. From the information they provided 
about the devastation of the vegetation in the Al-Areedh area, the Muslims were able to 
deduce the approximate number of the horses, camels and other beasts of burden which the 
enemy was deploying.260 To verify the information already received, Prophet Muhammed 
sent another scout: 
 The Prophet secretly dispatched Al-Habab bin Al-Munthir bin Al-Jamouh to 
the Quraishis. He advised him to be discreet and not to report the results to the 
Prophet in the presence of other men. Upon completion of his secret operation, 
Al-Habab waited until he saw the Prophet was alone. The Prophet asked: 
‗What did you see?‘ He answered: ‗O Prophet of Allah, I saw approximately 
3000 men, perhaps a little more or a little less. I also saw 200 horses, and seven 
hundred men clad in mail‘. The Prophet then asked: ‗Have you seen women on 
camel-back?‘ ‗Yes‘, came the answer. ‗They had drums and tambouines.‘ Then 
the Prophet said: ‗The women seek to incite their men and remind them of 
those who fell at Badr. This is what I have heard. Now, remember: Never 
mention any of all this to anyone.261 
 
 Al-Habab‘s report contained more details than that of the two brothers, especially as it 
provided facts and figures about the Quraishi army. The report also included information 
on the psychological condition of the advancing warriors and the attempt of their leaders to 
boost morale by reminding the fighters of those who had been killed in the first 
confrontation with the Muslims. There were several reasons for embedding war widows 
and other women in the Quraishi army. It was intended as a stark reminder of the necessity 
to avenge the bereaved women, by cleansing Quraishi honour and reputation of the stigma 
of the Badr defeat. But the female presence on the battlefield was also an incentive for 
Arab tribesmen to fight bravely before their women, who, with their drums and tambours, 
acted both as spectators and cheerleaders. 
 Prophet Muhammed continued reconnaissance operations and on the night before the 
two armies met he directed a Medina intelligence operative, Salameh bin Salamah bin 
Waqash, to infiltrate the Quraishis and report on their final preparations: 
 When Salameh approached the enemy camp, he was discovered by the 
Quraishi intelligence, who immediately dispatched ten horsemen to chase him. 
They followed him for some distance, until he reached a place not far from his 
farm. He dismounted and exchanged darts and stones with his chasers. He then 
sped to his farm, where he soon got hold of a sword and an iron shield, which 
he had buried underground, and came back armed with them to fight on.262  
    
 In his protracted engagements with the Quraishis, Prophet Muhammed relied not only 
on secret agents, dedicated swordsmen and others experienced in psychological warfare 
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who deliberately leaked disinformation aimed at undermining the morale of his enemies, 
but also on highly experienced desert guides. These men, who possessed accurate 
knowledge of alternative routes and safe shortcuts, were crucial to the success of any 
military operation. Having readied his one-thousand-strong army for the imminent battle, 
Prophet Muhammed, with the help of one such guide, Abu Hathama al-Harithi, gave the 
order to advance in the direction of the Quraishi army. The Muslims moved under cover of 
darkness and choosing a little known route not under the surveillance of the Quraishis, they 
managed to reach Uhud undetected. But no sooner had they started to set up camp than one 
of Prophet Muhammed‘s field commanders, the Khazraj tribal leader Abdullah bin Abi 
Masloul, withdrew from the battlefield, taking with him three hundred fighters. Masloul, 
known in Islamic history as the ‗master of all dissemblers‘, had objected to Prophet 
Muhammed‘s battle plans, arguing that leaving Medina was to court disaster.  He told 
Prophet Muhammed: 
  [In pre-Islamic days], we always defended Medina without having to leave 
the confines of the city. Our women and children would help us by amassing 
huge heaps of stones, which they would then throw at the enemy when they 
tried to storm Medina, while we fought with our swords in the open. O 
Messenger of Allah, Our city is still virgin, untouched by invaders. Whenever 
we stay inside to ward off and fight the attackers we always win.  But when we 
go out to meet the assailants, we always suffer losses. So, Messenger of Allah, 
let them come forward and they will be met with an evil fate. If, on the other 
hand, they decide to retreat, they would then retreat dishonoured and defeated. 
O Messenger of Allah, please listen to me and abide by what I say. Know that I 
have inherited this experience from the elders and most dignified of my people, 
who possessed great wisdom and experience.263   
 
 It is not unlikely that Masloul, the ‗master of all dissemblers‘, was a Quraishi agent, 
planted amongst the Muslims in order to undermine Prophet Muhammed‘s authority from 
within. There must have been a good reason why he was consistently called ‗Munafiq‘.264 
According to chroniclers‘ accounts, this term fits Masloul‘s description perfectly, as the 
damage he inflicted was immense. Besides the negative impact on the morale of the 
fighting men, he also undermined the military capabilities of the Muslims by reducing the 
number of fighting men from one thousand to only seven hundred, which ultimately led, at 
least in the first part of the battle, to a military defeat. 
 Upon arrival on the battlefield, Prophet Muhammed immediately went on a 
reconnaissance mission to acquaint himself and his commanders with the topography and 
special features of the terrain which was soon to be the main theatre of the confrontation. 
He decided to take full advantage of the 'Ainain Hill, on the slopes of which the Muslim 
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army was camped. The high ground was especially advantageous for the spear throwers 
and provided a good rear defence. Prophet Muhammed deployed a batch of fifty archers to 
the Hill, with specific orders not to pull out under any circumstances. Their duty was to 
protect the rear of the Muslim army. In the first round the Muslims managed to force the 
enemy to retreat and flee the battlefield. Muslims sensed victory and started collecting the 
war booty. At this point, most of the archers started leaving their posts in order to wrest 
their share of the war booty. In the event, lack of military discipline and disregard of strict 
orders had catastrophic consequences for the Muslims. The right flank officer of the 
Qurishi‘s army, Khalid bin Alwalid, spotted the 'Ainain Hill vacated posts. He immediately 
pushed forward with his two hundreds cavalrymen and occupied them. He then took the 
Muslim army rear by surprise and inflicted heavy losses upon them. Panic and 
bewilderment seized the Muslim army. Prophet Muhammed was badly injured in his face 
and many of his bodyguards and fighting men fell. A rumour quickly spread in the 
battlefield that Prophet Muhammed had been killed. But the tide of battle turned against 
the Quraishis when the serious shortcomings and failings were remedied in the second 
round of hostilities especially as more use was made of scouts, guides and advance 
reconnaissance teams. In all, the Muslims suffered the loss of 70 men while the Quraishis 
lost only 22. Despite the increase in intelligence activities in Uhud, the battle which 
followed it, Khandaq, witnessed a qualitative leap in intelligence operations.  
5.4 The Battle of Khandaq (March 627) 
The roots of the Battle of Khandaq (The Trench or Ditch) date back to an earlier 
confrontation between the Muslims and the Jews of Banu Nadhir, who had been exiled by 
Prophet Muhammed from Medina to Khaibar. According to Muslim chroniclers, Banu 
Nadhir did not forget their eviction and waited for an opportune moment to exact revenge. 
Their plan was to launch an all-out assault on Prophet Muhammed‘s stronghold, Medina, 
in order to end the Muslim threat once and for all. As they could not embark on such an 
ambitious expedition on their own, they had to involve as many of Prophet Muhammed‘s 
enemies and rivals as possible, in order to muster a force strong enough to redraw the 
newly created map on the ground. Banu Nadhir‘s strategy, which required the launch of a 
well-orchestrated smear campaign against Prophet Muhammed, also included an active 
drive to enter into new pacts and alliances. To lure Arab tribes to their side, they promised 
rewards, in cash and provisions, for those who would join the military effort against 
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Prophet Muhammed. To that end, a group of Jewish dignitaries, assisted by a number of 
chieftains from other tribes, led a large delegation on a flurry of contacts and a tour that 
took them to many parts of Arabia.
265
  
 The first port of call was Mecca, where great effort was made to solicit Quraishi help 
against the Muslims, who after the Battle of Badr had become too assertive and ambitious 
for the non-Muslims and polytheists to accept. Basing his account of the battle on that of 
the 8
th
 century chronicler, Ibn Ishaq, Al-Mubarakpouri says that twenty chiefs and 
celebrities of Banu Nadhir went to Mecca to negotiate an alliance with Quraish: 
 They began to goad the people there to attack [Prophet Muhammed], 
promising them full support and backing. The people of Quraish, who had been 
languid and proved too weak to challenge the Muslims at Badr, seized this 
opportunity to redeem their stained honour and blemished reputation. The same 
delegation set out for Ghatfan, called them to do the same, and they responded 
positively. The Jewish delegation then started a fresh effort and toured some 
parts of Arabia and managed to incite the confederates of disbelief against the 
Prophet, his Message and the believers in Allah. Quraish, Kinanah and other 
allies from Tihama, in the south, rallied, ranked and recruited four thousand 
men under the leadership of Abu Sufyan. From the east there came tribes of 
Banu Saleem, Ghatfan, Bani Murrah, etc. They all headed for Medina and 
gathered in its vicinity at a time already agreed upon.
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 Greatly outnumbered by the Quraishi army, which was ten thousand strong, the 
Muslims had to devise a defence strategy which would neutralise this numerical 
superiority. One of Prophet Muhammed‘s companions made an inventive proposal: ―O 
Messenger of Allah! When siege was laid to us in Persia, we used to dig trenches to defend 
ourselves‖.267 Then the Muslims, with Prophet Muhammed at their head, encouraging, 
helping and reminding them of their reward in the Hereafter, started to build a trench 
around Medina. ―Severe hunger, bordering on starvation, could not dissuade or discourage 
them from achieving their desperately sought objective‖.268  
 The land to the north of Medina was a flat desert plateau, making it quite vulnerable, 
so the Muslim leaders expected their enemies to concentrate their assault from that 
direction. To thwart the impending attack, they decided to dig a defensive trench or dry 
moat on that side. The trench was dug with such speed that the Quraishis were unpleasantly 
surprised at   
 a new stratagem unknown in Arabia before, standing as an obstinate 
obstruction. Consequently they decided to lay siege to Medina and began to 
manoeuvre around the trench, trying hard to find a vulnerable spot through 
which they could infiltrate into the beleaguered city. To deter their enemies, the 
Muslims hurled arrows and engaged in skirmishes with them. The veteran 
fighters of Quraish were averse to this situation, waiting in vain in anticipation 
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of what the siege might reveal. Therefore they decided that a group of fighters 
led by ‗Amr bin ‗Abd-e-Wudd, ‗Ikrima bin Abi Jahl and Dirar bin Al-Khattab, 
should work its way through the trench. They ... managed to do that and their 
horsemen captured a marshy area between the trench and Sila‘ Mountain. ‗Amr 
challenged the Muslims to a duel, and ‗Ali bin Abi Talib was deputed. After a 
short but fierce engagement, ‗Ali killed ‗Amr and obliged the others to 
evacuate.
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 Prophet Muhammed‘s use of intelligence was instrumental in aborting the assault on 
Medina. Reports began to flow in as soon as the Quraishi army started its advance. The 
Muslim sources, who were mainly from the tribe of Khuza‘h, kept Prophet Muhammed‘s 
headquarters in Medina informed of all that they managed to see or hear. Over a period of 
several days, the Quraishis were closely shadowed and monitored, all along the route to 
Medina.
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 The agents confirmed earlier reports about the magnitude of the force 
assembled by the Quraishis, who were far superior on every count: numbers, provisions 
and weapons. From these reports, Prophet Muhammed learnt that the Quraishis had 
recruited ten thousand fighting men and three hundred cavalrymen against his own army of 
three thousand. To lessen the impact of this imbalance, Prophet Muhammed, who had 
carefully studied the topography of the area surrounding Medina, decided to make full use 
of the natural characteristics of the terrain. In his consultations with his commanders, it 
became clear that the best option for the Muslims was to avoid a head-on clash with the 
Quraishis and to engage them instead in a long-term war of attrition. It was thought that 
this would wear out the besieging armies and exhaust Quraishi resources, especially as the 
confrontation coincided with the arrival of the short but cold season of winter, during 
which animal fodder was normally hard to come by, while grazing land for the horses, 
camels and other livestock was depleted. The decision to favour a war of attrition, which 
may be seen as strategically sound, was mainly dictated by the prevailing circumstances. It 
also took into account that vendettas and revenge-based wars might last for generations, 
that desert Arabs were not accustomed to long-term active hostilities and that few of their 
military confrontations in the past had been protracted.
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 Direct reconnaissance of Medina and the vicinity around it provided Prophet 
Muhammed with detailed knowledge of the topography and natural barriers which could 
be exploited for defence purposes. The Muslims decided to take full advantage of Mount 
Sala‘ and the rocky highlands adjacent to it, which provided an excellent defence against 
any army approaching from the south. Other impenetrable mountains were also counted 
upon to provide a natural bulwark for the army‘s back. But the open rolling plains of the 
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northern approaches to Medina presented a serious challenge to Prophet Muhammed‘s 
defence strategy; hence the decision to dig a trench across it so as to impede any advance 
from that direction. The trench, which took twenty days to complete, was over 5 kilometres 
long, 4 metres wide and 3 metres deep. Sentinels and regular patrols were soon put in place 
to monitor any movement close by. To make the best use of his forces, Prophet 
Muhammed‘s major battalions were deployed to defend this soft underbelly, whereas 
smaller units were stationed in and around Mount Sala‘, where no direct engagements were 
expected and the only weapons which could be used effectively were arrows and stones 
thrown by catapults and mangonels.
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 When the commander of the advancing Quraishi army discovered that Prophet 
Muhammed had dug a deep ditch across the northern approach, he was dumbfounded, 
declaring it to be ―a trap which the Arabs had never known or resorted to before‖.273 The 
Quraishis, who had not taken the existence of the trench into consideration, had no other 
choice but to camp outside Medina and lay siege to the city, having been practically 
entrapped by this stratagem. They neither had enough provisions to outlast the defenders of 
Medina, nor had they equipped themselves to negotiate their way through the ditch.  
 The Quraishis realized that the best option was to find a gap through which they could 
infiltrate the defences and reach Prophet Muhammed‘s stronghold in Medina. To that end, 
they contacted the Jews of Banu Quraidha. Muslim chroniclers relate that the Jews were 
persuaded to break a covenant which they had signed earlier with the Muslims. When 
reports reached Prophet Muhammed of Banu Quraidha‘s defection to the Quraishis, he 
directed Umar bin Al-Khattab, the second in command for intelligence and security affairs, 
to verify this disturbing development. Umar dispatched an agent who was able to confirm 
these reports, adding that they were in fact preparing for war, as he had seen them 
―mending their castles, paving their roads and gathering their livestock‖.274 Prophet 
Muhammed also learnt that Quraidha had suggested that one thousand cavalrymen should 
launch an attack on Medina from their own territory. Against this background of 
heightened suspicion and intrigue, Prophet Muhammed decided to intensify foot and 
cavalry patrols through Medina, assigning 500 men to the task. To inspire confidence and 
infuse a sense of security among the inhabitants of Medina, the patrols roamed the streets 
day and night, shouting ―Allah Akbar‖ (Allah is Greatest).275 
 Quraidha‘s default on its covenant was, among other things, an immense 
psychological blow to the Muslims. Abu Bakr is reported to have said: ―When it came to 
the safety and security of our children, whom we had left behind, we feared Banu Quraidha 
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more than we did the Quraishis. But when we saw that the city was being defended by the 
guards, I thank Allah that Quraidha‘s designs were all thwarted‖.276 
 Realizing that the odds weighed even more heavily against the Muslims, Prophet 
Muhammed had to conceive a stratagem by which he could break up the broad alliance 
forged against him by the Jews, Quraishis and other Arab tribes. Therefore, he sent for one 
of his agents in the Ghatfan tribe, Na‘im bin Mas‘ud, and asked him to execute a very 
delicate mission. Mas‘ud was ordered to go on an extended tour whose purpose was to 
weaken and ultimately destroy the tribal coalition against the Muslims. Mas‘ud was chosen 
for a number of reasons. He had kept his conversion to Islam secret, so he was trusted not 
only by his tribesmen but by the other tribes of the anti-Prophet Muhammed camp. He also 
had many strong personal relationships with the Jews of Banu Quraidha, making his 
mission much easier and his words more credible. Empowered by Prophet Muhammed to 
do or say anything that might facilitate his shuttle mission between the different coalition 
parties, Mas‘ud incited each party to betray the other. He whispered in the ears of Banu 
Quraidha not to trust Quraish, nor fight with them unless the latter pledged some hostages. 
He then headed for the camp of Quraish and told them that the Jews had reneged on their 
pledge and that they were maintaining regular correspondence with the Muslims. He 
further exhorted the Quraishis not to send hostages to Banu Quraidha. Mas‘ud‘s scheme 
proved effective, and "a state of distrust and suspicion prevailed among the disbelieving 
allies, reducing their morale to a great degree".
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 Masu‘d‘s success in fragmenting the alliance against Prophet Muhammed was greeted 
with immense joy by the Muslims, but Prophet Muhammed did not drop his guard. He 
ordered one of his intelligence officers, Huthaifah bin Al-Yaman, to go on a secret mission 
to infiltrate Quraishi ranks, attempt to discover their plans and assess their psychological 
condition, now that the besieging armies had lost their allies and helpers. Huthaifah was 
specifically directed to guard against discovery by the enemy and was ordered never to 
engage in any fighting or draw his weapon throughout the mission. He did as directed and 
reported to Prophet Muhammed that the Quraishis were in a sorry state as they faced the 
unexpected inclemency of the weather: an extremely strong and cold wind was blowing. 
Huthaifah told Prophet Muhammed how he managed to join a group of Quraishis who 
were sitting around a campfire. He then saw Abu Sufyan rise to address his followers: 
―Beware of spies and agents. Let each man amongst you look around you and check who is 
sitting next to you‖. He then said:  
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 We are really in a terrible state now. Our food and provisions have almost 
completely disappeared, our livestock is gone, and we have now been reduced 
to living in a total wasteland. Banu Quraidha have betrayed us. The wind has 
been so terrible that it has obliterated all that we have built. I strongly believe it 
will never be safe for us to remain here. I therefore urge departure.
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 Upon collapse of the month-long total blockade of Medina, the fighting men of 
Quraish began to leave in droves, giving Prophet Muhammed's men who had worked night 
and day to dig up the trenches around their besieged city cause for celebration. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, it is important to point out that the Quran allows Muslims to fight 
their enemies and use force against them. According to the Surah of Pilgrimage, Allah 
asserts: ―To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they 
are wronged; and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid.‖279 In light of this divine 
legislation, Prophet Muhammed‘s employment of intelligence was naturally seen as a 
means to spread the word of Allah and defeat those who bore enmity to the Prophet and 
Islam. Without the effective use of clandestine collection, secret agents, scouts and all other 
intelligence and covert action tactics, the history of the early battles of Islam would have 
been different.   
 What greatly contributed to the successes of Prophet Muhammed was the fact that he 
kept all intelligence activities under tight control, with Umar Bin Al-Khatab, his trusted 
companion as second in command. The effective use of agents and informers ensured that 
not only was Prophet Muhammed warned of the intentions, location and capabilities of his 
adversaries, but he was always one step ahead of the Quraishi and his other enemies. As for 
counterintelligence, his countermeasures were so effective that his enemies were often 
shocked by his moves. The best illustrative example of this is the conquest of Mecca, which 
took the Meccans by surprise. It may thus be said that Prophet Muhammed practiced what 
Sun Tzu had preached a full millennium earlier, that all war is based on deception and that 
one‘s plans should be as impenetrable as night.280 The next chapter concludes this account 
of the historical and religious background to the topic by examining Arab intelligence 
tradecraft. 
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Chapter Six 
Arab Intelligence Tradecraft 
 
6.1 Intelligence Skills in the Early Islamic Period 
When Prophet Muhammed first set out to preach the new religion among the Quraishi idol 
worshippers in present-day Mecca, he was extremely cautious as to whom he approached 
where and when; indeed, total secrecy marked his early efforts to preach the word of Allah. 
But once a few followers and supporters had been secured, he changed tactics and 
gradually started to lift the thick veil of secrecy behind which he moved. Alarmed by the 
audacity of the Muslims and their initial successes at the popular level, and having failed to 
silence them through negotiation with the elders of Prophet Muhammed‘s Banu Hashim 
clan, the powerful Quraishi establishment now resorted to all sorts of warfare in order to 
uproot what they considered a malignant scourge. The Quraishis appeared to believe that 
launching constant and unrelenting propaganda campaigns against everything Prophet 
Muhammed and his new faith stood for might silence this new voice. They were 
particularly active during the annual pilgrimage season, when people from all over Arabia 
descended upon Mecca as pilgrims and to do business at the same time; but pilgrims, 
visitors and traders were not the only people the Quraishis targeted. The local residents and 
urban dwellers, as well as the Bedouin tribes around Mecca, were all cautioned against the 
‗subversive‘ preaching of Prophet Muhammed, on whom a multitude of accusations were 
heaped. Among other things, he was accused of being a magician, a madman, a charlatan 
and a liar.
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 The hate-Prophet Muhammed campaign was even joined and fuelled by some 
of Prophet Muhammed‘s own family members, including Abu Lahab, his paternal uncle, 
who is still cursed by Muslim believers when they recite the following verses from the 
Quran: ―Perish be the two hands of Abu Lahab, and perish he. His wealth and his children 
will not benefit him. He will be burnt in a fire of blazing flames. And his wife too, who 
carries wood and thorns. In her neck is a twisted rope of Masad (palm fibre).
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 The psychological war against Prophet Muhammed produced no tangible results, 
however; the Muslims increased in numbers as they carried on spreading the message, 
countering Quraishi propaganda by resisting the campaign of vilification and humiliation 
to which they were subjected.
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 When the Quraishi attempts to suppress and eradicate the 
new movement were entirely frustrated, the Meccan establishment grew more ferocious 
and bloodthirsty. Nothing less than Prophet Muhammed‘s head would now satisfy them.284  
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 In the face of this turn of events, Prophet Muhammed had to devise a new strategy that 
would ensure his survival and the continuity of the call for Islam. He saw that the only 
option was to leave Mecca and head for Yethrib (Medina), which, as a thriving commercial 
centre with a mixed population of idol worshippers and Jews living side by side. It was 
deemed to provide a realistic prospect of affording a safe haven for the Muslims, especially 
as Prophet Muhammed had, in previous pilgrimage seasons, won a number of converts to 
Islam from that city. These new converts paid allegiance to Prophet Muhammed and 
promised that if he chose to come to their city, Medina, he would be warmly welcomed, 
well treated and protected as one of them. In planning his escape from Mecca, Prophet 
Muhammed showed a very keen sense of security. Having learnt through his highly 
secretive and intricate web of followers that his head was wanted, he thought out an 
elaborate and meticulous escape plan.  
 To mask his preparations for the escape, Prophet Muhammed went about his business 
as usual, but quietly and secretly enlisted the help of a guide to lead him across the 
desert.
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 He then chose two sturdy camels, one for himself, the other for his closest 
confidant, Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq, who was later to succeeded Prophet Muhammed as caliph 
of the Islamic state. To prepare for a journey across the desert, Prophet Muhammed had to 
stock up on water and food, as he did not know how long the journey might take him. In 
order not to arouse the suspicions of Quraishi spies by purchasing large quantities of 
foodstuffs or leaving home with bales and sacks, he asked Abu Bakr to deal with 
provisions. As night fell, Prophet Muhammed slipped out of his house before the squad 
charged with murdering him could lay their hands on him.
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 In planning and executing the 
move from Mecca to Medina, Prophet Muhammed was secretly assisted by one of his 
paternal uncles, Al-Abbas, who had embraced Islam but had kept his conversion a secret in 
compliance with Prophet Muhammed‘s directions. Al-Abbas, who may be said to be one 
of the earliest ‗influence agents‘, proved to be an excellent and crucial source of 
intelligence for his nephew.
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The following chapter will discuss the intelligence tradecraft of the Muslims and their 
Meccan adversaries. It will focus in some detail on the use of safe houses, means of 
communications and transport, and the employment of deep cover agents.  
 
6.2 The First Safe House: Dar Al-Arqam 
As indicated earlier, the first three years of the history of Prophet Muhammed‘s call to 
Islam were marked by extreme caution and secrecy, on the part not only of Prophet 
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Muhammed himself but also of all those early converts who had been handpicked first by 
Prophet Muhammed then by his close associates and ardent followers. Threatened by 
death, torture and persecution, the early Muslim converts were continually reminded to 
ensure that their conversion remained totally concealed, even from their own immediate 
family
288
. The decision to go underground was undoubtedly taken in consideration of 
Islam‘s long-term strategic interests. But the thick cover of secrecy was abandoned when 
the Muslims succeeded in establishing what might be called a popular foothold amongst 
the Meccans. 
 It must be borne in mind that fear of Quraishi persecution and revenge was such that, 
even after the call to Islam had become public, many Muslims continued to conceal their 
adoption of the new faith, going discreetly to remote areas or to the hills and valleys 
surrounding Mecca in order to pray to Allah and practise their religious rites.
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 During 
that period, it was a matter of course that when discovered, Muslims, especially slaves or 
those of humble origin, were assaulted, tortured or even lynched. It was necessary, 
therefore, to confide only in those who were truthful, honest and trustworthy. Physical and 
psychological strength and the ability to keep a secret were foremost among the qualities 
valued in the men Prophet Muhammed entrusted with the task of preaching the new faith 
and winning over friends and supporters. 
 Prophet Muhammed‘s adherence to strict secrecy, diversionary tactics and 
concealment may be said to be the first building block of an Islamic intelligence doctrine. 
Soon after the start of his call to Islam, while the Muslims were battling for survival, the 
Prophet felt an urgent need to set up a ‗safe house‘ for his followers. In order to evade 
detection and persecution, Prophet Muhammed was compelled to meet his followers at 
different times and places, and in small units or cells.
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 He carefully chose as the 
headquarters of the new faith a house which belonged to a new convert and enjoyed all the 
distinctive qualities of a model safe house. The house, to which the Muslims sometimes 
went disguised, was quite spacious and belonged to young man called Al-Arqam bin Abi 
Al-Arqam Al-Makhzumi.  
 Few details have come down to us about this remarkable Muslim, who was among the 
very first men to respond to Prophet Muhammed‘s call.291 Most historical documents 
estimate that he was very young—between sixteen and twenty five years old—when he 
joined Prophet Muhammed‘s first Muslim underground cell. He is thought to have been the 
seventh person to convert to Islam and was a member of the powerful and influential 
Makhzum tribe. Judging by the large property he owned when he was still in his teens, Al-
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Arqam must have been quite wealthy himself. This now famous dwelling was situated in a 
prime location in Mecca, on the slopes of the Safa Mountain, overlooking the holiest shrine 
in Islam, the Kaaba, towards which practicing Muslims face in prayer five times a day. The 
spacious property in what might be described today as an exclusive area must have 
distinguished Al-Arqam among his fellow Meccans as a man of eminence and of 
independent means, which, at that stage, stood Prophet Muhammed and his companions in 
good stead.
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 Dar Al-Arqam (the House of Arqam) is known in Islamic history by the eulogistic 
name ‗Dar Al-Islam‘ (the House of Islam), in recognition of the significant part it played in 
housing the founding fathers of Islam during a most critical period in the history of the new 
religion. Throughout the three years of secret propagation of the faith, Prophet Muhammed 
spent most of the day there, although he did not take up residence in the house: 
 His followers came to him in it, and were taught the Quran and otherwise 
instructed. Together the Muslims performed their distinctive act of worship, 
which culminated in the prostration, the touching of the ground with one‘s 
forehead in acknowledgement of the might and majesty of God. It was also 
possible for enquirers to come to Muhammed in this house and talk about their 
difficulties and about all the troubles of the people of Mecca.
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 The choice of Al-Arqam‘s house as a meeting place for the Muslims indicates that 
Prophet Muhammed was a good tactician and strategist with an acute sense of security. 
The reasons for this choice may be outlined as follows:  
 Firstly, the property owner was not at that time a known Muslim. It was therefore 
unlikely that the Quraishis would suspect that the preacher of the new faith, Prophet 
Muhammed, would spend time there for any reason, let alone use it as an underground 
pulpit to spread Islam through sermons, discussions and debates. Secondly, Al-Arqam, as 
pointed out earlier, was quite young and as such would not be suspected of leading or 
hosting as serious a movement as the call initiated by Prophet Muhammed. Thirdly, there 
had been open rivalry and enmity between Al-Arqam‘s clan, the Makhzumis, and that of 
Prophet Muhammed, the Banu Hashim, for decades, as each strove to have the upper hand 
in business and in running the affairs of the Quraishi community. Because of this inherited 
tribal antagonism, Quraishi suspicions were normally directed towards the residence and 
family of Prophet Muhammed himself and of Abu Bakr, towards those who were 
perceived to be sympathetic with and close to Prophet Muhammed, or at least towards 
those whose conversion was suspected. Fourthly, the house was quite close to Al-Kaaba. 
This geographic proximity was quite important from the logistical point of view, as it 
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facilitated contact and afforded ease of communication and dissemination of directives and 
instructions by Prophet Muhammed to his followers.  
 Furthermore, anyone going to the Kaaba or taking part in the pilgrimage to Mecca had 
to pass by the house. This enabled Prophet Muhammed and his followers not only to blend 
in with the crowd with ease, but also to enter and leave the house without raising the 
suspicions of the wary Meccans. Indeed, throughout the whole period during which Al-
Arqam‘s property was used as a safe house, the Quraishis appear to have had no inkling of 
what took place there. Furthermore, the area was inhabited almost exclusively by 
Makhzumis. If, for any reason, the house were to be attacked by Quraishis, the whole 
Makhzumi clan would then rise in arms against the attackers. By tribal tradition, which is 
still adhered to in most parts of the Arab world, an attack on a member of tribe or any of 
their guests would be considered an attack on the whole tribe. 
 
6.3 Time and Communication  
The peculiarities of the climate and topography of the Arabian Peninsula greatly affected 
the performance of early Arab spies (uyoun) as well as the methods of communication and 
means of transport which they adopted to carry out their missions. With the exception of 
the Sarwat mountain range, which extends from the neck of the peninsula in the north to 
Yemen in the south, the terrain is a vast expanse of desert and sand dunes. In the elevated 
and rugged Sarwat, consisting of steep chasms and deep ravines, rain falls almost all year 
round, but throughout the vast plateau, especially the Empty Quarter, the climate is 
extremely arid, with only 7 inches of rain a year, and the temperature may reach 55 °C 
(139 °F) in the long summer days. The narrow, winding and dangerous footpaths of the 
mountainous areas present great communication and transport challenges to armies, 
commercial caravans, wayfarers and message carriers, and especially to the uyoun, for 
whom racing against time was and remains essential to their primary duty. In short, 
scarcity of water, inclement heat and lack of any visible landmarks are among the major 
challenges facing all those who traverse the sands of the Arabian Plateau.  
 Medina is strategically situated on a slope, making it possible to draw water from 
springs and wells in the vicinity. The city is dominated by Mount Uhud, the scene of one 
of the most crucial confrontations between Prophet Muhammed and his polytheist enemies. 
One of the advantages Medina had in those days was that it stood at a crossroads linking 
the north, south and west of the Peninsula and was very close to the caravan routes linking 
Mecca with Syria. This meant that whoever sought to reach Mecca had either to take the 
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long Red Sea coastline route, passing through the dangerously labyrinthine mountains and 
valleys of the west, or simply to choose the desert caravan route passing Medina.   
 The use of animals for communication purposes dates back centuries before Islam. 
The Assyrians and the ancient Egyptians are thought to have been the first to use animals, 
especially horses and camels, as mail carriers in the primitive postal services of the time. In 
the seventh century, other animals and methods of transportation were introduced. Besides 
these two beasts of burdens, donkeys, mules and oxen were also used in the Arab 
Peninsula, while carrier pigeons were also employed, especially in times of war.
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 As a 
precautionary measure, when for example the terrain was too rugged for beasts of burden, 
or when message carriers feared discovery in the wide, desolate and often hostile deserts of 
Arabia, messages were carried on foot, either by a single man or by several in relay.  
 For the early uyoun, travelling on foot rather than animal riding was the favoured 
method of moving about from one place to another. Traversing the arid regions demanded 
that wayfarers must move at night and rest or sleep during the daytime in order to ward off 
the fierce heat of the sun. Besides the fact that those precursors of the present-day 
intelligence operatives had to avoid dehydration, it was also more convenient for them to 
be on the move at night.  Finding their destination was easier, as they were guided by the 
stars, which are readily visible in the clear night skies of the desert.    
 The use of the stars as a guide in the open deserts was necessitated not only by the fact 
that there were no maps or landmarks to go by, but also to maintain the secrecy of the 
missions. One of the social characteristics of the Bedouins was that they did not take 
kindly to strangers amongst them. Too many requests for directions would naturally lead to 
suspicion, especially when made in a different dialect to that prevalent in the area. 
Discovery of the true identity of spies by the nomadic Bedouins often led to plunder and 
sometimes to death.
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 It normally took 10 days to carry a message on foot from Medina to Mecca. A 
commercial caravan would take twice as long as a lone wayfarer, because they required 
wider roads to transport their loads of merchandise, water and forage. Armies took even 
longer, as troops were normally given longer periods of rest. Commanders took every care 
not to exhaust their fighting men, as they were keen to preserve their strength for the 
impending battles. Armies were also required to await the reports of scouts and advance 
units before venturing forward.
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 In the deserts of Arabia, the most popular form of transport used in caravans was the 
camel. Camels are the best pack animal for desert travel because they are strong, ―have 
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natural protection from the environment, and can travel long distances without needing to 
stop for water.‖297 They are furthermore quite easy to look after during long journeys 
through barren land and, quite importantly, can withstand the hardships of travelling 
through sandstorms, as they have very long eyelashes to shield their eyes, and can also 
close their nostrils to protect themselves from flying dust and sand. But it is their unique 
ability to store water in their bodies that endeared them to the desert dwellers, as this made 
it possible for armies and commercial caravans alike to cover long distances without 
worrying about providing their pack animals with any water for many days.
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  In times of war, however, the Arabian horse was the preferred method of transport, 
being bred for its compact size, light weight and excellent speed, qualities of great value to 
warriors as well as those involved in communication. A horse would take only one third of 
the time normally required to deliver a message, provided that it was ridden by an 
experienced horseman with good knowledge of the appropriate desert paths and shortcuts.  
 An example of the impressive speed with which urgent messages were dispatched may 
be found in the intelligence which one of Prophet Muhammed‘s undercover agents secretly 
sent from Mecca to Prophet Muhammed in Medina. The message, carried by a skilled 
horseman who knew the shortcuts in the area and was trained in the use of the stars for 
navigation in the desert, was of immense importance. It warned the Muslims that a 10,000 
strong Quraishi army had been mobilized to begin a massive assault on Medina.  Instead of 
the customary ten-day journey, it took the messenger only three days to reach Medina. This 
advance warning provided the Muslims with valuable and much needed time. It enabled 
them to strengthen their defences, build a trench around the northern part of Medina and 
ultimately repel the attack.
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 A pressing need was felt to improve methods of communication between the Muslim 
leadership and its clandestine network operating in Mecca and among the various tribes in 
the region, especially following the imposition of an embargo on Mecca. To gain time, 
couriers were recruited from the tribes who lived along the routes. The message would 
then change hands several times before it reached its destination. Despite its efficiency, it 
was deemed unsafe to rely on this method of communication alone, for fear that the secret 
contents of messages might be exposed. As a result, both systems—the single horseman 
and the relay of runners—continued to be employed.300  
 Most message carriers had no knowledge of the content of the messages they carried, 
which were indirect, concealed, encrypted, or written in a coded language. But the Arabs 
excelled in the use of coded messages through the composition of versified texts. In such 
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cases, the veiled intention within the text would normally be understood by the intended 
recipient only. This was thought to be a safe way of communicating and exchanging 
sensitive information, whether personal or state secrets. The use of arcane language in 
messages would ensure that the content would not be revealed to unauthorized parties, 
even if the courier changed his allegiance or ran into unexpected difficulties, such as 
torture, capture or entrapment.
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 Besides coded and versified documents, the early Arabs also used oral messages, 
which were carried by people endowed with exceptional memory, excellent physical 
qualities and a thorough knowledge of the dialects of the Peninsula. Oral messages were 
normally composed when writing materials were not readily available or when the 
recipient was illiterate. An example of this method of oral communication may be seen in 
the message carried by one of Prophet Muhammed‘s agents, who was sent to the Jews of 
Banu Quraidha to enquire whether they were still bound by the agreement concluded 
earlier to defend Medina, or had reneged on it. When the messenger returned, Prophet 
Muhammed asked him to announce the response before all the troops who were present, 
but it was rendered in coded words, the meaning of which had been agreed by Prophet 
Muhammed and the agent. This precautionary measure was felt necessary to spare the 
troops the psychological impact of bad news if the Jewish response had been negative.
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 Another method of transmitting urgent oral messages was the employment of a 
number of agents or sentinels, who executed their missions in much the same way as did 
town criers in ancient times. These agents would shout out a coded message, relaying it 
from one to the other until it reached the decision makers. This method, which was used in 
times of crisis, was especially useful in areas where the terrain was difficult to traverse. In 
order to overcome topographical challenges, the Quraishis resorted to placing scouts on the 
mountain tops around Mecca and along the mountainous route leading to it, in order to 
observe enemy movements. When, six years after he had emigrated to Medina, Prophet 
Muhammed decided to return to his birthplace in order to perform the Umra (minor 
pilgrimage), he expected the Quraishis to prevent him from entering Mecca. He therefore 
dispatched one of his agents to collect information on the general conditions there and 
report especially on the preparations and intentions of Quraish. The agent returned with 
news of the relay crier method which the Meccans had put in place in order to monitor  
Prophet Muhammed‘s every move as he approached Mecca. To ensure that they never lost 
sight of their target as he approached, ten informers under the command of Al-Hakam bin 
Abd Manaf were placed at vantage points along the road to Mecca. They were able to 
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transmit details of the advance of Prophet Muhammed‘s convoy, starting from as far afield 
as Mount Wizr, to their intelligence headquarters in a place called Baldeh in Mecca.
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 With the possible exception of the face and hands, the rest of a woman‘s body was 
considered ‗awrah‘ (sexual, private) and so had to be properly veiled and concealed from 
all except the spouse and children. The accepted social attitude which expected women to 
be mostly covered and segregated from men in public was sometimes exploited in order to 
dispatch secret messages. The most notorious instance of this may be found in the story of 
Sarah, the singing girl. In the Sealed Nectar we read: 
 Despite the improved relations between Mecca and Medina after the signing 
of the Treaty of Hudaybiyah, the ten-year peace was broken by the Quraishis, 
who launched several raids against one of the allies of the Muslims, the tribe of 
Khuza. When Muhammed heard of these attacks, he immediately ordered his 
men to prepare for war. He then prayed to Allah and said: ‗Oh Allah, take the 
eyes and ears from Quraish, so that we may take them by surprise in their 
land.
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 Just as the Muslims were finalising their general assault plan against the Quraishis, a 
woman called Sarah came to Prophet Muhammed and begged him to help her, saying that 
she had fallen on hard times and desperately needed food and clothing. Prophet 
Muhammed then urged some of his followers to see to it that she was well looked after and 
given enough help to facilitate her journey back to her home in Mecca. No sooner had she 
left Prophet Muhammed than she was approached by one of the Muslims, Hatib Ibn Abi 
Baalta‘ah, who gave her some money and asked her to deliver a written note to Mecca. He 
advised her to take an unusual route and warned her not to tell anyone about the letter. In 
the concealed note Hatib had written a brief warning to the Meccans: ―Prophet Muhammed 
is out to get you. Take care‖.305 When Prophet Muhammed later heard about the woman‘s 
secret message he sent three men to prevent her from delivering it. They managed to find 
her and demanded to see the note, but Sarah insisted she did not know what they were 
talking about. The men then said threateningly: ―Take out the letter; otherwise we will strip 
you naked‖. When Sarah  saw that  they were determined, she took out the letter, which 
she was hiding in her underwear.
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 Hatib was later confronted with the evidence and was accused by Umar bin Al-
Khattab of betraying not only Allah but His messenger and the faithful. As a fit 
punishment, Umar demanded to cut off his head, but Prophet Muhammed forgave him, 
because of his previous services and sacrifices for the cause of Islam. Responding to 
Umar‘s call for Hatib‘s execution, Prophet Muhammed exclaimed ―Is he not one of the 
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Badr warriors? Maybe Allah looked at the Badr warriors and said: ―Do whatever you like; 
as I have granted Paradise to you‖, or said, ―I have forgiven you‖.‘ On hearing this, tears 
fell from Umar‘s eyes and he said, ‗Allah and his Messenger know best‘.‖307 
 In their correspondence, the early Arabs used a variety of writing instruments and 
materials, including quills, bamboo stems and wooden pens crafted from a variety of 
hardwoods, especially from olive and mulberry. While paper was known and used during 
the early stages of Islam, the early Arabs also used parchment of all types, wood panels 
and bones, especially the broad shoulder blades of camels, date leaves and tablets of white 
stone.
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 The utensil most widely used was the writing pen, the ‗qalam‘, which is 
mentioned several times in the Quran. The qalam was made of a small piece of wood, 
approximately 10 to 15 centimetres in length, smoothed over, with one extremity forming a 
fine, sharp point. This primitive pen was easy to use and consumed very little ink, a costly 
commodity which was normally kept in glass or ceramic jars.
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 Spies and secret agents made use of these resources when writing secret notes. Paper 
documents were written with concealment in mind. Most carriers and secret messengers 
would go to great lengths to hide a written document inside a scabbard, a poniard casing, a 
walking cane or some other item which a desert traveller would be likely to carry. In order 
to evade exposure, an agent might slide a secret note inside a horse‘s saddle, or fold it and 
tuck it inside a lock of hair or his underwear.   
 With the passage of time and the expansion of the Islamic empire, the means of 
communication witnessed steady growth and progress. To ensure rapid responses and 
communication between the seat of the central government, whether in Damascus during 
the Umayyad rule, Baghdad during the Abbasid period or Istanbul under the Ottoman 
supremacy, it was felt necessary, especially for military commanders and administrators, to 
pay more attention to transport, communication in general and postal services in particular. 
This was important not just for reasons of conquest, security, enforcing law and order, and 
monitoring the vast territories; with improved communication, inspection of agricultural 
produce, imports, exports and the business world in general would be more efficient. Taxes 
would then begin to flow faster and in larger sums into the state coffers. Faster breeds of 
horses and mules were in greater demand than before. A special breed of dromedary, 
lighter and speedier than that of Arabia, was imported from Persia and Asia Minor. This 
beast later became the main carrier for those in the old Arab intelligence community. On 
the other hand, with the improvement in road-building techniques, horse-drawn carriages 
were increasingly used to transport people, goods and mail  Homing pigeons were also 
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used to deliver secret messages. Special towers were built for the pigeons to perch on, in 
order to collect or deliver messages, concealed with great care under their wings.  
6.4 Cryptography  
Cryptography, the practice of preparing and reading texts in a form designed to prevent 
them being read or understood by those not privy to the secret of that form, was born,  
according to a recent study, among the Arabs shortly after the rise of the Arab-Islamic 
civilization (650-1400). Many Arab scholars who excelled in cryptology have written on 
this art.
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 Chief among the reasons which made it possible for the early Arabs to master 
cryptology was the need of the emerging Islamic state for administrative organization 
and services, which led them to  
 concentrate on developing secretarial and management skills, especially in 
the fields of composition and correspondence. The practical need to protect 
sensitive state affairs, particularly in the mails, was one of the main driving 
forces behind using, and therefore writing about, cryptography and 
cryptanalysis. The hands-on experience of practicing message concealment and 
code breaking is evident in the available biographies of many Arab writers and 
secretaries, who were considered among the most important personnel in 
government offices, especially in the Caliph‘s court.311  
 
 The practice of using poetry to communicate a coded message has been known for 
centuries. Even today, poetry is perceived as a dangerous tool, able to provide a subtle 
means of communication between ordinary individuals, dissident groups and resistance or 
terrorist organizations. As recently as mid-February 2008, a Burmese poet, Saw Wai, 
exploited Valentine‘s Day in order to write a coded attack on the leader of the military 
junta in Burma. In his carefully worded poem, Wai appealed to the Burmese people to 
unite against the 74-year-old dictator, Than Shwe. When the coded message was broken 
the day after the ‗love poem‘ was published, the poet was immediately arrested and 
detained.
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  A notable example of the fear that coded messages might be exchanged through poetry 
is afforded by the stringent attitude of those in charge of the Guantanamo Bay prison camp 
towards any form of written material passed to or received from the detainees. The tight 
censorship imposed on the written word in Guantanamo Bay followed the discovery that 
poems were scratched on Styrofoam cups with a stone and secretly passed from cell to cell. 
The guards, as pointed out by The Independent, confiscated these, fearing that the 
scratched verses were coded messages:  
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 As far as the US military is concerned, ‗poetry ... presents a special risk, and 
DoD [Department of Defense] standards are not to approve the release of any 
poetry in its original form or language‘. The fear, officers say, is that 
allegorical imagery in poetry may be used to convey coded messages to 
militants outside.
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 Arab history affords numerous examples where, through poetry, secret messages were 
exchanged between parties who may not even have agreed on a specific code. A prominent 
example of that is the folk tale of Muhalhal Al-Zair Salim, which has come down to us in 
several literary forms and versions.
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 Besides the popular poetic forms of the short ballads 
and the longer metrical romances, the folk tale has also survived in numerous versions of 
prose romances. The most popular metrical version speaks of an elderly man who, after a 
long life of quiet and solitude, asks his nephew to help him arrange some sort of excursion 
across the desert so that he might enjoy the change of scenery and regale himself with the 
pleasant sight of the open space and the fresh scent of the desert air. His nephew readily 
obliges and in order that his uncle should lack nothing whilst on the journey, he orders two 
of his slaves to attend to the old man‘s every wish. The three then set out on their journey 
across the desert, stopping by this oasis or that until the two slaves become physically 
exhausted and decide that they can bear no further hardships, so they agree to kill their 
elderly charge.  
 Realising that the slaves have grown weary of him and are conspiring to kill him, the 
man asks them if they will oblige him with one last favour, to deliver his last will to his 
sister and nephew, as he feels certain that he will soon perish in the desert. He also tells 
them to make sure that his message is reproduced verbatim in order that it may not be 
misconstrued by anyone. He spends the whole day reciting and repeating a one-line 
message until the two illiterate slaves have learnt it by rote. They take a solemn oath to 
deliver the message exactly as he has dictated it: 
Oh ye message-carrier alas! / Woe betide you and your father!  
 That night, the slaves kill him, bury him in the sand and return to their master with 
news of his uncle‘s death. They also recite the message entrusted to them. As the nephew 
cannot make sense of it, he calls his sister, Yamama, one of the most brilliant minds among 
the Arabs. As soon as she hears the one-line verse, which is taken from a well-known 
ancient poem, she picks up the secret message. The grief-stricken Yamama gasps and starts 
to wail loudly, beating her cheeks and thighs, saying ―my uncle has always had a good ear 
for poetry. He never recites incomplete verses‖. She realises that the missing words of the 
quotation, contain an unambiguous clue to the uncle‘s murder. She then recites the correct 
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version with its clear reference to the kind of punishment, which should be meted out to 
the two killers: 
 Oh ye message-bearer alas! / Muhalhal lies murdered in the desert 
Woe betide you and your father! / Let not the two slaves depart alive. 
 The two slaves are immediately arrested and interrogated. They eventually confess and 
pay with their lives. Thanks to his cunning and erudition, the old man was able to establish 
the identities of his murderers and to arrange for revenge even before his death.
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6.5 Security and Counterintelligence 
Prophet Muhammed is repeatedly quoted as cautioning the Muslims against acting on 
suspicion, hearsay or rumour: ―Beware of suspicion, for it is most deceptive; Do not envy, 
hate, abandon or spy on each other, and be as brothers to each other at all times‖.316 But it 
was a quite different matter when it came to questions relating to the security of the state or 
the public good. In order that he might keep abreast of developments outside Medina, 
spread Islam and strengthen his position in Arabia and beyond, Prophet Muhammed 
created a network of uyoun. Besides those especially charged with surveillance and 
observation duties, there were zealous volunteers who were quite helpful, especially during 
the early development of Islam, as informers and agents stationed in different regions of 
the Peninsula. The uyoun constituted first-hand sources of intelligence, not only on military 
matters, but also concerning caravan movements, trade activities, water resources, the 
general attitude of the communities towards their chiefs and rulers, and the extent to which 
these communities were prepared to embrace Islam. The most important station Prophet 
Muhammed had outside Medina was that of Mecca. This was headed by Prophet 
Muhammed‘s uncle, Al-Abbas, the influence agent who is said to have showed exceptional 
skill in conveying messages to Prophet Muhammed in record time.
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 Besides agents in different parts of Arabia, there were also many uyoun dispersed 
among the different tribes of the desert, especially among the influential and powerful tribe 
of Khuzaá.
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 Chief among those early Muslims who went on spying missions for Prophet 
Muhammed was Hussail bin Nuwairah, who roamed the Arabian Desert, gathering 
information from a variety of sources on different tribes.
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 Long before the conquest of 
Persian and Byzantine lands, Prophet Muhammed had agents deep inside their 
territories.
320
  
 The first few months in Medina were especially difficult for Prophet Muhammed 
and those who had emigrated with him from Mecca. Prophet Muhammed was quite 
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apprehensive of the Quraishis, who never gave up hope of delivering him and his 
followers a fatal blow. It was inevitable that he would keep a very close watch on the 
situation in Mecca so as to be prepared for any moves against him. To that end, he 
directed that a special platoon, called the Palm Tree Platoon, be commissioned to carry 
out constant surveillance of the Quraishis.
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 It is a commonplace to say that intelligence and counter-intelligence often involve the 
employment of stratagems, manoeuvres and tactics specifically designed to mislead the 
enemy in order to safeguard public security and undermine any subversive designs of the 
foe. The most important saying of Prophet Muhammed in this context is that in which he 
declares that ―war is deception‖. Most commentators cite this hadith to show the great 
importance attached to the role played by spies in advancing the cause of the Islamic state. 
Al-Asqalani, for example, affirms that ―a good war is that in which there is more need for 
deception than fighting. While confrontation is always fraught with danger, victory may be 
achieved through deception without exposure to danger‖.322 Similarly, for Al-Aini, the 
significance of this hadith is that it advises the ―use of deception in war whenever possible, 
or failing that then fight‖. In other words, the use of arms ―should be the last resort‖.323  
 
6.6 Secrecy and Concealment 
Secrecy was, from the inception of Islam, the hallmark of Prophet Muhammed‘s long-term 
strategy. This is especially true of the first three years of his mission, known in Islamic 
history as the Stage of the Secret Call. During these critical years, Prophet Muhammed‘s 
movements, performance of religious rites and contacts with his followers remained 
covert. Even during the Stage of the Proclamation of the Call (from the fourth to the tenth 
year), when Prophet Muhammed started openly to call people to embrace Islam, discretion 
was not abandoned with regard to transactions and operations which required adherence to 
secrecy and concealment. 
 To pre-empt any attempt at leaking information to Quraish, and in order to be fully 
apprised of the designs of enemy agents, Prophet Muhammed had spies and scouts 
everywhere in Medina. With the possible exception of his call for the necessity to worship 
only one God, Allah, and inviting fellow Arabs to come to the fold of Islam, most of his 
movements and activities, on the personal and public levels, were couched in secrecy. It is 
reported that he often encouraged Muslims to adhere to secrecy. His sayings, such as (He 
who keeps his secret keeps his choices)
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and (Get your chores done with secrecy)
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testify to his predilection for concealment. As for security issues, Prophet Muhammed 
considered adherence to secrecy a prerequisite.  
 An early example of Prophet Muhammed‘s insistence on secrecy may be found in the 
attitude he adopted following the arrival of a delegation from his allies, the Banu Khuza‘h 
tribe, to complain that Quraish had breached the terms of the Hudaybiya Treaty. The 
Quraishis, Prophet Muhammed was told, were supporting the Banu Bakr tribe against 
Banu Khuza‘h, who suffered great losses. When the meeting with the Khuza‘h delegation 
was over, Prophet Muhammed told the men to disperse discreetly, without attracting any 
attention. He was careful not to let the Quraishis know that the Muslims were aware of 
their violations. He reasoned that keeping them in the dark would deprive them of the 
opportunity to prepare for a possible confrontation with the Muslims.
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 In order that the movements and manoeuvres of his army might be concealed from 
those who did not need to be informed, Prophet Muhammed invariably ordered it to march 
at night and retire during the day, declaring that his men should take advantage of the 
cover of darkness and should always move between midnight and dawn.
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 As for his 
secret agents, they were constantly reminded never to talk carelessly about the nature of 
their missions or their destinations. Secrecy, in other words, became a doctrine in its own 
right.    
 In enforcing strict military discipline, Prophet Muhammed was assisted by a highly 
trained group of enforcers called Al-Safwah, which literally means ‗the elite‘: 
 Like other leaders, Muhammad surrounded himself with a loyal group of 
followers who acted as his bodyguard and carried out his orders without 
question. For this purpose he created the Al-Safwah, a small cadre of loyal 
followers who lived in the mosque next to Muhammad‘s house. Recruited from 
among the most pious, enthusiastic, and fanatical followers, they came from 
impoverished backgrounds. The Al-Safwah members spent much of their time 
studying Islam. They were devoted to Muhammad and served not only as his 
life guard but also as a secret police that could be called upon at a moment‘s 
notice... .
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 It was inevitable that in almost all his dealings, Prophet Muhammed should place 
much emphasis on secrecy. The odds against him were so great that any uncalculated move 
would jeopardise his own destiny and that of his followers. He carefully guarded the 
minutest detail of information lest it be taken advantage of and used against him. It is 
related that on the eve of the Battle of Badr, while Prophet Muhammed and one of his 
companions were on their way to confront the Quraishis, they came across a very old man. 
Prophet Muhammed stopped him and asked him who he was. 
–You tell me first, who are you? 
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–No, You tell us first, and then we‘ll tell you who we are. 
–Fine. What is it you are after? 
–Tell us about Quraish. 
–I am told they left Mecca on such and such a date; if what I heard was true, they 
should be very close to this valley. 
–Now tell us about Muhammed and his companions. 
–I have been told they left Yethrib [Medina] on such and such a date; if what I 
heard was true, they too should be very close to this valley. Now tell me who are 
you? 
–"We are from water."  
[The evasive answer apparently produced a desired result, for the old man waved 
his hand in the direction of Iraq and retorted:]   
–So, you are from Iraq then. 329 
 
 To ensure secrecy at all times, Prophet Muhammed would sometimes order his army 
to meet at a certain location in order to prepare for a specific operation or assault. At the 
specified place, he would then issue his orders and inform only the field commanders and 
team leaders of the exact destination and nature of their mission. When, in preparation for 
the Battle of Mu‘tah, Prophet Muhammed ordered his army to meet at a place called Al-
Jurf, the whole army headed there and waited for the orders to be issued. When Prophet 
Muhammed spoke to the waiting troops he only told them: 
 Zaid bin Haritha is hereby declared commander in chief of the force; if he 
is killed or wounded he is to be succeeded by Ja‘far bin Abi Talib; If Ja‘far is 
wounded then Abdullah bin Rawaha should succeed him. If bin Rawaha is 
wounded then you should elect someone from amongst you to lead the 
campaign.
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 Aside from secrecy, Prophet Muhammed would also resort to diversionary tactics and 
cunning in order to defeat his enemies. As well as agreeing with Sun Tzu that ―all warfare 
is based on deception‖331, Prophet Muhammed once remarked that ―all war is cunning‖.332 
To deceive the enemy and take them by surprise, Prophet Muhammed would order his 
army to zigzag their way to their destination. One example of this tactic may be seen in his 
campaign against Banu Lahyan. He let it be known that his destination was Syria, and 
indeed he did order the troops to march towards Syria, but they were soon ordered to return 
to Mecca for the real target, which was the territory of the Banu Lahyan, who, taken by 
surprise, fled to the mountains.
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 Another example of this diversionary tactic occurs when 
on the eve of the final assault on Mecca, Prophet Muhammed despatched an eight-men 
platoon under the leadership of Qatadah bin Rab'i in the direction of Edam, a short distance 
from Medina, in order to divert attention and screen off the main target with which he was 
preoccupied  
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 Again, when the ten-thousand-strong Muslim army was making final preparations for 
the assault on Mecca, Prophet Muhammed took every precaution against news of the 
imminent attack reaching the Quraishis, so that he could storm Mecca by surprise. The 
field commanders were all summoned at zero hour and issued with their orders. They were 
told to be extremely cautious and warned to adhere to utmost secrecy. To ensure that 
Quraish would have no notion of Prophet Muhammed‘s military plans, a tight security belt 
was thrown all around Medina and a total news blackout was imposed. The night before 
the orders were issued for the army to mobilise, no one was allowed to leave or enter 
Medina. When, just before the march, Prophet Muhammed asked his wife Aishah to pack 
some food for the intended journey, he was quite careful not to reveal his destination to 
her. He furthermore asked her not to tell anyone about the matter. Only Abu Bakr, Prophet 
Muhammed‘s confidant, advisor and father-in-law, knew of the planned assault on Mecca, 
having had to extract it  for himself the day before the march was ordered: 
Abu Bakr: O Prophet of Allah, are you planning to travel? 
Muhammed: Yes. 
AB: Have you made arrangements for sustenance? 
Muh: Yes. 
AB: What is your destination? 
Muh: Quraish. There are some who think I‘m heading towards Syria. Others 
think I‘ll be going to Thaqeef. Still others suspect I‘ll be marching towards the 
land of Hawazin.
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 Another aspect of the employment of secrecy was Prophet Muhammed‘s frequent use 
of passwords and secret authentication methods for each regiment of his army. To 
maximise security, these predetermined words, phrases or sounds, which were kept from 
those not allowed access and known only to members of the regiment, were frequently 
changed. Among the passwords adopted by Khalid bin Al-Waleed, the famed military 
leader and hero of the Ridda battles, was ‗amut‘, meaning ‗kill‘.335 Some of the passwords 
used by Muhammed‘s army in the Battle of Hunain were 'people of the Surah of the Cow' 
and 'total goodness'.
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 At Badr, the password, which has now attained an almost sanctified 
status as a battle cry, was 'the One, the One'
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 Two passwords which have come down in 
history are ‗Abdullah‘ 'Slave of Allah', which was used by the Ansar (Helpers) regiment 
and ‗Abdul-Rahman‘ 'Slave of the merciful' by the Muhajiroon (Emigrants) regiment.338 
Another famed password used by the early Muslim armies was ‗Allah Akbar‘ (Allah is 
Greatest). This now familiar exclamation, which is recited from the tops of minarets to call 
the Muslims to perform the obligatory prayers five times a day, is recited in a variety of 
situations in the daily life of the Muslim.
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 This password was also used when the second 
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Rashidi caliph, Umar bin Al-Khatab, sent more troops to support the army of Ubaidullah 
bin Al-Jarrah, who was leading the Muslim campaign against Byzantine Syria. The two 
allied armies identified each other when shouts of ‗Allah Akbar‘ were heard on both 
sides.
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 Most caliphs who followed Prophet Muhammed counselled secrecy. Military leaders 
and governors were especially reminded to observe secrecy in their dealings and contacts 
in order to gain a military advantage, mask a specific weakness or seize an opportune 
moment to act. When Umar bin Al-Khattab ordered Abu Ubaidah bin Masoud Al-Thaqfi to 
lead a campaign against the Persians in Iraq, his advice was to ―watch over your tongue 
and never reveal your secret. Those who keep their secrets are always fortified and are 
never taken by surprise or confronted by that which is odious to them‖.341 The first 
Omayyad caliph, Muáwiya bin abi Sufiyan (r. 661-680), made extensive use of secrecy in 
his administration of the affairs of the state. Among his often quoted words are: ―Every 
time I reveal a secret to someone, sorrow and penitence soon follow. But whenever I 
deposit a secret and seal it inside my heart, I feel more secure, confident and elevated‖.342 
A better known saying in this connection is his advice to all: ―That which you conceal 
from your enemy, do not show to your friend‖.343  
 
6.7 Bribery, Intrigue, and Disinformation Techniques 
Bribes, perks and kickbacks have throughout history been used to gain favours and 
facilitate transactions, lawful or illicit. In Arabia, as in other cultures, desert dwellers and 
townspeople alike have used such highly effective devices to achieve specific purposes and 
as means to influence decisions or the conduct of an official or a person in a position of 
trust. Bribes may comprise immediate cash payments, presents and gifts, or promised 
favours, often in order to facilitate clandestine activities. Indeed, it may be said that most 
covert operations involve bribery in one form or other.
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 When the Quraishis realized that the Muslim fugitives who had made it to Ethiopia 
were afforded a secure haven and were free to practise their religious duties without any 
molestation or interference on the part of their benevolent hosts,
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 they feared what the 
future might hold for them if the Muslims were allowed to prosper and gain strength. They 
therefore decided to approach King Negus of Ethiopia and convince him to extradite the 
Muslims and hand them over to Mecca. To that end, the Quraishis sent a high-powered 
delegation consisting of Amru bin Al-Aas and Abdullah bin Abi Rabia.
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 Before their 
departure to Abyssinia, the Quraishis had amassed an impressive array of presents to be 
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given to the King and each of his counsellors. The delegation was instructed to present the 
valuable gifts to the King‘s courtiers before they approached the King himself. In their 
meetings with the King‘s advisors, the two men explained to them the nature of their 
mission. They also told them that the newly arrived people from Mecca had betrayed the 
religion of their ancestors and were preaching a strange religion, unknown to anyone, 
adding that the new religion ran counter to all that the Christian Abyssinians believed in. 
They also claimed that they were delegated by the tribal leaders of those miscreants in 
order that they may be returned to them. The two men also requested the courtiers to give a 
helping hand by suggesting to the King that he should agree to the Quraishi request. When 
the two emissaries met the King, they gave him the presents from Mecca and told him that 
a group of ignorant and uncouth boys had descended upon his land. They also reiterated 
that they were carrying out the mission on behalf of the dignitaries and elders of Mecca, 
their own parents, kinsmen and tribesmen. The King was also told that those who 
delegated them knew full well how mischievous these scoundrels were. The courtiers all 
agreed that it would be best if the newcomers were to be returned to Arabia. The King 
refused to grant this request, however, saying that he would never expel those who came to 
seek his protection. But he assured the two envoys that if they were indeed as evil as they 
were said to be, then they would be handed over to Quraish. If, on the other hand, the 
emigrants proved to be other than what was alleged, then they would be more than 
welcome to stay on.   
 Having failed to achieve their goal, despite the presentation of extravagant gifts to 
King Negus and his courtiers, the two delegates resorted to their contingency plan. Before 
they arrived in Abyssinia, the Meccans had studied the character of Negus and identified 
his weaknesses and points of strength. They therefore knew him to be above all else a 
pious man and a practising Christian. If the two men could convince him that the emigrants 
spoke ill of the Christian faith, he would certainly order their deportation. To that end, they 
requested an audience with the King and told him that the Muslims said grave things about 
Isa bin Meriem (Jesus son of Mary) and that if he did not believe them, he could send for 
the Muslims and enquire about the matter from them directly. The King then summoned 
the Muslims to the court and asked them to explain the teachings of their religion. Ja'far 
bin Abi Talib [Muhammed‘s cousin] stood up and addressed the King in the following 
words: 
  O King! we were plunged in the depths of ignorance and barbarism; we 
adored idols, we lived in unchastity, we ate dead bodies, we spoke 
116 
 
abominations, we disregarded every feeling of humanity, and the duties of 
hospitality and neighbourliness were neglected. We knew no law but that of the 
strong; when Allah raised among us a man of whose birth, truthfulness, 
honesty and purity we were aware; and he called to the Oneness of Allah, and 
taught us not to associate anything with Him.
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 Curious to know more about the teachings of the new religion, the King asked Ja'far to 
recite some of the verses of the Quran to which Ja'far readily responded. Ja'far read a few  
verses of the Surah of Mary in which reference is made to Jesus Christ and the immaculate 
conception. Thereupon the King said: 
 It seems as if these words and those which were revealed to Jesus are rays of 
light which have radiated from the same source.‘ Turning to the crestfallen 
envoys of Quraish, he said, ‗I am afraid that I cannot give you back these 
refugees. They are free to live and worship in my realm as they please.
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 Amru bin Al-Aas, who was sent on this delicate mission, is famous for being a crafty 
warrior and an experienced negotiator and politician. Despite his credentials and   
experience, however, his mission was a failure. Determined by nature, he devised a 
Machiavellian plan to ensure the return of the emigrants from Abyssinia. As soon as he 
arrived in Mecca, he orchestrated a disinformation campaign, leaking reports to the effect 
that the whole people of Mecca had embraced Islam and that life had at last blossomed for 
Muhammed. When, through the machination of the Quraishis, this rumour reached 
Abyssinia, there was jubilation among the Muslims, who immediately folded camp and 
headed back to Mecca. When they reached home and discovered the truth of the situation, it 
was too late for most of them. Those who could make it back to Africa did so, but those 
who were caught unawares had to pay heavily for their religious zeal and credulity.
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6.8 Conclusion 
Intelligence tradecraft reflects the historical and cultural heritage of the society in which it 
is exercised. The previous pages have demonstrated how the Arabs first then the Muslim 
Arabs later developed and reconciled the arts and practices of intelligence with their own 
culture and norms of social behaviour. We have also seen how the peculiarities of the 
topography of the Arabian Peninsula, especially the challenges posed by the vast deserts 
and scorching heat greatly affected the performance of early Arab (uyoun) as well as the 
methods of communication and means of transport. In resorting to secrecy and the practice 
of concealment the early Muslims were simply guided by one of Prophet Muhammed's 
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Traditions who reportedly enjoined the faithful to "get your chores done with secrecy". To 
achieve a specific aim, the Arabs thought nothing of practicing bribery, intrigue and 
disinformation. 
Despite the fact that most if not all of the methods adopted by the early Arabs and 
Muslims were crude and undeveloped, compared with the advanced present-day 
technology-based methods and tactics, these coarse and imperfect methods remain a guide 
and fundamental source of inspiration for those who have no way of acquiring modern 
advanced technologies. Just as the early Muslims had made much use of the age-old 
intelligence arts and traditions in building their first state in Medina, much of the inherited 
Muslim intelligence tradecraft can still be drawn upon, a long time after it had 
originated.The following pages will take up the attitude of Islamic jurisprudence towards 
espionage and intelligence gathering.   
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Chapter Seven 
 
Islamic Jurisprudence (Ijtihad) 
7.1 Introduction 
The term ‗Ijtihad‘ is derived from the Arabic verb ‗jahada‘, which means ‗to exert an 
effort'. In jurisprudence, it came to acquire the meaning of ‗to seek a judgement through 
deduction‘ and 'the derivation of Shar`i law through personal judgement' for an issue for 
which Muslims do not find any express text either in the Quran or the Sunnah (Prophet 
Muhammed‘s practices and sayings). The fundamental activity of  the Mujtahids (scholars 
practicing ijtihad) involves deduction of the laws of the Shari'ah for emergent issues and 
new phenomena of life by employing general principles and rules.
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We have in the previous chapters taken up the attitude of the Quran and the Sunnah 
towards intelligence and demonstrated that the Quran lays down the demarcation lines in 
espionage between what is and what is not admissible. We have also discussed the 
significance of Prophet Muhammed‘s Sunnah as the second most important source of 
Islamic legislation, in intelligence as in all matters touching the Muslim‘s life. Muslim 
jurists and scholars in general have since Prophet Muhammed‘s death in the seventh 
century looked to these two important sources for general guidance and clues especially in 
cases where there are no precedents or opinions expressed vis-à-vis specific emergent 
issues or new developments. In providing legal judgement on a range of issues including 
the types and requirements of intelligence work and the punishments meted out to those 
involved in inadmissible espionage Ijtihad has therefore filled in a wide gap in Islamic 
legislation.   
7.2 Admissible and Inadmissible Espionage 
The question of collecting information, espionage and the employment of agents during a 
crisis, in wartime or in ordinary life is admittedly not a major theme in the Muslim Holy 
Scriptures. Nevertheless, the Quranic relevance in this field is quite noticeable. This is 
evidenced by the recurrent use of the Arabic equivalent of such words as ‗intelligence‘, 
‗spy‘, ‘agent‘, ‗scouting‘, ‗verification‘, ‗suspicion‘, ‗rumour‘, ‗deception‘, ‗dissembling‘ 
and ‗reconnoitre‘.351  
 Generally speaking, the Quran does not readily approve of espionage. There are, as will 
be pointed out later, many demarcation lines separating legal or admissible spying 
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operations from illegal or inadmissible ones. Foremost among those sanctioned and 
approved by the Quran are espionage activities directed towards those who attempt to 
undermine Islam or weaken the authority of the Islamic state. The Quran expressly and 
unambiguously targets all those who conspire against Islam and its Messenger. The 
following verse was recited by Muhammed with the schemes and machinations of the 
enemies of Islam in mind: ―Do they think that we do not hear their secrets and 
conspiracies? Yes indeed; our messengers are with them, recording‖.352 Encouraging all 
Muslims to do good and admonishing them to distance themselves from all that which is 
evil, in word and deed, the Quran warns the children of Adam that ―not an utterance does 
he [or she] utter but there is a watcher by him, ready [to record it]‖.353 In so far as 
admissible espionage is concerned, Islam makes it clear that it is quite acceptable to 
discretely screen prospective public officers in order to safeguard the public good and 
protect the rights of Muslims. Islam also sanctions spying for the purpose of uncovering 
enemy plots or infiltrating the criminal world.
354
   
 Although Islam prohibits a range of intelligence activities,
 355
 especially spying on the 
private lives of Muslims, most commentators on the Quran agree that collecting 
information clandestinely was legitimate and indeed sanctioned by a number of Quranic 
verses. In his Splendid Pearls of the Holy Quran, Abdul-Rahman Al-Thaa‘libi (d. 1474), 
cites a number of Quranic references in support of the legitimacy of the intelligence 
profession. One such example is taken from the Surah of Al-Zukhruf (the Ornaments), 
which declares ―What! Have they settled some plan (among themselves)? But it is We 
Who settle things. Or deem they that We cannot hear their secret thoughts and private 
confidences? Nay, but Our envoys, present with them, do record.‖356 
 Islam attaches great importance to the question of choosing the right person to 
administer justice or occupy a public office. In order that new appointees may carry out 
their work efficiently and treat people fairly and ethically, they have to be very carefully 
screened before they are finally offered a public post.
357
 The most sought-after quality in 
an administrator, team leader or public figure is trustworthiness. The Quran stresses this in 
various chapters,
358
 but especially in the Surah of Qassas (History), which relates the story 
of an old man who offers his daughter as a wife to Moses simply because Moses combines 
the qualities of trustworthiness and strength.
359
 But to identify such worthy, strong and 
upright people is no easy task. Hence the necessity of checking on and indeed spying on 
the character, reputation, dealings and track record of those nominated to fill public offices. 
In fact, it is the rulers and others in positions of power who are obligated to ensure that 
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those chosen to administer public affairs should first be investigated in order that the 
interests of the ruled may be safeguarded.
360
 Commenting on the necessity for the rulers to 
carry out security and character clearance of prospective and incumbent public officers, the 
great 9
th
 century prolific writer and scholar Al-Jahiz (781-869) stresses that ―a prince is 
obliged to pry into the secrets of those close to him as well as those of the general public. 
[The prince] should always set his spies on them. Nothing is more important than this for 
the stability and steadfastness of his rule.‖361 
 The general view of commentators and chroniclers is that surveillance of administrators 
and high officials is not only condonable but a lawful action in Islam, for obvious reasons. 
Choosing the right person for the right position is no guarantee that appointees will not 
misuse or abuse the powers invested in them or that they will acquit themselves of their 
moral duties towards the general public. Even when the holders of public office are devout, 
faithful, honest and above suspicion, they might still err and make wrong decisions, or pass 
unwise judgments
362
. Muslim commentators and historians have always held the view that 
―it is in fact the duty of the ruler to keep a watchful eye over those who are entrusted with 
public offices; the trustworthy might fall into the pit of treason and the trusted advisor 
might resort to deception‖.363   
 Islamic history abounds with evidence that keeping a permanent watch on public 
officers was considered one of the most vital responsibilities of a ruler. Such evidence is 
afforded by a military commander during the reign of the famed Abbasid caliph, Al-
Ma‘moun. The commander, Tahir Bin Al-Hussein, in a letter to the caliph‘s son, advises 
the young man on how best to keep things under tight control in his princedom of Egypt 
―You must appoint in each hamlet a trusted agent who will keep you informed of how your 
representatives work and how they carry out their duties. Their letters to you will keep you 
abreast of developments and make you see things as though you were present with each of 
your rulers or representatives"
364
. 
 In order to secure a safe and free environment for the people, Islam allows espionage 
on and infiltration of the criminal world. People in Dar-al-Islam (home of Islam) need to be 
protected from the evils of lawbreakers and wrongdoers of all kinds
365
 Commenting on the 
need to spy on ex-convicts and others posing a danger to society, Al-Juaini points out that 
it is the duty of the sultan to keep close watch on those who attempt to spread vice and to 
corrupt innocent, Allah-fearing citizens. To combat the perpetrators of crime, Al-Juaini 
advocates the use of what might today be called infiltration or entrapment:  
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 If someone amongst the citizenry ... persists in [wrongdoing], it will then be 
the duty of the ruler to admonish, stop and threaten him. Such a person has to be 
very closely watched. But it is vital that he is always totally unmindful of those 
who are watching him. … Those assigned to watch … [a criminal, an ex-
convict, a suspect, etc.] must first of all be unknown to him. They must sit with 
him in different groups and at different times. They must show signs of interest 
in his disposition and inclinations. They must also attempt to contact him 
directly, enquire of him and pretend to seek knowledge and guidance from him. 
Once something is learnt about his intentions, they must then hasten to inform 
the Sultan, whose duty will be to stop him in his tracks and severely punish 
him.
366
  
 
 Finally, spying on the enemy is quite permissible in Islam. Islam always stresses the 
fact that the rulers‘ primary responsibilities are to ensure the safety and security of their 
nation against any act of aggression by an enemy. Gathering information on those who 
seek to undermine the state or those who are classified as potential aggressors, whether 
during times of war or peace is therefore considered a duty which rulers must shoulder 
painstakingly and effectively.
367
 In this sense, spying on the enemy becomes not just 
legally permissible but ―a need which has to be met‖ in the preparations for war.368  
 Spies and informers do not necessarily have to be Muslims. The founder of the Islamic 
state, Prophet Muhammed, employed a variety of spies ranging from close relatives to men 
recruited from the enemy camp. Safiur Rahman al-Mubarakpuri, in Al-Raheeq Al-
Makhtoom (Sealed Nectar), tells the story of a Jewish spy, who provided Prophet 
Muhammed‘s army with highly sensitive intelligence on his own people. This came at a 
critical time, when the Muslim army was poised to storm the Jewish stronghold of Khaiber 
in 629: 
 The Muslims besieged it for three days, but in vain. A Jewish spy told the 
Prophet about a subterranean water source, and advised that it be cut off in order 
to undermine their resistance. The Prophet (Peace be upon him) did that so the 
Jews came out to engage with the Muslims in fierce fighting, during which 
some Muslims and ten Jews were killed, but the fort was eventually 
conquered.
369
   
 
 The prohibition against spying on the private affairs or family life of people is quite 
universal and applies to both individuals and the state, although there are a few exceptions. In 
certain cases, when there are strong and credible indications that the life of an individual is in 
imminent danger, that a woman is about to be raped, or that an extreme situation requires 
urgent intervention, then spying would be permissible, as the intention in these instances is to 
act before it is too late, in order to prevent an imminent evil or save a life.
370
 In the Quranic 
Surah of Joseph, Jacob asks his sons to keep looking for their brother as he sends them on 
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a ‗spying mission‘ in the hope that they will be able to obtain some information about his 
son.
371
  
 A very significant reference to espionage occurs in the Surah of the Feast. When Moses 
approached the ―land of the infidels‖, according to Al-Tabari, he asked twelve dignitaries 
to scout the battlefield, spy on the enemy. The twelve men however
 
 were captured before 
accomplishing their mission.
 372
 They were then released after they had been thoroughly 
terrorized. The enemy on whom the twelve men had hoped to spy went to great lengths in 
order to strike fear into their hearts. They were naturally expected to relay the grim 
message to their leader. It was further hoped that the message would demoralize the 
Prophet‘s army, cow his men and sap their courage. When Moses was finally informed of 
the situation, as they had experienced it, he asked the twelve men to keep the matter to 
themselves and never to divulge it to anyone. What is quite significant in this reference is 
the fact that the task of spying was entrusted not to a group of ordinary individuals, but to 
distinguished men, referred to as ―Nuqaba‘‖. The root of this Arabic word is ‗naqqaba‘, 
which means ‗search‘, ‗pursue‘, ‗hunt‘ or ‗dig deep‘. Among other things, it is used to 
refer to patriarchs, elders, dignitaries, representatives or ‗those who have deep knowledge 
(of  secrets)‘373.  
 The Quran abounds with references to Allah‘s omnipotence, omniscience and accurate 
knowledge of the schemes and machinations of the hypocrites and enemies of Islam. There 
are numerous verses which stress that Allah knows not only every move or manoeuvre of 
Prophet Muhammed‘s enemies, but also every word they utter and every thought that 
crosses their minds. Muslims are constantly reminded of the presence of ‗watchers‘, 
‗sentinels‘ or ‗observers‘, specially commissioned by Allah to record their every move, 
word or thought. The Surah of Qaf declares that ―He (man) utters not a word but there is a 
sentinel by him, ready (to record it)‖,374 while the Surah of Tawbah (Repentance) 
rhetorically asks: 
 Know they not that Allah knows their secret ideas, and their secret 
counsels), and that Allah is the All-Knower of things unseen? Those who 
defame such of the believers who give charity (in Allah‘s Cause) voluntarily, 
and such who could not find to give charity (in Allah‘s Cause) except what is 
available to them – so they mock at them (believers); Allah will throw back 
their mockery on them, and they shall have a painful torment.
375
 
 
 The Quran does not condone prying into private lives. The most quoted verse in the 
Quran in which the word ‗spying‘ (tajassus) is mentioned occurs in the Surah of the 
Hujurat (Chambers). The verse expressly prohibits the Muslims from spying on each other, 
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especially with regard to their private lives: ―O ye who believe! Avoid suspicion (as much 
as possible): for suspicion in some cases is a sin: and spy not on each other, nor speak 
ill of each other behind their backs.‖376  
 In this verse, Muslims are admonished against spying, harbouring malicious suspicions or 
acting on doubts and unfounded reports of other people‘s affairs, which is either idle curiosity, 
and therefore futile, or excessive suspicion, which is tantamount to a sin.
377
 In the ―land of 
peace‖ (the Islamic state), individuals are held accountable only for the apparent crimes and 
indiscretions in which they are known or appear to have been involved.
378
 
 The prohibition of spying is not universal, however. It is primarily confined to unlawful 
invasion of privacy particularly on their weaknesses, shortcomings and sexual relations or 
activities (al-awrat). This type of spying is considered especially abhorrent and is absolutely 
prohibited by the Quran.
379
 In Islam, privacy, details of personal life and interpersonal 
relationships are considered sacred and inviolable. The Muslim faithful are consistently 
reminded to live in harmonious co-existence, without infringing on personal details.
380
 ―O ye 
who believe! Avoid suspicion as much (as possible): for suspicion in some cases is a sin: 
And spy not on each other behind their backs‖.381   
 Commenting on this verse, Al-Qurtubi interprets the Quranic reference as being a 
commandment to ―judge people only by their apparent and visible acts, not by following up 
their ‗awrat‘382 (private lives, sexual relations).383 Other commentators also stress the fact that 
Allah forbids prying into the secrets of Muslims or into anything Muslims may wish to veil 
and hide from the public eye, even if what they strive to hide is evil and prohibited by divine 
or human laws. Abu Al-Saud Al-Imadi explains that the Quranic commandment ―spy not‖ 
means ―do not look for other Muslims‘ awrat or their weaknesses and foibles. The 
justification for this ban in Al-Imadi‘s view is that ―acquainting oneself (with other people‘s 
evil deeds) will cause great (ethical and moral) damage‖.384 
 In Islam, domestic privacy is of special sensitivity; it has always been treated as 
sacrosanct, never to be violated or compromised in any way. A man‘s or woman‘s home in 
Islam is not just their ‗castle‘, but also their ‗temple‘, which should always be respected and 
revered. Severe punishment is promised to those who violate the sanctity of private life. In 
one of the Traditions, Prophet Muhammed says: ―It would be permissible for those who catch 
someone prying into their home without their consent to put out his eyes‖. Furthermore, 
eavesdropping is prohibited in Islam: ―He who listens to other people‘s speech without their 
permission or knowledge,‖ says Prophet Muhammed ―will have his ears filled with boiling 
lead in the Day of Judgment‖.385  
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 Just as the Quran forbids spying on and prying into other people‘s private affairs, 
Prophet Muhammed‘s Traditions also make it clear that the individual‘s right to privacy 
should at all times be respected. On numerous occasions, the Prophet stressed that spying 
on ordinary citizens would have a very serious negative impact, not only on the targeted 
individuals, but also on society at large. Prophet Muhammed appears to have been fully 
aware that constant spying and surveillance of the people would create an oppressive 
atmosphere of fear and mutual suspicion, which would undermine the very moral basis on 
which he was hoping to build the new society of believers. ―If you pry into the privacy or 
sexual relations of people‖, says Prophet Muhammed, ―you will (practically) deprave them 
or drive them to depravity‖.386 What is meant here, according to Al-Qaradhawi, is that the 
domestic front will be shattered and undermined if suspicion is allowed to dictate actions 
and attitudes, especially when people realise that their private shortcomings or the extent of 
their preparedness to commit acts of indecency are being investigated or spied on. This 
oppressive sense of alarm and distrust will drive not only the targeted individual but many 
others in society as well to lose their modesty and sense of decency, which will ultimately 
encourage them to engage in indecencies.
387
  
 The prohibition of spying on the private lives of Muslims is based on a number of 
Quranic verses as well as the sayings of Prophet Muhammed. Islam views all Muslims as 
brothers, who should lead peaceful and happy lives blessed by the mercy of Allah: ―The 
believers are naught else than brothers. Therefore make peace between your brethren and 
observe your duty to Allah that haply ye may obtain mercy.‖388 Among the many 
Traditions of Prophet Muhammed on this specific point is the ‗hadith‘ (saying) in which 
the same concept is echoed: 
              A Muslim is a brother of another Muslim, so he should not oppress him, nor 
should he hand him over to an oppressor. Whoever fulfilled the needs of his 
brother, Allah will fulfil his needs; whoever brought his (Muslim) brother out of 
a discomfort, Allah will bring him out of the discomforts of the Day of 
Resurrection, and whoever screened a Muslim, Allah will screen him on the 
Day of Resurrection.
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 Another inadmissible intelligence activity in Islam is spying for the enemy. Islam quite 
categorically and unambiguously prohibits spying for those who oppose the message of 
Prophet Muhammed as revealed to him by Allah.
390
 The Quran considers such an act to be 
one of utter betrayal and treason, rendering those who engage in this crime against the faith 
apostates ―O you who believe, do not betray Allah and the messenger, and do not betray 
those who trust you, now that you know.‖391  
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 Muslims who support non-Muslims, whether Jews, Christians or polytheists, and 
collaborate with them against the interests of the Muslims, are no better than the 
disbelievers themselves and will be dealt with accordingly ―O ye who believe! Take not 
the Jews and the Christians for your allies and protectors: They are but allies and protectors 
to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them for friendship and protection is surely 
one of them. Verily Allah guides not the wrongdoing folk.‖392 
 Another Quranic verse states that extending love and friendship to the ―enemies of 
Allah‖ is a quite serious crime, which would entail the gravest of punishments393:   
 O you who believe, you shall not befriend My enemies and your enemies, 
extending love and friendship to them, even though they have disbelieved in the 
truth that has come to you. They persecute the messenger, and you, just because 
you believe in Allah, your Lord. If you mobilize to struggle in My cause, 
seeking My blessings, how can you secretly love them? I am fully aware of 
everything you conceal, and everything you declare. Those among you who do 
this have indeed strayed off the right path.
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Spying for the enemies of Islam, as pointed out earlier, is considered a capital sin, which 
the Quran describes as ‗khiyanah‘ (betrayal). The Surah of Anfal admonishes Muslims: 
―Oh ye who believe! Betray not Allah and His Messenger, nor betray knowingly your 
Amanat (things entrusted to you) and all the duties which Allah has ordained for you‖.395  
There are admittedly few references to the existence of enemy spies amidst the Muslims. 
In one such reference, followers of Prophet Muhammed are warned to take every 
precaution, especially in times of war, lest their secrets be exposed to the enemy
396
. In 
another, the scripture warns believers not to be taken in by the charm or smooth talking of 
those who harbour evil against Islam and who might today be called fifth columnists or 
undercover agents: ―And when you look at them, their bodies please you, and when they 
speak, you listen to their words… They are the enemies, so beware of them! May Allah 
curse them‖.397   
 The Surah of Tawbah (Repentance) comments on those who have infiltrated the ranks 
of the Muslims in order to destroy Islam from within. The verses clearly indicate that there 
were some amongst the Muslims who paid only lip service to Islam and who were intent 
on subverting the new faith through the spread of rumours and divisive stories in the hope 
of stirring up sedition among the believers. Significantly, the verses refer to the fact that 
there were those among Prophet Muhammed‘s followers who were prone to lend ears to 
them: 
 Those who truly believe in Allah and the Last Day do not ask your 
permission to evade the opportunity to strive with their money and their 
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lives. Allah is fully aware of the righteous. The only people who wish to 
be excused are those who do not really believe in Allah and the Last Day. 
Their hearts are full of doubt, and their doubts cause them to waver. Had 
they mobilized with you, they would have created confusion, and would 
have caused disputes and divisions among you. Some of you were apt to 
listen to them. Allah is fully aware of the transgressors.
398
 
 
 Another reference occurs in the same Surah, where Allah informs Prophet Muhammed 
not to take the question of the presence of a few false believers, spies or perpetrators of lies 
to heart. Ibn Kathir notes that the Arabic ―Sammaóun‖ which literally means ‗listeners‘ 
here means ‗listeners for others‘, i.e. ‗spies‘: 
   O you messenger, do not be saddened by those who hasten to 
disbelieve among those who say, ‗We believe,‘ with their mouths, while 
their hearts do not believe. Among the Jews, some listened to lies. They 
listened to people who never met you, and who distorted the words out of 
context… Whomever Allah wills to divert, you can do nothing to help 
him against Allah. Allah does not wish to cleanse their hearts. They have 
incurred humiliation in this world, and in the Hereafter, they will suffer a 
terrible retribution. They are listeners to lies and rumours (for others), 
and eaters of illicit earnings. If they come to you to judge among them, 
you may judge among them, or you may disregard them. If you choose to 
disregard them, they cannot harm you in the least. But if you judge 
among them, you shall judge equitably. Allah loves those who are 
equitable.‖399 
 
7.3 Spying in the Land of Islam and the Land of Infidels 
The Quran contains numerous references to the necessity of spreading the word of Allah 
amongst all peoples. In the Surah of the Bee, we read: ―Call to the way of your Lord with 
wisdom and goodly exhortation, and have disputations with them in the best manner; 
surely your Lord best knows those who go astray from His path, and He knows best those 
who follow the right way‖.400 Islam furthermore enjoins all believers to prefer peaceful 
resolution of conflict: ―And if they [the enemy] incline to peace, then incline to it and trust 
in Allah; surely He is the Hearing, the Knowing‖.401 Muslim clerics have nevertheless 
divided the world into two parts: the Land of Peace or Islam in which Muslims live, and 
the Land of Disbelief or War in which infidels live.  
 According to most clerics, the Land of Islam is that which is governed by Muslims and 
in which the Islamic (Shari‘a) Law prevails.402 In this land, people are either Muslims, 403 
Dhimmis (people of the book, i.e. Jews, Magi and Christians), apostates or those granted 
safe conduct. Muslims are expected to be true to their faith by, among other things, 
praying, fasting and giving alms. The Dhimmis are those who are permitted to practice 
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their own religion in the Land of Islam but have to pay a kind of poll tax (Jizya), in return 
for state protection of their lives, property and freedom of religion and worship.
404
 All 
other non-Muslim individuals who happen to be in the Land of Islam for a legitimate 
reason are granted safe conduct
405
 to live and move amongst the Muslims for a specified 
length of time: ―And if one of the idolaters seek protection from you, grant him protection 
till he hears the word of Allah, then make him attain his place of safety; this is because 
they are a people who do not know‖.406    
 The ‗Land of War‘, on the other hand, refers to the territories populated by a majority 
of disbelievers, who are not ruled by Muslims and where Shari‘a law is not observed.407 
Muslims can enter into peace covenants with either the whole people of the Land of 
Disbelief or with only some of them.
408
 Residents of the Land of Islam, whether Muslims 
or Dhimmis, provided they have legitimate reasons such as conducting business, may 
apply for a special permit to travel to the Land of Disbelief. Muslim scholars are still in 
disagreement as to whether Shari‘a should be applied to those who travel to or sojourn in 
the Land of Disbelief, upon their return to the Land of Islam.  
 Punishment for Muslims who spy for non-Muslims is quite severe. According to the 
Maliki school of thought, he who spies for disbelievers becomes a disbeliever himself and 
has to be dealt with as such. The Malikis base this unforgiving attitude on the case of Hatib 
Ibn Abi Balta‘a, who was caught spying for the Meccan idolaters. He would have been 
killed by Omar bin Al-Khattab for collaboration with the enemy, had it not been for 
Prophet Muhammed‘s intercession and recognition of Hatib‘s services to Islam in the 
Battle of Badr.
409
 Besides the Malikis, most Islamic schools of thought specify the death 
penalty for those convicted of spying.
410
  
 There is admittedly no unambiguous judgment on those involved in spying,
411
 but 
when convicted of spying for the enemy, non-Muslims living as Dhimmis in Muslim 
societies receive no less severe punishments than their Muslim counterparts. Most Islamic 
scholars consider that Dhimmis forfeit their right to state protection and are deemed in 
contravention of the covenant between them and the Islamic state they live in when caught 
spying for non-Muslims. A notable example is afforded by the case of Furat Bin Hayyan 
who was condemned to death but was spared the punishment upon his conversion to 
Islam.
412
  
 Non-Muslims who entered the Land of Peace on a safe conduct were expected to abide 
by the laws of the land and to refrain from engaging in activities detrimental to the security 
of the state. Those caught spying on their Muslim hosts would be considered to have 
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reneged on the terms upon which they were permitted to move and operate in the land of 
Islam. Punishment for such an action was death. Some schools of thought, however, do not 
insist on capital punishment but advise imprisonment.
413
 Punishment for war spies is 
another issue on which there is no agreement. Some clerics stipulate the death penalty. 
This judgment is based on a precedent in the Battle of Hanin in which Prophet Muhammed 
approved this specific punishment for a man who was caught spying on the Muslim 
military camp.
414
 Other clerics have waived the death penalty and treated those spying in 
times of war as prisoners of war. In return for his life, a war spy was expected to provide 
whatever information he might possess.
415
  
 It is significant that many fatwas have recently been issued with regard to the 
suitability and relevance of the expressions ‗Land of War‘ and ‗Land of Peace‘ to our 
contemporary lives. Many Muslims consider this outright division between war and peace 
to be irrelevant at present. As peoples of the world have pledged to live under the canopy 
of the United Nations and honour its conventions and resolutions, this terminology appears 
obsolete. According to many clerics, the world now is made up of a great number of 
communities and cultures all sharing one Land of Peace.
416
    
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Through the process of deduction, Ijtihad plays an important role in providing 
answers to many questions which had no precedents or parallels in Islamic history. 
Another important aspect of Ijtihad lies in the fact that it allows jurists and scholars not 
only to introduce new legislations but also to ignore, modify or enhance rulings which no 
longer respond adequately to the demands of the age. In the field of intelligence, espionage 
was divided into admissible and inadmissible activities. Admissible espionage ‗Tahassus‘ 
was sanctioned by the Quran in the Surah of Joseph, when Jacob despatches his sons  
Go and enquire about Joseph and his brother, seek news of 
them, and do not despair of God‘s [gracious] Spirit, His mercy. 
Indeed none despairs of the [gracious] Spirit of God save the 
disbelieving folk‘: and so they departed to Egypt [to look] for 
Joseph.
417
 
 
 In his commentary on this verse, Ibn Katheer points out that Jacob‘s sons did not 
practice ‗Tajasus‘ a term which normally describes espionage for evil purposes but  
‗Tahasus‘, which is reserved for benign causes and the public good of the Muslim nation. 
Jurists on the other hand have condemned espionage as a crime if it violates privacy or is  
129 
 
carried out for personal purposes. Prohibition of this type of espionage is based on the 
following verse ―O ye who believe! Avoid suspicion (as much as possible): for suspicion 
in some cases is a sin: and spy not on each other, nor speak ill of each other behind 
their backs.‖ 418 Ijtihad  has furthermore provided the Muslim intelligence community with 
the required flexibility to carry out their duties as long as their work does not run counter to 
the Quran and the Sunnah.   
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Chapter Eight 
Fatah and the Concept of Intelligence 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In order that we may be able to assess the intelligence capabilities and practices of Fatah, it 
is imperative to start with an investigation of some aspects of the social and religious 
culture within which this major faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
came into being. Intelligence work, as a specialized human endeavour, is not an 
autonomous universal given, but, as Adda Boseman points out, a ―derivative and 
expression of the particular society, culture, or ideology‖ in terms of which it is being 
activated.
419
 Examining non-Western intelligence through Western lenses is neither 
appropriate nor adequate, so this thesis will take note of the impact and influence on 
intelligence of the ‗layered mosaic‘ of Islam, tribal affiliation, family identities and 
history.
420 
Culture, as Philip Davies elaborates, plays an important role in defining the 
frame of mind and general concepts of intelligence in any given community
.421  
Indeed,
 
Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman are correct in stating that culture, as a concept 
related to intelligence, contributes to our understanding of how related elements such as 
shared values, beliefs, practices and assumptions about how the world works and how 
insiders are distinguished from outsiders encourage ―predictability and stability‖ within a 
delineated community.
422
 Understanding the religious and ideological basis of any 
insurgency or paramilitary group is therefore a prerequisite if tragic failures, such as what 
happened in Iraq, are to be avoided. This is particularly true in the present context, given 
that while religion underlies basic beliefs in most parts of the world, ―it is not normally 
toxically linked with politics in the same way as it is in the Middle East‖.423 
 The previous chapters have demonstrated that the origins of the Arab concept of 
intelligence date back, long before the rise of Islam in the first half of the 7
th
 century, to the 
pre-Islamic ages, more specifically to the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 centuries. At that time, the Qahtani 
tribes of Southern Arabia, like all inhabitants of the northern and central parts of the 
peninsula, had their own networks of spies and secret agents, who were quite active, not 
only during wars and crises, but also in peacetime. In the early stages of Islam, Prophet 
Muhammed and his followers, who took it upon themselves to spread the new religion, 
first made use of and later enriched and developed what intelligence notions and practices 
they had inherited from their Arab predecessors.  
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 To the founders of Islam, intelligence gathering and the employment of secret agents, 
whether to proselytise or for purely military purposes, were of utmost importance. The 
methodologies and tactics which the builders of the Islamic state improvised and perfected 
gave shape to and crystallized what can be called an Arab Islamic concept of intelligence. 
Although it may at first seem that this concept does not differ from any of its contemporary 
intelligence counterparts, it does so in fact, as their cultural bases are widely different. The 
rich Islamic cultural heritage, based as it was on the teachings of the Quran and the 
Traditions of Prophet Muhammed, provided a rich source from which the Arab Islamic 
intelligence community, across successive generations, never ceased to draw inspiration 
and guidance. Bernard Lewis was among the first Western Arabists to acknowledge that 
interaction between Arab Islamic culture and intelligence has been notably consistent since 
the seventh century.
424
  
 It must be stressed that the Islamic religion has permeated Arab culture so deeply that 
it has become difficult to distinguish between what is Arabic and what is Islamic. For 
Islam constitutes the spiritual and moral foundation upon which Arab values, customs and 
aspirations are based. The early history of the Arabs (AD 700-1000) is so intertwined with 
that of Islam, that the terms Islam and Arabism become almost synonymous, especially 
during the period of Islamic expansion outside the Arabian Peninsula into Asia, North 
Africa and beyond. All states, kingdoms and empires which embraced Islam adopted 
Arabic not only as a lingua franca but as a medium of communication among their own 
citizens. The expansion of Islam has thus greatly impacted Arabic culture and language. 
Just as Arabic came into a wide range of terminological riches, other languages borrowed 
extensively from Arabic, the language of the Quran. With the advent of the modern Arab 
renaissance which began towards the end of the 18
th
 century, the question of the Arab 
Muslim identity re-emerged as a reaction to the European renaissance whose values and 
ideals were rejected. This tendency is evidenced by the emergence of a number of anti-
Western movements which opposed all attempts at what was seen as a cultural invasion of 
the Muslims.
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 It is clear that in the Arab world, especially in the Middle Eastern countries, an 
increasing amount of hatred has, since the end of World War II and the creation of the state 
of Israel, been transformed into Islamic and Arab radicalism. Many radical movements and 
paramilitary groups espousing armed resistance or terrorism to varying degrees have 
emerged since then, beginning with the Muslim Brotherhood, including dozens of 
Palestinian organizations of every political shade and ending with the notorious groups, 
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Taliban and Al-Qaeda.426 Most of these movements, radical or not, have sought to draw on 
this rich inheritance when launching political projects or building military and security 
apparatuses.   
 Almost all the nationalist and Islamist paramilitary groups which emerged during the 
interwar period shared a common denominator: hostility towards the presumably 
imperialist West. Western invasion of Arab and Islamic lands was viewed by Islamists and 
nationalists alike as a flagrant aggression against the peoples of the region and an attempt 
to control and plunder their natural resources. Resisting the Western invasion was further 
viewed as a defence mechanism to protect their culture and identity. The emergence of 
nationalist and leftist parties deepened the struggle and intensified even further the clash of 
interests, especially after the discovery of yet more oil fields and the entry of the Soviet 
Union as a serious contender. Among the Palestinians there emerged a number of political 
groupings and parties. Among the most important parties with nationalist tendencies were: 
the Baath (Renaissance) and the Harakat Al-Qawmiyeen Al-Arab (Arab Nationalist 
Movement). On the left of the political spectrum were the Marxists and socialists. 
Although the vast majority of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fatah) 
members were Muslims, Christian Palestinians too joined Fatah. These include Kemal 
Nassir, Fatah‘s Central Committee member, George Habash and Naief Hawatma both of 
whom played a significant part in the Palestinian resistance and formed their own 
revolutionary brigades.
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  The early experience of Islam, especially during its initial secret phase, which focused 
on providing a safe environment for spreading the new faith among various tribes and 
towns in and around Mecca and Medina, has been of special significance to these modern 
movements. Modern and contemporary paramilitary leaders, especially in areas where they 
are confronted with heavy and punitive state reprisals, almost invariably identify 
themselves with the early followers of Prophet Muhammed. The circumstances under 
which they operate are also seen as similar to those of the early days of Islam. These 
largely faith-driven movements see in Prophet Muhammed‘s life and practice an 
exemplary role model, worthy of emulation in every detail. This tendency can easily be 
seen not only in the political and military discourse of these groups, but also in the 
suggestive names they adopt for themselves, for their organizational structures and for the 
operations they implement.
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 The founders of such resistance movements as Fatah were 
extremely cautious, selective and  secretive about identifying prospective recruits. To 
avoid reprisals and in order to protect the newly formed underground organization from 
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infiltration and sabotage, they resorted to all sorts of dissimulation and deceptive tactics. In 
so doing they were following in the footsteps of Prophet Muhammed who excelled in the 
use of secrecy and concealment, especially during the early years of his call to Islam. 
 
 These precautionary measures and tactics were standard procedures in the Muslim 
Brotherhood which carried special appeal to many of the Palestinian youths who later 
came to found Fatah. The Muslim Brotherhood's motto was ―Muhammed Qudwatuna‖ 
(Muhammed is our Role Model). In attempting to win new recruits to their movement, the 
Brotherhood operated under numerous front organizations such as boy scouts, sports and 
youth clubs, students unions and a variety of literary and cultural groupings. The Fatah 
leaders who  had joined the Brotherhood in Egypt learned these tactics and mastered them. 
When they set out to form their first nucleus cell, they chose the state of Kuwait, away 
from Palestine and its Arab neighbouring countries. Just as Prophet Muhammed used the 
Dar Al-Arqam safe house to educate his followers and teach them in the ways of spreading 
Islam, the Fatah founders, as one of its members Khalil Al-Wazir points out, used to meet 
and lay down their strategies and plans of action  in an out of the way safe house in 
Kuwait. To protect the fledgling group against infiltration no one cadre knew all the other 
members of the underground group.
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 Despite the emergence during the past century of numerous nationalist and Islamist 
movements in the Arab and Muslim worlds, the Palestine National Liberation Movement 
(Fatah) remains a remarkable and unique group, which has distinguished itself as a 
competent organization, capable of dealing flexibly with other Palestinian factions, 
grouping them all under a unified umbrella structure and providing efficient leadership, 
through its control of the PLO.  
 Chief among the factors which enabled Fatah to lead the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) was its effective leadership which was experienced and hardened by 
years of resistance and underground political and military action. The fact that, apart from 
Islam, there were practically no ideological or dogmatic restrictions governing its operation 
and methodologies made Fatah quite free to choose, adopt or modify any mode of action 
which suits its strategy. Like the early builders of the Muslim state in Medina who were in 
the main émigrés from Mecca, most of the founders of Fatah were refugees who had fled 
their towns and cities following the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. They had spent their 
formative years in refugee camps amidst the misery and suffering of their own people. 
They were quite different from the traditional leaders of the Palestinian national movement 
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who had mainly been businessmen, middle class dignitaries, religious or feudal leaders or 
descendants of rich and well connected families. But these 'lowly' youths were soon to win 
credibility and wide popular support. Hardly ten years had passed before Fatah imposed its 
full control over the PLO, which was transformed into a more dynamic entity, capable of 
establishing international relations with all parts of the world and building competent 
social, military, security and intelligence agencies which in some cases surpassed their 
counterparts in the region.
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 The efforts exerted by the Fatah-led PLO in Jordan first and later on in the Lebanon 
during the period extending from 1970 to the Israeli invasion of 1982 resulted not only in 
the building of an efficient and disciplined security infrastructure capable of functioning in 
hostile or semi-hostile environments but also in consolidating and expanding a number of 
social, financial, health and educational institutions. In order to improve its performance on 
the military as well as the diplomatic and political fronts, the PLO launched an ambitious 
training programme through which many young men and women were offered grants or 
scholarships to study abroad.   
 The growth and expansion of the PLO led many observers and analysts to call it the 
―Fakahani Republic‖, in a reference to the part of Beirut in which the PLO headquarters 
and other offices were situated. A special Palestinian force directly responsible to 
Chairman Yassir Arafat‘s own office was set up in this part of the Lebanese capital. Its 
duties were to provide security for Arafat who was gradually becoming more like a ―ruler‘‘ 
or ―head of state‖ than a military leader. Through this carefully planned transformation, 
Arafat managed to accomplish what his predecessors had failed to accomplish. He 
succeeded in imposing himself as leader of the Palestinians everywhere, in the Diaspora as 
well as those in the Israeli occupied territories. No sooner had Yassir Arafat and the vast 
majority of the PLO declared their adherence to the path of peace, under American 
patronage, than the ―leader president‖ despite all defamation campaigns, blockade and 
rejection by a number of influential Arab powers, became a diligent and patient negotiator 
in the labyrinth of international manoeuvres and politics. After a lengthy series of 
clandestine meetings with the Israelis Arafat succeeded in concluding the Oslo Agreement 
of 1993, which placed him and the Israelis on the road towards the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. It was in accordance with this agreement that the Palestinian Authority 
was created in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Most of the institutions and 
infrastructure elements of the newly created Palestinian Authority were drawn from 
Fatah.
431
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 Fatah went a long way towards implementing its political programme, which, through 
a combination of armed struggle and diplomacy, sought and still seeks to establish an 
independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital. Fatah‘s consistency, and 
successes as a non-state intelligence actor are behind the choice of this paramilitary 
organization as a case study, through which its strategies, tactics and behaviour will be 
examined in some detail. It is only after we have attained a degree of understanding of the 
mind-set of ‗the other‘ in this case, Fatah on its own terms, that we can proceed to 
comparisons and assessments of its intelligence record.
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 The ideological point of departure of the founders of Fatah, especially those who took 
charge of its security and intelligence apparatuses, was in essence an extension of (if not 
identical with) that of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which looks to the Quran and 
the life of Prophet Muhammed for inspiration and guidance. While total adherence to the 
teachings of the Quran and the sayings and practices of its prophet lie at the core of the 
Muslim Brotherhood‘s message, the ascendancy of Fatah was in many ways a 
reinvigorated and more developed version of the Brotherhood‘s experience. It is hoped that 
the following pages will demonstrate how, in setting up Fatah‘s security and intelligence 
apparatuses, the originators were inspired and stimulated by the same ideals and visions 
which had driven the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
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8.2 Creation of Fatah 
 Most historical accounts of the foundation of Fatah indicate that this paramilitary group 
was the outcome of deliberations held in Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Gaza and 
lasting almost a decade, roughly from 1951 to 1959. These accounts come mostly from 
people who took part in the clandestine deliberations or from those who joined the first 
secret cell founded by Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalaf and a few others.
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 The ambitious 
aim of the young Palestinian founders was to create an independent organization that is to 
be different from those which had dominated the Palestinian scene.  
 In the years following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the most influential political parties, 
which enjoyed wide popularity among Palestinians, were the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
nationalist and communist parties. The bitter sense of disappointment felt by the 
Palestinians following the Arab defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was behind the 
emergence and flourishment of such ideologies and tendencies. This sense of indignation 
and frustration led many Palestinians to reject the guardianship which the Arabs were 
trying to impose on them. It also pushed them to vent their anger on the traditional 
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Palestinian leaderships which were blamed for the loss of their homeland. Many of the 
disillusioned, angry Palestinians joined the Muslim Brotherhood in droves. Some of those 
who espouse the Islamist cause such as Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalaf, Muhammad Yousuf 
al-Najjar, Kemal Adwan and others were later to become among the founding members of 
Fatah.   Most of those came from among the Palestinian refugees who had fled their newly 
occupied land in 1948 and settled in Gaza.
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 Some of those young men had taken part in 
the demonstrations, political activities and even military operations of the Brotherhood or 
had least been sympathetic to the ideals of the Islamist movement.
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 According to Khalil Al-Wazir, one of the Fatah founders the serious push for creating 
the organization started in earnest after the Suez invasion known in the Arab world as (the 
Tripartite Aggression) of 1956: 
 When the tripartite invasion took place and the Gaza Strip fell under enemy 
[Israeli] occupation, all that preoccupied us and seized our minds was: how to 
involve greater numbers of the [Gaza] Strip Palestinians in our armed 
operations? And how to establish support cells for our popular resistance 
groups in Gaza?.
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 Following the Suez War, which had inflamed the nationalist zeal amongst Arabs in 
general and Palestinians in particular, a new realization dawned upon those who were later 
to become the founders of Fatah and who included Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin), Farouq 
Qaddoumi (Abu Al-Lutf), Muhammed Yousuf Al-Najjar (Abu Yousuf), Kamal Adwan and 
Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). After a long period of collective searching and lengthy 
debates, these Palestinians came to the conclusion that the real challenge facing the 
Palestinian cause was not how to elicit support for armed action, but how to fill the 
vacuum created by the absence of an independent Palestinian political structure. The Israeli 
occupation of Gaza smashed what was left of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and 
undermined what little credibility the other political parties had enjoyed. In these bleak 
circumstances and a general atmosphere of distress and frustration among Palestinians, the 
Egyptian leader Jamal Abdul Nasser emerged as a great nationalist hero, a new Saladin, on 
the promise of whose charismatic rhetoric and fiery speeches many Palestinians pinned 
high hopes.
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 During that period however, the future founders of Fatah were incensed at the 
Egyptian authority's prohibition of all Fedayeen operations against Israel, after the latter 
had withdrawn its forces from the Gaza Strip in March 1957. As a result, the young 
Palestinian activists became even more convinced that no country, political party or 
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individual, however just or powerful, could settle the problems of the Palestinians on their 
behalf, so that an independent course of action should henceforth be their priority.
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 Other accounts of this event such as that of Farid Al-Falouji indicate that, the idea of 
creating a new independent Palestinian organization was discussed as early as 1952. It was 
always on the mind of Yassir Arafat and several of his close associates, who were then still 
pursuing their studies at Cairo University. Al-Falouji points out that from 1952 onwards, 
Arafat promoted the idea of creating an independent national movement specifically 
dedicated to the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Such an organization should, in 
Arafat‘s vision, be as far removed as possible from intra-Arab and regional conflicts and 
interests. Working diligently along with Salah Khalaf (aka Abu Iyad), Arafat was able to 
attract a number of young Palestinians, especially those who were students at Egyptian 
universities. Those who responded positively to Arafat‘s call were, like him and Abu Iyad, 
quite enthusiastic about armed struggle as a means to achieve self-determination and 
regaining Palestinian lands lost in battle. Amongst the first who were willing to join Arafat 
were Abu Mazin, who was later to succeed Arafat as president of the Palestinian Authority, 
Abu Al-Lutf, Abu Yousuf, Kamal Adwan and Abu Jihad. These five men, together with 
Arafat and Abu Iyad, formed a close personal alliance amongst themselves and succeeded 
not only in creating the most effective Palestinian grouping of like-minded people, but also 
in staying at the helm of the umbrella Palestinian organization, the PLO. Despite the 
assassination of four of his comrades (Abu Jihad, Abu Yousuf, Kamal Adwan and Abu 
Iyad), Yassir Arafat continued, until his death in 2004, to lead both the PLO and 
subsequently the fledgling Palestinian Authority.
440
 
 According to Abu Iyad, the story of Fatah begins in 1959, when Yassir Arafat and a 
number of associates and friends founded an engineering contracting company in Kuwait. 
Abu Iyad dates the birth of Fatah with the launch of this engineering company: 
On October 10, 1959, a small group of us met in a discreet house in 
Kuwait to hammer out the organizational structures of Fatah. More meetings 
with other participants took place over the following days, always in the 
greatest secrecy. There were fewer than twenty of us in all, representatives of 
underground groups from various Arab countries and beyond, coming 
together to centralize our activities for the first time. This limited congress 
marked the formal creation of what was to become the most powerful 
national liberation movement Palestine had ever known.
441
 
 
Besides Yassir Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir, the cell also included two Palestinian activists 
from Syria: Adil Abdul Kerim and Abdullah Al-Dannan, and two from Gaza: Khalid 
Umeirah and Tawfeeq Shadid.
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 By the end of the year, the founders of Fatah had written 
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two important documents: Haikal Al-Bina‟ al-Thawri (The Route Map for Revolutionary 
Action) and Bayan Al-Harakah (The Movement‘s Manifesto). These two documents set 
forth, in unambiguous terms, the vision, strategies and ultimate aims of Fatah. They also 
elucidated, amongst other things, the roots of its organizational infrastructure as well as the 
political philosophy behind the launch of the new movement. The founders of Fatah 
outlined their philosophy by adopting the old adage ―Freedom is not something which is 
given to people but wrested by them‖.443   
 The Arabic word ‗fatah‘, which is laden with positive Quranic connotations, means, 
among other things, ‗to open up‘, ‗to start afresh‘ and ‗to achieve success or a 
breakthrough‘. This word appears in the Surah of the Ranks in the sense of ‗victory‘, 
where the faithful are promised ―yet another (blessing) that you love: help from Allah and 
a victory near at hand‖.444 In Islamic history, the word is frequently used to denote the 
successful conquest of new territories, especially the conquest of Mecca by the Prophet 
Muhammed in AD 630. Adopting this name for the newly formed paramilitary group was 
therefore intended, above all else, to exploit the immense religious connotations associated 
with the successful re-entry of Prophet Muhammed to his birthplace, giving the idea of 
fighting for the liberation of Palestine a religious dimension. This is quite evident in the 
speeches given by Fatah‘s chairman, Yassir Arafat, who continually referred to the 
liberation of Palestine as a holy patriotic duty.
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 But the word ‗Fatah‘ is also a reverse 
acronym of Fatah‘s full name in Arabic: Harakat Al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini.  
 In The Route Map for Revolutionary Action, Fatah incites all Palestinians to rise up in 
arms and resist their enemies who have usurped their rights and freedoms: 
 Our stateless people have been leading an abject life characterized by 
misery and humiliation in every country throughout the diaspora. Palestinians 
are now living without a homeland, without dignity, without leadership, 
without hope, without arms, without guidance, without help, without respect, 
without existence. For far too long, we have held and sustained our hopes, 
patiently waiting … until all hopes have vanished and melted away.446    
 
 Once the organizational structure of the new movement was thought out, the zealous 
young men of Fatah laid out a detailed plan aimed at contacting several individuals 
(Palestinian) in Gaza and Syria, who shared the same vision or ideal. Amongst the first to 
be approached was Salah Khalf, who joined the group in 1959. Another newcomer was 
Khalid Al-Hasan, who proved a valuable asset to the founders and their supporters. 
Exploiting his official position in the Kuwaiti Public Works Department, Al-Hasan was 
able to have entry visas and work permits issued to many Fatah members and 
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sympathisers. A big boost for Fatah came in November 1959, when representatives of a 
number of Palestinian groups, comprising 500 members across the Gulf states, agreed to 
join the new organization. Like Mecca during the early (secret) stage of Islam, Kuwait thus 
became the most important base from which Fatah launched its diplomatic and political 
moves.
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 In an attempt to broaden popular support amongst fellow Palestinians and Arabs in 
general, the founders of Fatah sought from the beginning to secure a forum through which 
they could address the public and heighten awareness of the Palestinian cause. To that end, 
they contacted their fellow Beirut-based Palestinian, Tawfiq Houri, a writer who, like 
Salah Al-Hasan before him, proved quite helpful. Houri held a licence to publish a monthly 
magazine entitled Al-Nida‟ (The Call). To accommodate the new mission, it was agreed 
that the magazine should be re-launched, with a new title that was to be easily identifiable, 
more emotive and suggestive. The name chosen for Fatah‘s first official regular 
publication was Nida‟ Al-Hayat: Filistinuna (The Call of Life: Our Palestine), which 
continued to be the organ of Fatah from its first issue in November 1959 until 1964. The 40 
volumes published during this period included numerous contributions by Yassir Arafat, 
Khalil Al-Wazir, Tawfiq Houri and other founding members. The magazine played a 
significant part in raising the profile of Fatah in the Arab world and heightening political 
awareness among Palestinians. It also served as a mailbox for the new movement and a 
channel through which the Fatah leadership could be contacted. Besides articles and 
comments, the magazine received a huge volume of letters from Palestinians and Arabs 
indicating their support for the organisation. Many of these letters contained applications 
from ardent youths asking to join the ranks of Fatah.
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 Just as the early Muslims employed 
poets and public orators to popularise their cause, Nida‟ Al-Hayat was an important organ 
through which the Fatah founders eulogized their ideals and attacked their adversaries.   
 One of oldest members of Fatah, Khalil al-Wazir, explains that those who founded the 
organization had deliberately and consciously used the term ‗movement‘ rather than 
‗political party‘. In referring to themselves as founders of a movement, they were 
emulating the Muslim Brotherhood.
449
 In point of fact, the Arabic word ‗hizb‘, which is 
commonly used now to denote a political party, is not devoid of negative implications. To 
the founders the term ‗party‘ did not sound as inclusive or as free as ‗movement‘ since it 
only refers to a part rather than the whole. The term 'party' was also seen to denote 
commitment to a rigid and restraining discipline which impedes movement. It was quite 
common on the political scene in the post World War II period when a host of radical and 
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revolutionary parties mushroomed in the region. To distinguish themselves from these 
parties they decided to call themselves a ‗movement‘ rather than a ‗party‘.450 The word 
‗hizb‘ furthermore is closely associated with one of the most difficult periods in the life of 
Prophet Muhammed when the ‗ahzab‘ (plural of ‗hizb‘) imposed a total blockade on the 
newly established Islamic state in Medina. In one of his sayings, Prophet Muhammed 
invoked the help of Allah, in the hope that the ahzab be defeated and convulsed to 
pieces.
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 Besides, the Arabic term ‗harakah‘ (movement) is more vivid and positive, in 
that it connotes ―continued activity, away from the rigidity of any specific formula, 
especially as Fatah was not intended to be just another organization, but as a movement for 
the whole people‖.452 The movement projected itself not as merely another political entity 
on the Palestinian scene, but as a national front, comprising a wide spectrum of political 
entities. It therefore called upon all Palestinians, of whatever school of thought or 
tendency, to ―rise above their ideological and partisan allegiances and join the armed 
revolutionary vanguards‖.453   
 Despite the Islamist bent of mind of many members of the Fatah founders, the newly 
created movement did not seek to exclude any religious, sectarian or ethnic group. On the 
contrary, they embraced all talents wherever these are found among Muslims, Christians or 
other faiths. In their political discourse, the Fatah leaders were from the start quite keen to 
stress the national Palestinian identity away from the constraints of sect, faith or ethnicity. 
The National Charter of the PLO stresses the equal rights of all Palestinians, regardless of 
their faith or ideologies. Unlike most parties and groupings, Fatah distanced itself from all 
sectarian or religious conflicts and established good relations with the clerical 
establishment in Palestinian towns and cities. The excellent relations which Yassir Arafat 
cultivated with the Palestinian church leaders were reflected in the fact that there were a 
number of prominent Christians in the upper echelons PLO hierarchy.
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 In order to mobilize the Palestinian people into armed struggle, Fatah, unlike many of 
the Palestinian resistance organizations, placed considerable emphasis on the national 
Palestinian identity. Its political project was challenged by the atmosphere of failure and 
frustration which pervaded the Palestinian scene as a result of the multiplicity and diversity 
of philosophies and ideologies adopted by both traditionalist and revolutionary parties. The 
absence, or at least the deficiencies, of a national Palestinian project had prompted such 
famed leaders as Izz Uddin Al-Qassam and Amin Al-Husaini first to adopt Islamic slogans, 
then to turn away from them towards nationalist (pan-Arabist) ones. They did this without 
realizing that the absence of national identity was quite often behind the setbacks which 
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had befallen the Palestinians and behind their failure to form their own political frame of 
reference. The expulsion and displacement of the Palestinians, which led to the 
disintegration of Palestinian society, transformed the Palestinians, as it were, into a 
gambling card in the hands of Arab states.
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 A memorandum sent in July 1957 by Khalil Al-Wazir to the Muslim Brotherhood is a 
clear indication of the vision and thoughts with which al-Wazir‘s mind and those of his 
compatriots were preoccupied. The memo which detailed a new project did not elicit any 
serious interest or scrutiny; nor did Al-Wazir expect it to. Despite the fact that Fatah‘s 
initiators received no response from the Muslim Brotherhood or from any other political 
force to which the draft project was sent, they nevertheless held their constitutional 
assembly in 1958, a year after the memorandum had been distributed. As it turned out, the 
Muslim Brotherhood rejected the project, but this rejection was not conveyed until 1960, 
after the Brotherhood had lost increasing numbers of its followers to the new movement, 
Fatah.
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 Writing in one of the earliest issues of Filistinuna (1959), Khalil Al-Wazir says: 
 We have to wage an unmitigated war against Israel. We also have to reject 
any political bargains through which Israel would be permitted to continue its 
existence. Nor should we trust Arab governments. We should resist their 
attempts to impose their hegemony and guardianship. It is incumbent upon the 
Palestinians, above all else, to take their own destiny into their own hands, and 
to devote all resources to our armed struggle.
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 As soon as it was launched, Fatah set out to develop its own national project on the 
basis of ―Palestine First‖. This slogan proved quite popular and soon came to attract wide 
segments of Palestinian society. From the start, Fatah had stated its ultimate aim quite 
unambiguously as ―the liberation of the whole of Palestine, and the destruction of all 
foundations upon which Israel and the society of the Zionist colonialist occupation are 
built‖.458 When setting forth these two aims, Fatah insisted that its strategy was based upon 
two fundamental principles: first, total independence of the movement and the Palestinian 
decision-making; and second, recognition of the priority of armed struggle as the only way 
to liberate Palestine. Fatah condemned Arab politics, charging it with ―usurping the 
Palestinian masses of their initiatives and their will to act, through use of force and 
application of all sorts of pressures‖. Fatah also criticised Arab politics for seeking to 
―dismember the Palestinian national movement as a prerequisite for deploying Arab 
armies‖.459 It further accused some Arab leaders of ―exploiting the Palestinian cause for 
142 
 
their own benefit‖ and called for ―the establishment of an independent Palestinian political 
entity, with its own organizational structures‖.460  
 Until 1963, Fatah focused on widening its popularity and increasing its membership. It 
also actively sought to enlist as much support as possible from both Arab and non-Arab 
quarters. The circumstances prevailing during the period (1959-1963) were in a way 
similar to those of the second phase of the Islamic call during which Prophet Muhammed 
and his followers went public. But the need for Arab recognition of the PLO and the 
Palestine Liberation Army in 1964, constituted an immense pressure on the Palestinians to 
start their ‗armed struggle‘ much earlier than planned. The Fatah leaders concluded that 
―bolstering their military bases and making them battle-ready… in order that operations 
may be launched within a short span of time would save the Palestinian arena from the 
sophistries which had dominated it, and would furthermore enable the national movement 
to regain the initiative which it had almost lost‖.461 
 In order to gain experience and speed up preparedness for covert operations against 
the Zionist state and its interests, inside and outside Israel, the Fatah leaders sought to learn 
from the experiences of fellow fighters across the world. Algeria was of great significance 
to the Fatah fighters, as they drew many lessons from the Algerian war of independence. 
Algeria, furthermore, served as a promising model to be emulated, especially as the 
Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) had succeeded, through armed struggle, in 
seizing independence from the French colonialists. To most Palestinians, therefore, the 
Algerian experience was an inspiration and a concrete proof that only armed struggle can 
―transform the popular masses into an effective force of revolutionary cadres, fully aware 
of its mission in life‖.462 Commenting on the challenges facing Fatah during the formative 
years, Khalil Al-Wazir sums up the situation by saying that Fatah decided to ―learn how to 
swim by plunging into the water and to learn about war through doing battle‖.463 In short, 
Fatah had blind faith in what it considered a strategic universal certainty: ―The only way to 
press ahead with the historic process of struggle was to start an armed revolution within the 
usurped part of our homeland‖.464 
 This assertion came in the first official communiqué 
issued by the movement on 1
st
 January 1965, which called for 
national unity in the face of the grave challenges facing the 
Palestinians and emphasized at the same time the urgent 
necessity of setting up a Palestinian political entity. There was a 
common belief among the leaders of Fatah that the Arab 
governments were seeking to obliterate the Palestinian identity. 
This belief was expressed by Khalil Al-Wazir when he said that 
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―the whole purpose of deploying the [Arab Salvation] army to 
Palestine [in 1948] was to confiscate Palestinian decisions and 
strangle the independent Palestinian willpower‖.465    
  
 From the time it was launched in the late fifties, Fatah laid great emphasis on learning 
from the past struggle of the Palestinian people and attached great importance to the 
creation of an independent Palestinian entity that would express and embody the 
expectations of the Palestinians. This was achieved through the creation of the PLO, which 
soon became ―the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinians‖.466 Fatah also strove to 
protect the right of the Palestinians to take their own decisions, to stay away from intra-
Arab conflicts and rivalries and never to lose sight of their strategic aims. Fatah‘s 
embracing of all Palestinians, regardless of their social or intellectual links, and the fact 
that it did not adopt any specific ideology, political trend or school of thought, enabled it to 
attract a variety of people belonging to a wide range of political and intellectual 
backgrounds and to mobilise wider segments of Palestinian society. It was through its 
openness and sense of determination that Fatah was able to lead the PLO and transform it 
into an entity similar in its components, functions and the nature of its activities to a state. 
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8.3 Fatah’s Rapid Rise 
Through its adherence to the option of armed conflict and its execution of numerous 
operations deep inside Israeli territory and the occupied lands, Fatah gained credibility 
amongst Palestinians. Within a very short time, Fatah was able to strengthen its position 
within the Palestinian liberation movement and raise the hopes of the Palestinian people, 
deepening their sense of pride and self-reliance, especially as, since its launch, Palestine 
had become a much larger question than just that of refugees and UN humanitarian aid. On 
the Arab and Islamic fronts, Fatah succeeded in securing generous financial assistance as 
well as valuable technical and military help. This enabled it to build its own security 
apparatus and set up special training camps for its military and security personnel in a 
number of Arab countries.
468
    
 The declaration by Fatah on 1
st
 January 1965 that it had carried out its first operation 
inside Israel was adopted as the official date of the beginning of the ‗Palestinian 
Revolution‘. This declaration emphasized that there was no option for the Palestinians 
except armed struggle if they were to ―liberate Palestine and regain their usurped rights‖.469 
But the actual date of the adoption of a policy of armed struggle came in the aftermath of 
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the defeat of three Arab states—Egypt, Jordan and Syria—in the June 1967 War. This 
humiliating defeat led to the collapse of the revolutionary ideologies which had prevailed 
throughout the fifties and sixties. It also led to the rise of Fatah as a strong, popularly 
empowered representative of the Palestinians and their adherence to armed struggle.
470
   
 Fatah‘s armed struggle option soon developed into a national liberation project with 
new features, a sophisticated organizational structure and an elite military force, which 
pushed the Palestinian liberation movement forward and prompted the PLO to effect 
significant root-and-branch reforms. It was during this period of Fatah‘s ascendancy that 
the need to create security and intelligence apparatuses was felt, especially as Fatah was 
now in possession of trained and dedicated cadres, a philosophy to guide it and a position 
of authority. Having secured enough human and financial resources as well as technical 
know-how, Fatah pushed ahead with its security plans and set up Jihaz Al-Rasd Al- Thawri 
(the Revolutionary Surveillance Apparatus) in Jordan in 1969.
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 For the Palestinians, the Arab defeat in the June 1967 War resulted, among other 
things, in a loss of confidence in the Arab establishment, especially in the so-called 
‗progressive‘ regimes. The emergence following the 1967 defeat of the ―fedayeen‖ 
phenomenon reflects the growing conviction that the then existing Arab regimes, pro-
western or revolutionary, were incapable of confronting Israel or wresting back the 
occupied Arab lands. More and more Palestinians felt that there was only one option:  
armed struggle. The then raging Vietnam War provided a live example and a role model to 
follow. These notions were strongly advocated by Marxist-Leninist groups as well as 
revolutionary nationalist parties. To the founders of Fatah who were well-versed in the 
history of Islam and the strategies Prophet Muhammed had adopted to spread the new 
faith, armed struggle was a proven and tested strategy.
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 ―During the period 1967-1970 a 
multitude of fedayeen groups surfaced in Jordan and Syria first, then in Egypt, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Kuwait and Algeria later on. During this period operations against Israeli targets 
escalated to such an extant that sometimes there were dozens of attacks reported each 
week. While this grave development raised Israeli concerns that it would be dragged into 
an endless war with the armed groups, the Arab regimes felt threatened and sought to 
contain this  phenomenon and then to eliminate it.
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 The 1967 defeat also led to the enhancement of the status of the Fedayeen (self-
sacrificers) movement in the Arab world, which now became more sympathetic towards 
the Palestinian resistance on one hand and quite sceptical about the governments of the day 
on the other. During the last six months of 1967, an attempt by Fatah and other Palestinian 
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groups to incite the Arab masses to rise up spontaneously in arms against Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza failed to produce the desired results. Fatah‘s status 
nevertheless became firmly entrenched as a serious resistance group in the national 
conscience of the Arabs. In an attempt to contain the Arab frustration and enthusiasm for 
the Palestinian cause, the Arab governments softened the restrictions and limitations which 
had been imposed on the Palestinian resistance. This new situation enabled Fatah to build 
safe bases in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in the two years following the 1967 War.
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 Even at an early stage when it was still a relatively small entity, both politically and 
militarily, Fatah was the only group capable of taking the initiative in the new conditions 
which the 1967 defeat had created across the Arab world. The resilience and spirit of 
defiance which characterized its discourse at the time transformed it into a formidable 
political force within a very short period of time. Just a few months after the June defeat, 
Fatah resumed its military operations against Israel. Its performance in the Battle of 
Karameh, 21 March 1968,
475
 confirmed its status not only as a military force but also as a 
revolutionary base enjoying immense popularity among both Palestinians and Arab 
masses. The Karameh battle was hailed throughout the Arab world as a latter day Badr, in 
reference to the first important victory Prophet Muhammed scored against the Meccans 
who hugely outnumbered the forces under Prophet Muhammed‘s command. Thereafter, 
Fatah became the major organizer and motivator of the Palestinian masses and a role 
model for young Arabs. Besides its military operations, which dramatically increased in 
scope after Karameh, Fatah also set out to intensify its political and diplomatic activities on 
the international scene, especially in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
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 The Karameh victory which rendered the Palestinian quest for independence as a 
legitimate political movement
477
 prompted some Arab leaders, especially those anxious to 
appease the angry masses, to befriend Fatah and offer political and financial support. King 
Hussein of Jordan‘s declaration following Karameh that "we are all fedayeen!‖ is a case in 
point.
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 In so doing he was simply bowing to the wind of the revolutionary storm that was 
blowing across the Arab region. Karameh transformed the Palestinian question into a 
people‘s revolution against an occupation force. Commenting on the outcome of this 
confrontation, Arafat stressed "what we have done is to make the world...realize that the 
Palestinian is no longer refugee number so and so, but the member of a people who hold 
the reins of their own destiny and are in a position to determine their own future."
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 One 
of the architects of Israeli diplomacy, Gideon Rafael, voices a similar opinion ―The 
operation gave an enormous lift to Yasser Arafat's Fatah organization and irrevocably 
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implanted the Palestine problem onto the international agenda, no longer as a humanitarian 
issue of homeless refugees, but as a claim to Palestinian statehood."
480 
 The new found pride and confidence felt by the Fatah leaders can be seen in the fact 
that they opened an office in the Jordanian capital and started going about their business in 
the open. Palestinians of different political leanings and ideological convictions thronged 
these centres to either volunteer or offer donations. The surge in Fatah‘s popularity after 
Karameh was such that one of its recruitment centres in Amman received 5000 
applications within 48 hours. In short, Karameh established Fatah not only as a legitimate 
and hugely popular force in Palestinian and Arab politics but also entrenched it as an 
undisputed and capable leadership of the PLO.
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 On the international scene, the Soviet 
Union which had until then been hesitant to open up to the Palestinians, became quite 
supportive and sympathetic with Fatah after Karameh. 
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 The period immediately following the June 1967 War was characterized by the heavy 
presence of numerous Palestinian groups and Fedayeen in what were then known as the 
‗confrontation states‘: Egypt, Jordan and Syria.  By 1969 these armed groups had become a 
strike force capable of launching dozens of attacks each month against Israeli targets. The 
‗Asifeh‘ (storm troopers) carried out most of these attacks. Syria and Egypt, which were 
seeking to turn Israel‘s eyes away from them while they were still in the process of 
rebuilding their armed forces, provided vital military assistance to the Fedayeen movement 
and helped them set up official safe bases in Lebanon between April and November 1969. 
This was done while these two countries were preparing to wage a war of attrition against 
Israel. Iraq, for its part, provided significant support for the Palestinian resistance. The 
Iraqi attitude was prompted by a desire to legitimize its new Baathist regime, which had 
come to power following a coup in July 1968, and was an attempt to outshine the rival 
Baathist regime in Syria. When Iraq formed its own protégé Fedayeen group, the Syrians 
did the same, which complicated Palestinian politics even further. However, all Palestinian 
resistance groups received financial and technical help from Arab and Muslim states. 
Fatah, which was now controlling the PLO, was the largest beneficiary. Unlike the 
Western powers, many third world and Eastern Bloc countries showed sympathy towards 
the Palestinians. The PLO would soon be recognized by the People‘s Republic of China, 
North Korea and what was known then as North Vietnam. After a period of some 
hesitation, the Soviet Union extended its recognition to the PLO. Cuba, however, did not 
recognize the PLO until much later.
483
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 The 5
th
 Session of the Palestinian National Council, which was held in Cairo on 1
st
 
February 1969, marked a new epoch in the history of the PLO, when a new Executive 
Committee chaired by Yassir Arafat was elected. Arafat also presided over the PLO‘s 
Military Office. His first activity as PLO chairman was to visit the fledgling Palestinian 
military units hosted and trained by Arab countries:  Ain Jalut  which was stationed next to 
the Egyptian troops along the Suez Canal, the Qadisiya units in Iraq and the Hattin force in 
Syria. These moves were evidently intended to demonstrate the great attention Arafat paid 
to the troops of the Palestine Liberation Forces. These military formations were all named 
after important battles in which the Muslims had scored decisive victories against their 
enemies. 
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 Three factors combined to make it possible for Fatah to dominate the PLO. The first 
was the inefficiency of the old PLO leadership and its inability to deal with the 
developments and new challenges facing the Palestinians during that dire period of their 
struggle. Then there was the outbreak of the June 1967 War, which, among other things, 
exposed the deficiencies and inadequacies of the Palestinian course of action and refuted 
the frequent assertion that the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity were organically 
interrelated. There was, thirdly, the eruption of the armed Palestinian revolution under the 
leadership of Fatah and the accelerating and widening impact of the Palestinian Fedayeen 
movement as a fighting force against Israel. Just as faith in the Arab armies receded 
following the June War, the national Palestinian project was gaining wider popularity and 
impact within the Arab world.
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 Fatah‘s control of the PLO was the result of a carefully thought-out plan, which aimed 
at seizing the organization and revolutionizing it from within. This was made possible 
when Fatah gradually and assiduously encouraged its members to join as many PLO 
committees and work groups as they could. Fatah members and sympathizers were also 
urged to participate in all activities: rallies, donation campaigns, conferences and other 
functions sponsored or organized by the PLO. In carrying out its strategy to enhance its 
influence and control the PLO, Fatah also resorted to a policy of coordination and political 
alliances with other Palestinian groups, in order that a broader Arab alliance might then be 
built.
486
  
 
8.4 Jihaz Al-Istikhbarat Al-Askaria (PLO’s Military Intelligence)  
For all his shortcomings, the first chairman of the PLO, Ahmed Al-Shuqairi, was 
instrumental in setting up the umbrella organization as an independent Palestinian entity. 
148 
 
Despite the harsh criticism meted out to him by the Palestinians themselves, Al-Shuqairi 
was behind the creation of the Palestine Liberation Army and his name will always be 
linked to the call for armed struggle against Israel. Expounding his views on the creation of 
a national Palestinian homeland, he addressed the Palestinians in a broadcast from Radio 
Cairo in mid-February 1964, emphasizing the need to build a solid political entity as a first 
step towards creating a free and independent Palestine. ―We are a people without a 
homeland‖, he said, ―a cause without a leadership. It is for these and other reasons that we 
have to hasten towards the establishment of a wide open, all-embracing entity, which will 
guide us through. The Kings‘ and Presidents‘ summit has opened the way for such an 
entity that would encompass the whole Palestinian people‖. By ‗entity‘, he meant a 
―national collective leadership, training camps, regular forces and equipment‖.487 
 These developments, as well as the wide exposure given by the media throughout the 
Arab and Muslim worlds, brought the Palestinian question to the fore and contributed to 
the elucidation and enhancement of the national identity of the Palestinians. Recognition 
by the Arab states of the PLO under the leadership of Al-Shuqairi came as a significant 
boost to the Palestinian cause, especially as the 2
nd
 Arab summit endorsed the PLO 
decision to establish the Palestine Liberation Army.  
 The first Palestinian military camp was inaugurated in the Gaza Strip in May 1964. 
This was immediately followed by the Algerian government‘s declaration that it had set up 
training camps for the Palestinians on Algerian soil. The first official appearance of the 
regular Palestinian army was in Cairo in July 1964, in the course of the celebrations 
marking the anniversary of Nasser's 1952 Revolution in Egypt. Soon after, the PLO laid 
plans to form more Palestinian units in Jordan, Syria and Iraq. In Syria, the newly formed 
Hattin Troops comprised three elite battalions and a number of support units, while Iraq 
hosted the Qadissiya Troops, made up of one battalion and a few companies, and Egypt 
trained the Ain Jalout force: three battalions and a number of support units. One 
commando battalion was also set up in Jordan and Lebanon. According to Al-Shuqairi‘s 
vision, the Palestinian entity should be founded upon four columns: the financial apparatus, 
the political, the executive and the military, whose prime duty was to train all able-bodied 
Palestinians to carry arms and serve their homeland.
488
  
 PLO‘s first chairman Al-Shuqairi then embarked upon setting up a PLO military 
intelligence apparatus Jihaz Al-Istikhbarat Al-Askaria in 1967, which he modelled on those 
then operating in the Arab armed forces. The first Palestinian to head this apparatus was 
Faiz Al-Turk, who had completed his military studies in Egypt and was a close friend of 
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the commander-in-chief, Wajih Al-Madani, who himself enjoyed good relations with Al-
Shuqairi. The main duty of the newly formed apparatus was, as was the case in the Arab 
countries, to monitor the Palestinian military units in the Arab states. Al-Turk reported 
directly to the commander of the army, and the two men collaborated closely. There were 
no significant changes as to the tasks of the apparatus or its position within the 
organizational structure of the PLO until Yassir Arafat became head of the latter in 1969. 
From then onwards, the head of Military Intelligence no longer reported to the military 
commander but to Arafat‘s own Bureau, as Arafat was the overall commander-in-chief. 
The headquarters of military intelligence also moved from Cairo to Beirut, where a high 
ranking officer, Attallah Attallah (Abu Al-Zaéem), assumed office upon Al-Turk‘s 
departure. Attallah, who had earlier fled to Jordan following a rift with Arafat, rejoined the 
PLO and worked closely with his old master, Arafat, then relocated to Tunis in 1982 
following the eviction of the PLO from Lebanon.
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 The activities and size of the apparatus 
remained modest and nothing much is known about its functions and activities.
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 From the beginning, the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization caused a 
number of rifts and divisions within the Palestinian body politic, whether in the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip or the diaspora. Some Palestinians supported its creation and 
considered it an important and necessary step for the restoration of their rights and 
repossession of their lands, while others saw nothing in the PLO but a propaganda trumpet 
for the Egyptian president, Nasser. As a result, Ahmed Al-Shuqairi felt compelled, on 
numerous occasions, to justify its structure and explain the circumstances which had 
compelled him to create the Organization in the manner he did. Six years after his 
departure from the  leadership, he explained why the first communiqué came devoid of any 
reference to a ‗Palestinian entity‘: ―the Arab kings and presidents, who did not bless [its] 
establishment, were not of one mind as to the meaning of the term ‗entity‘ and were 
apprehensive of the political challenges it might present‖. While King Hussein insisted that 
the summit‘s communiqué should never include a reference to a Palestinian entity, 
President Amin Al-Hafiz of Syria demanded that the West Bank and Gaza be given to the 
entity. Furthermore, while King Saud of Saudi Arabia proposed the formation of a 
Palestinian government, the presidents of Algeria and Tunisia, Ahmed ben Bella and Al-
Habeeb bu Rqaiba, proposed setting up a National Liberation Front.
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 In order to consolidate their power and establish a firm presence on the Palestinian and 
Arab scenes, the Fatah leaders did all they could to avoid the pitfalls and snares of Arab 
politics, distancing themselves at the same time from the intra-Arab and intra-Palestinian 
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competition and rivalries. They assiduously sought to make the PLO the main vehicle 
through which national policies were made and decisions taken. This position was in stark 
contrast to that adopted by many Palestinian organizations, movements and fronts, which 
espoused a range of policy positions, ranging from class struggle and Marxist-Leninism to 
anti-establishment Pan-Arab nationalism. Some were involved in international terrorism 
and went so far as to be involved in attempts to topple Arab governments. But this 
complex and volatile situation was stabilized between September 1970 and July 1971, 
during which time Jordan succeeded in putting an end to the Fedayeen excesses and 
turning the tide of their revolutionary ascent. King Hussein exploited the blunders and 
excesses the Fedayeen committed against ordinary citizens who were sometimes searched, 
questioned or even detained without recourse to any legal system. Nor was the Jordanian 
military establishment spared these excesses. The military police was quite often 
sidestepped and ignored especially when unauthorized check points were installed on 
highways and on approaches to towns and cities. These excesses played into the hands of 
King Hussein who channelled the anger of his military officers into a massive and 
relentless onslaught against the Palestinian military presence in Jordan. King Hussein‘s 
victory was quite costly, not only in terms of blood and loss of life but also in terms of 
political isolation from which he was to suffer for a number of years.
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His firm stand 
against the extremists propelled the Palestinians into a period of soul-searching and an 
ideological and organizational upheaval which led them to lay the foundation stone for the 
‗post-revolution‘ stage, when they started to focus more on building their own state in 
exile.
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 In late May 1970, the United States and the Soviet Union announced a number of 
proposals with regard to their stance vis-à-vis the Middle East and what they considered 
was essential to move towards peace in the region. These were on the whole received with 
discomfort across the Arab world because the Arab states did not see in this initiative any 
guarantees for peace or for an Israeli withdrawal from their occupied lands. The PLO 
expressed grave concern because there was absolutely no mention of the Palestinians in the 
US-USSR peace plan. Later in the year, Joseph Sisco, US Assistant Secretary of State, said 
in a speech that peace would also include ―giving the Palestinians some sort of expression, 
quite likely in the form of an entity‖. But such statements could not satisfy the ambitions of 
the PLO.
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 Against this background, the PLO leaders felt increasingly beleaguered, especially as 
Israel launched a successful campaign against the Fedayeen in Gaza, where hundreds of 
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Palestinians suspected of involvement in armed operations against Israel were detained. 
Furthermore, both Israel and Jordan were in search of an alternative to the Palestinian 
leadership in the now Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Syria, intent 
on imposing its hegemony on the PLO, continued to apply all sorts of pressures on the 
Organization. Lebanon also insisted that no Fedayeen attacks were launched from its 
territory against Israel. These factors combined to thrust Fatah into international terrorism; 
between 1971 and 1973, it launched a series of bloody terrorist operations against Israeli 
and Western targets in Israel and in other parts of the world.
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8.  The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Islamist movements, first in Egypt and Syria, then in Jordan and Palestine, did not 
emerge until the end of World War I, as a result of the setbacks and failures which came to 
frustrate the ambitions and expectations of the Arab masses, who had cherished the hope of 
reliving their glorious past and rebuilding a united nation-state. In Palestine the 
Brotherhood presence was at first felt through the activities of individuals or small groups 
who were managed and handled from abroad, especially from Jordan and Egypt because 
these were the only two Arab countries to which Palestinian territory was annexed 
following the 1948 War. These two countries had furthermore been quite active since the 
1930‘s in resisting Zionist immigration into Palestine. They frequently sent representatives 
to Palestine: 
not only to spread the da'wa [call to Islam] and invite opposition to 
Zionism, but also to assist in the training of Palestinian scouts. The most 
prominent of these representatives was a retired officer  named Mahmud 
Labib who supervised the Brotherhood‘s volunteer movement, led its 
military units….and to assisted  in the military training of civilian groups 
to help Palestinian paramilitary organization.
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Under the direction of Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood opened its first branch in 
Palestine in 1946. Following the Egyptian example, the Palestinian founders concentrated 
on winning over dignitaries, scholars and those enjoying a respected social status. In time, 
these formed the majority of the Brotherhood‘s leadership, while most rank-and-file 
members were either middle class or the children of refugees.
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 In Palestine, the Islamist movement first emerged in the form of youth clubs, where 
young men were taught the general principles of Islam and offered training in fitness and 
physical education. There was at first no specific political vision behind these sporting and 
152 
 
scouting activities, which attracted many of the nationalist youths and those fighting 
against the then British mandate, such as the followers of Izz Aldin al-Qassam.
498
 In other 
words, the Muslim Brotherhood did not compete with the Palestinian nationalist 
movement, which was at the time led by Amin Al-Huseini, a close personal friend of the 
Brotherhood‘s founder Hasan al-Banna. Indeed, the leaders of the Brotherhood in Cairo 
encouraged their followers to work alongside those of Al-Mufti within the structure he led. 
Furthermore, Amin Al-Huseini warmly welcomed the Brotherhood‘s active participation in 
the 1948 Palestine War.
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During the 1940's, the most important Islamist movement that dominated the scene in 
Palestine, Egypt and Jordan was the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoun) to 
which the Fatah founders were drawn. As a political and military movement, it was very 
secretive and highly organized. This, as will be demonstrated, stood the aspiring young 
Palestinians in good stead when they left the Brotherhood in order to establish a new, 
ideologically independent movement, with its own declared aims and political discourse.
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The Brotherhood afforded these young men a framework within which they were able to 
express themselves and vent their anger at the Zionist occupation of their country. The 
young men‘s interest was not confined only to such practical aspects as military training 
and physical education, but included a curiosity about Islam and its intellectual heritage. 
Through their links with the Islamists, they became better acquainted with the thoughts of 
the Brotherhood, which were derived from and based upon the Quran and Prophet 
Muhammed‘s Traditions. They also learnt a good deal about the tactics and methods 
employed by Prophet Muhammed to spread his message amongst the people. Most 
followers of the Muslim Brotherhood were young secondary school pupils who were 
attracted to a movement, which offered them a wide range of social and sport activities. 
The Brotherhood also organized short courses covering some aspects of basic military 
training and physical education.
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 The youths of Palestine saw their ‗salvation‘ in the slogans and activities of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which were aimed at challenging and resisting the Zionist 
occupation of their land. The Islamists were widely perceived to be indefatigably striving 
to wipe out the humiliating outcome of the first armed confrontation with Israel, and 
seriously attempting to liberate the territories occupied by the newly created Jewish state, 
after the defeat of the regular Arab armies. The Palestinian Chapter of the Brotherhood 
operated in three major areas, the first being the Gaza Strip, which was then under 
Egyptian administration. The leadership there reported to Egypt‘s central office of the 
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Brotherhood. The second was in the West Bank, which after 1948 came to be administered 
by Jordan; the leadership reported to the Jordanian chapter. The third was in Syria and 
Lebanon, falling within the structural organization of the Syrian Brotherhood.
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 The lure of the Muslim Brotherhood after the 1948 War was enhanced even further 
when it was associated with the Mujahideen Movement of the Grand Mufti of Palestine, 
Amin Al-Huseini. The secrecy, strict discipline and paramilitary organization of the 
Brotherhood appealed to young Palestinians, especially those displaced by the war. What 
helped the Brotherhood disseminate its ideology among the Palestinian refugees was also 
the religious sentiments of most Palestinians, especially among the poor, who were socially 
austere and traditionalist in their attitudes and values.
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 According to Shafiq Shoqayer, the Muslim Brotherhood was ideologically ―perhaps 
the most focused Islamist movement, which is both vivid and moderate. Despite these 
qualities however, its track record appears controversial and researchers differ as to the 
nature of its system of thought. Some go so far as to describe it as extremist, while others 
accuse it of declaring one thing while concealing another.‖504   
 Shoqayer points out that the essays of the Brotherhood‘s founder and spiritual leader, 
Hasan Al-Banna, provided the main ideological foundation upon which the movement‘s 
rules and procedures are built. These essays, more than twenty in number, deal with a 
range of religious, political, economic, organizational and other issues. They are, even 
today, on the required reading list of the Brotherhood. The main thrust of Al-Banna‘s 
essays is that patriotism and nationalism should forever be linked to and informed by the 
teachings and tenets of Islam. He strove to project the Brotherhood as an all-encompassing 
cosmic movement, ―reflecting the nature of Islam which is simultaneously a religion, a 
state, a sword and a Quran‖.505 As Ziyad Abu Amr, asserts ‗‗despite their different 
methods, the goal of the Islamic groups is to transform society into an Islamic one, 
modelled after the first Islamic society, established by the Prophet Muhammed and his 
companions...and consider the Koran and the Sunnah as the basis for all aspects of life.‘‘506 
 Explaining the Brotherhood‘s ideology and the nature of its message, al-Banna 
emphasizes that his movement ―calls for a return to the crystal clear fountain of Islam, 
exemplified in the Quran and the Traditions of Allah‘s Messenger‖.507 He also asserts that 
the only way to achieve this is by ―emulating the most noble practices of the Prophet in 
everything, especially in matters of doctrine and worship, taking them as our only model in 
life‖.508 Special attention is given to precision, perseverance, loyalty and total secrecy as 
the only proper means of surmounting the impediments obstructing the Muslims‘ yearning 
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for a just and equitable society. Al-Banna‘s teachings also enjoin all members of the 
Brotherhood to look after their health, enhance their physical fitness and to exert as much 
effort as they can to study and enquire, in accordance with the Islamic principles which 
stress that ―a strong believer is better than a weak believer‖ and ―every Muslim, male or 
female, is obliged to seek knowledge‖.509  
 The Brotherhood‘s social and political project was to create an Islamic state, based on 
the two essential columns, the Quran and Prophet Muhammed‘s Traditions, which 
constitute the Islamic principle upon which all Shari‘a laws must be based. In so far as the 
question of Palestine was concerned, the Brotherhood saw it as part of a greater and more 
important cause: to achieve victory for Islam and to attain the blessing of Allah and His 
Prophet.
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8.6 Fatah’s Islamic Roots 
From its inception in the late 1950s, Fatah faced a series of criticisms because of the 
Islamic background of most of its founding members. Rival Palestinian groups accused it 
of being reactionary and fundamentalist, with some going so far as to claim that it was part 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose popularity was on the wane. Fatah‘s founders realized 
this fact, especially when they attempted to build bridges between their movement and the 
Syrian regime in 1961-63. They found it extremely difficult to accomplish this mission, 
because both the civilian and military leaders of the new regime in Damascus were aware 
of the Muslim Brotherhood background of Fatah‘s leaders, who were also thought to have 
been connected to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-Fatah relationship, however, was indirect; it 
ran through Amin Al-Huseini and the Egyptian members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who 
were at the helm of Al-Rabita Al-Islamiya (the Islamic League), which operated under the 
auspices of Saudi Arabia.
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 The Baath Party (Palestine branch) supported the Syrian leaders‘ move to distance 
themselves from Fatah, as the latter‘s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood rendered 
it suspicious. What made Fatah‘s leadership open to question was its conspicuous 
relationship with Egypt, especially as Yassir Arafat himself spoke the Egyptian dialect and 
many of Fatah‘s cadres came from Gaza, which had been under Egyptian administration 
for almost 20 years (1948-1967).
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 In his Unknown Facts about Salah Khalaf, the 
Palestinian writer Hasan Khalil Husein quotes the Fatah leader Abu Iyad as saying:  
 his friends in the Muslim Brotherhood leadership began to launch severe 
attacks in Kuwait, Qatar and the Gaza strip, against Fatah because they thought 
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that the Fatah movement was hostile to the ideology of the Brotherhood, 
although the truth is quite different… The fact is that Fatah was nothing but a 
melting pot and a crossroads, where all elements, regardless of their religious 
or political orientations meet. The only condition [to join Fatah] was 
commitment to work for the liberation of Palestine.
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 Husein also recounts how a well-known Palestinian personality, Asa‘d Al-Saftawi, 
refused to join Fatah at the time because of the severity of the attacks: 
 Mr Asa‘d Al-Saftawi was until that time refusing to join the Fatah 
movement, despite the fact that all their founders were the best among the 
youths of the Muslim Brotherhood, although many assert that its leader Yassir 
Arafat was only a supporter of the Brotherhood and well-liked by its leaders. 
He [Arafat] was always counting on their help in the election campaigns of the 
Palestine Students League in Cairo.
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 In order to broaden their popular base and widen their appeal to as many Palestinians 
as possible, the Fatah leaders avoided in their first communiqué any reference whatsoever 
to their Islamic background or to the fact that they were members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. They did however exploit the undefined common ground between them and 
the Brotherhood and sought to present their nationalist approach in an unsophisticated and 
comprehensible manner making full use of the spiritual and religious place Jerusalem and 
Palestine in general occupies in Islam.  
 Fatah‘s impressive showing impacted the political powers which had been dominating 
the Palestinian scene. The major political players such as the Islamists led by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Nationalists led by the Arab Nationalist Movement and the leftists and 
socialists led by the Communist Party all felt threatened by Fatah‘s rising star. Many 
Muslim Brotherhood members rushed to join the ranks of Fatah, deserting the 
Brotherhood. This development prompted some in the Brotherhood leadership to declare 
Fatah a breakaway faction, while others called for dialogue with Fatah in order to ascertain 
its political identity, programmes and the nature of its aims.
515
  
 The new situation created by Fatah led the Muslim Brotherhood to hold a meeting in 
Cairo during the summer of 1960, attended by representatives of Palestinian Brotherhood 
formations in the Gaza strip, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and other countries. The outcome was 
the creation of an umbrella organization comprising all Palestinian branches of the 
Brotherhood. Significantly, the first task undertaken by the new structure was to ―take a 
clear stand vis-à-vis Fatah and [to set] up a barrier between Fatah and the Brotherhood‖, 
which it managed to do in the following few months.
516
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 Because of its fast growing popularity especially among youths with Islamic 
tendencies, Fatah represented the most serious challenge faced by the Muslim Brotherhood 
since its creation in 1946. This challenge was far greater than that posed by the Egyptian 
government crackdown on the Islamists, by the Arab Renaissance (Baath) Party, or by the 
Pan-Arab nationalists. This state of affairs, the close entanglement between Fatah and the 
Islamists, prompted Abdullah Abu Izza and other researchers to conclude that Fatah was in 
reality an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and that it offered a settlement to the 
Palestinian question outside the framework of the Arab order. The Fatah-Brotherhood 
interrelationship cannot be dismissed if we take into consideration the intimacy and affinity 
between their ideologies, practices, and political programmes.
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 The declared aims of the Muslim Brotherhood appeared quite attractive to many 
Palestinians living in Gaza, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Perceiving the Islamic movement as a 
promising vehicle through which their expectations and hopes for a free independent 
Palestine might be achieved, many of these enthusiastic young men, who were later to 
create Fatah, almost at the same time hurried to join the Brotherhood. They saw in such 
activities as ideological education, organizing and participating in strikes, protests and 
mass demonstrations a proper arena for releasing their energy and an appropriate forum 
within which they could express their yearning for national independence.
518
 Yassir Arafat 
was one of those young men. In 1948 he was attracted by the slogans of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a student at the College of Engineering, Cairo University. On campus, 
Arafat was quite active and played a major role in the League of Palestinian Students in 
Egypt, of which he was elected president in 1952. It was during the League years that 
Arafat came to be acquainted with many of those who were collectively to lay the 
foundations of Fatah.
519
  
  
 A recent Israeli study
520confirms Arafat‘s religiosity, his observance of all Islamic 
rites and his quite religious bent of mind. The study shows him as a confirmed believer 
who frequently reiterated that his fate was controlled only by Allah, not by human beings. 
It also depicts him as a devout practicing Muslim, who never smoked or touched alcohol in 
his whole life and whose discourse was often punctuated by quotations from the Quran or 
Prophet Muhammed‘s Traditions. In an attempt to present Arafat as a ―true blue‖  Islamist, 
the study points out that Arafat saw himself  not only as a latter day Saladin, who wrested 
Palestine from the Latins in 1187, but also a modern version of the Prophet‘s companions, 
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especially Omar bin Al-Khattab, the second caliph to succeed Prophet Muhammed and the 
Arab leader whose troops conquered or ‗opened up‘ Jerusalem.521  
 Arafat‘s interest in politics, according to many of his childhood friends, had been quite 
noticeable since the days of his primary education, when he took part in 
 numerous protests and demonstrations against British occupation in 
Egypt. With the outbreak of World War II, he was frequently seen 
rounding up the neighbourhood‘s children, then dividing them into 
small groups and demanding that all march in a military style. He was 
also seen carrying a ‗cane‘, with which he would beat those who did not 
obey his orders.
522
  
 
 Then in 1946 Arafat met two men who were to play a significant part in the 
Palestinian struggle for independence: the first was the Palestinian Arab nationalist, Amin 
Al-Huseini, who led the Palestinian opposition to the British following their military 
control of Palestine at the end of World War I; the second was Amin‘s cousin, the 
legendary soldier, Abdul-Qadir Al-Huseini, who later became commander in chief of the 
Mujahideen. Shortly after the meeting in Cairo, young Arafat joined Abdul-Qadir‘s staff as 
a personal assistant.
523
  
 Arafat claims that in 1947-48 he interrupted his studies in Egypt and crossed the 
border into Palestine in order to take part in some of the operations led by Abdul-Qadir Al-
Huseini and Hasan Salameh in the vicinity of Jerusalem. The 8
th
 of April 1948, says 
Arafat, marked a decisive turning point in his life, as, when Abdul Qadir, was killed in 
battle and Sheikh Hasan Salameh took over command of the Mujahideen. Sheikh Hasan‘s 
son, Ali Salameh, was to be linked forever with Yassir Arafat, when the latter appointed 
him as chief of Force 17, which was in charge of security for Arafat and the PLO. Ali 
Salameh remained in this position until his assassination at the hands of the Mossad in 
Beirut in 1979.
524
   
 Upon Arafat's return to resume his studies in Cairo, his mind was fully preoccupied 
with the Palestinian question. His overriding concern was to find ways of wiping out the 
shameful consequences of the Arab defeat against the newly created state of Israel. In 
cooperation with his friend, Fathi Abu Sitta, who was on Abdul Qadir Al-Huseini‘s staff, 
Arafat called a general meeting of Palestinian students in the Muslim Brotherhood‘s 
auditorium at Cairo University, during which he gave a fiery speech ―This is no time for 
the pursuit of study. Our homeland is being looted. What is the use of continuing our 
studies if we have no homeland? We all ought to head for Palestine and fight.‖525 
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 Amid cheers and loud shouts of approval, Arafat took a match and set his books 
aflame. Abu Sitta then followed suit. Soon after, Arafat called upon those of his fellow 
students who wished to receive military training to join him and Abu Sitta. Besides his 
fighting experience in Palestine, Arafat had earlier been trained by a German officer in 
Cairo.
526
    
 According to Farid al-Falouji, ―in mid-April 1948, Yassir Arafat, Abu Sitta and an 
Egyptian officer left for Palestine, where Arafat joined one of the Muslim Brotherhood 
military unit, which was laying siege to a Jewish settlement, Kiffar Drum‖. Al-Falouji then 
describes how Arafat‘s fighting skills were put to the test, when a Jewish military unit of 
24 Israeli tanks attempted to break through the siege. But the Muslim Brotherhood fighters 
had laid an ambush, where they initially targeted the leading tank and the last in line, thus 
paralysing the whole Israeli column, which was then destroyed. The Israeli soldiers who 
did not fall in the trap had to retreat. It was reportedly Yassir Arafat who fired the first 
mortar shot that destroyed the leading tank.
527
  
 Significantly, adds Al-Falouji, Arafat refused to comply with the order issued by the 
Joint Command of the Arab Forces, which demanded that all weapons possessed by the 
Palestinians be handed over to the Arab Forces. Rather than giving up his weapons, Arafat 
left for Jerusalem, where he spent months fighting alongside the Mujahideen led by Sheikh 
Hasan Salameh. This explains the very strong bond between Arafat and Sheikh Hasan‘s 
son, Ali, whom Arafat was grooming to succeed him as PLO chairman. Ali‘s assassination 
in Beirut in 1979, however, put an end to this plan.
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 It was through the Muslim Brotherhood that Arafat came to know Jamal Abdul 
Nasser. The Brotherhood often wondered why, in the words of Al-Falouji, ―such a genius‖ 
as Arafat had refused to join their ranks, especially as he was one of the relatives of a 
distinguished Palestinian religious and political reader, Amin Al-Huseini, the Grand Mufti 
of Palestine from 1921 to 1936.
529
 The Brotherhood was somewhat suspicious of Arafat, 
and feared that he might have been recruited to work for Nasser. It is for this reason that 
they wanted to know as much as they could about his background and past affiliations, 
when he declared his nomination for presidency of the Palestinian Students Union. To 
obtain such information about Arafat, the Brotherhood contacted another reliable youth, 
who was none other than Salah Khalaf (Abu Ayad), who became later the head of Fatah‘s 
first intelligence apparatus.
530
 
 Arafat had consolidated his relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood through 
participation in a number of attacks organized and launched by the Brotherhood against the 
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British troops along the Suez Canal, especially during the period extending between 1950 
and 1954.
531
 Upon his graduation from the College of Engineering in 1956, Arafat worked 
for a contracting company, but he abandoned this job immediately after France, Britain and 
Israel launched their tripartite attack on Egypt. He enlisted in a military training course on 
explosives and mines, organized by the Egyptian army, which he completed with 
distinction. He was then offered the rank of 2
nd
 lieutenant in the Egyptian army, where he 
was seconded to one of the formations of the Storm Troopers.
532
 Only a few months after 
the end of the Suez war, Arafat was arrested by the Egyptian police for ―sedition, and 
because of his connection with the Muslim Brotherhood‖. But the real reason behind his 
arrest was the Egyptian authorities‘ fear that he might plan armed operations against Israel, 
at a time when Egypt was trying to appease the inflamed situation along its borders with 
Israel. Arafat was released a few months later, leaving immediately for Kuwait with two of 
his close associates, Abu Jihad and Farouq Qadoumi.
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 Said K Aburish, confirms the account of Arafat‘s relationship with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and adds that although there is no categorical evidence that Arafat was indeed 
a member, he nevertheless took part in numerous activities organized by it. Aburish also 
asserts that the Brotherhood was behind not only Arafat‘s election as president of the 
Palestinian Students Union but also his later successful bid to take control of the PLO. All 
of this indicates that there was indeed some sort of bond between Arafat and the 
Brotherhood.
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 One of the founders of Fatah, Saleem Al-Zanoon, points out that ―Arafat 
and Wazir visited Jordan repeatedly after mid-1963, and were followed in 1964 by Abbas, 
and Rafiq al-Natsha.  In one such visit, Arafat met Kamil Al-Shareef, a leader of the local 
of the Muslim Brotherhood and cabinet minister.‖535   
 The second Fatah leader who had close links to the Muslim Brotherhood was Khalil 
Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), who, according to an interview with him, had joined the Islamist 
group in 1951. At the age of 16, Al-Wazir was leading a group of some 200 youths, who 
were only a year or two younger than himself.
536
 He was a member of the so-called 
Brigade of Truth, a clandestine Muslim Brotherhood military organization. But when later 
he realized that the Brotherhood was not as enthusiastic about espousing armed struggle as 
he had hoped, he took it upon himself to form secret cells independently with a view to 
launching attacks inside Israel, without informing or coordinating with the Brotherhood. 
He clarified his position by saying that ―they [the Brotherhood] wanted us to focus on a 
number of issues, among them Palestine… Others wanted us to concentrate our efforts on 
Islamic issues in general‖.537  
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 Explaining the reasons which prompted him and his fellow young Palestinians to join 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Wazir says: 
 We were still young in the aftermath of [the War of] 1948. We were quite 
eager to meet those mujahideen who had participated in the Palestine war in 
order that we might learn from their individual fighting experiences. The 
majority of them told us that they had fought in the Muslim Brotherhood ranks. 
This was what solidified the relationship between the youths in the [Gaza] 
sector and the mujahideen. We were drawn to the experience of the 
Brotherhood, especially as there was no political power in the [Gaza] sector, 
except the Communists and the Brotherhood. The communists were quite few 
and their special world view did not appeal to the sentiments of the people. 
They were at the time calling for peaceful co-existence with [Israel]. This is 
why their presence was limited and to a certain extent confined to clandestine 
work. As for the vast majority, they were mostly coordinating with the youths 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were being educated and prepared for armed 
military struggle.
538
   
  
 As a young man, Khalil Al-Wazir was more experienced and tough-minded than his 
peers. He comprehended from the start the complexities of the regional and international 
circumstances surrounding the Palestinian question. This is quite apparent in the 
courageous way in which he presented his ideas when he returned to Gaza in 1957. Al-
Wazir presented a bold plan according to which the Muslim Brotherhood should create a 
new political entity that would operate under a different name. It should adopt the 
liberation of Palestine as its central aim and should espouse Fedayeen tactics.  
 In a memorandum addressed to the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Wazir referred to the 
state of siege from which it was suffering in the Gaza strip, and  suggested that such a plan 
was bound to break the siege, attract a wide segment of Palestinian youth and contribute to 
the concerted effort to liberate Palestine. Al-Wazir did not mince his words, when he 
proposed that the new front organization for the Brotherhood should be ideologically 
flexible and should, in order to produce the desired results, abandon the ideological 
framework of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Wazir‘s proposals reflect the intensity of the 
crackdown on the Islamists during the early years of the second half of the twentieth 
century, when Nasserism was gaining dominance. His memorandum also reflected the 
extent to which the young Palestinians had been influenced by the experience of the 
Algerian National Liberation Front, which was not based on ideology but on a general 
political consensus amongst Algerians for the higher good of liberating Algeria from the 
clutches of the French.
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 Salah Khalaf joined the Muslim Brotherhood at about the same time as Al-Wazir and 
soon became a member of the clandestine military unit called The Youths‘ Vengeance.540 
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After some time these three young men, Arafat, Khalaf and Al-Wazir, left the Muslim 
Brotherhood for a variety of reasons and became the founders and most prominent leaders 
of Fatah. It is they who laid the foundation of the security and military apparatuses of 
Fatah and supervised its policies and operations, from humble beginnings in the 1960s to 
the early 1990s.   
 Besides Arafat, Al-Wazir and Khalaf, a number of Fatah founders were also members 
of the Egyptian‘s Muslim Brotherhood, which had opened a branch in Palestine in 1946. 
Among them were Muhammed Yousuf Al-Najjar, Salim Al-Zanoon and Fathi Al-Baláwi, 
who were all in their twenties, while Al-Wazir, Khalaf, Kemal Adwan and Yehya Ashur 
were a little younger. These young men, who were all refugees in Gaza from their 
occupied lands, met while pursuing their studies. Their link to the Muslim Brotherhood 
was the bond that tied them together.  
 These young men later become the theoreticians of Fatah‘s intelligence, and in the 
tradition of the Brotherhood, adopted the Quran and the Sunnah as their main source of 
inspiration and guidance. Four of these men headed the Intelligence work, having learnt 
and experienced it while involved in the clandestine activities of the Brotherhood. At the 
time the young refugees met, the Muslim Brotherhood was a power to reckon with in the 
Gaza Strip. What enhanced its reputation and influence was not only their record in the 
War, but also the fact that the Islamist Egyptian officers in Gaza were quite active and  
succeeded in recruiting many of the Palestinians who were working in their barracks.
541
In 
the West bank, three ex-Muslim Brotherhood members reached the top rung of the Fatah 
leadership ladder to become Central Committee members. These were Abdul-Fattah 
Hamoud, Majid Abu Sharareh and Ahmed Qurai‘. In Jordan, a successful businessman and 
high official in the Jordanian Trade union joined the Muslim Brotherhood, but withdrew 
from the Islamist movement in 1957-58, only to align himself with those operating within 
the framework of the nationalist Palestinian organizations.
542
 Among the Palestinian 
refugees in Syria who joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s was Hani Al-Hasan, 
who later formed the Aqsa Youth. Soon after joining the Brotherhood, he was attached to 
the elite force known as the Fursan Badr (Badr Knights). This clandestine force controlled 
the ‗Special Missions‖ unit. Members of this unit were given vigorous training programme 
in ideology, sociology, political science and the military arts. Al-Hasan, along with Abu 
Mazin, founded a youth group called Palestine‘s Sons. Another Palestinian who joined the 
Brotherhood in Syria was Haiyl Abdul Hamid, who was then a student at Damascus 
University.
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 In 1949, Khalid Al-Hasan, who was quite close to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
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formed a group which called itself Palestine Liberation. He then co-founded the Islamic 
Liberation Party in 1952. But the Syrian regime launched an oppressive campaign against 
this party, which led Al-Hasan to take refuge in Kuwait.
544
 Abdul Hamid and Al-Hasan 
were among the elite group who participated and supervised the intelligence work in Fatah 
movement, as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
8.7 The Fatah-Brotherhood Divergence over Palestine 
Differences over how best to approach the question of liberating Palestine were at the core 
of the divergence between the Muslim Brotherhood on one hand, and the Fatah founders 
and a wide segment of the Palestinian members of the Brotherhood on the other. The 
Brotherhood‘s grand design of linking the question of Palestine to their greatly ambitious 
political project of rebuilding the Islamic caliphate did not appeal to the young 
Palestinians, who had not yet fully recovered from the shock of the 1948 War. The young 
refugees felt that the Brotherhood‘s plan would distract them from their immediate 
preoccupation: regaining their lost lands through armed conflict. The positive perception of 
the Brotherhood started to undergo a slow but fundamental change among Palestinians, 
who increasingly came to view its declared adoption of armed struggle as a slogan rather 
than an actual statement of fact. 
 In an attempt to reorder the priorities of the Brotherhood and convince it to pay more 
attention to the question at hand, the Palestinians had lengthy and heated discussions with 
its leaders. When these attempts failed to produce the desired result, the Palestinians 
seriously considered embarking upon an independent political project of their own. This 
was later embodied in the launch of Fatah, which carried with it many of the ideas of the 
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups then operating. Inspired by the assertion of the 
Muslim Prophet that whoever testifies that ‗there is no God but Allah‘ becomes a Muslim, 
the Fatah leaders stressed that their new movement was open to all those who believed in 
the notion that liberating Palestine can only be achieved through armed struggle. Small 
wonder, then, that all shades of the political spectrum and a wide range of currents and 
ideologies were present within the new structure. 
 Because the Palestinian members of the Brotherhood followed different regional 
leaderships, the young men who later founded Fatah had accumulated different experiences 
and established relations with many personalities, parties and institutions in the Arab 
countries and the Islamic world in general. Relations with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other 
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Gulf states were exceptionally strong, which explains why they launched their future 
project from that part of the world. 
 There are many direct and indirect factors which triggered the divergence between the 
Brotherhood and the young Palestinians, whose family backgrounds were quite religious, 
who had all been well acquainted with the Quran, Traditions and the Islamic heritage in 
general, and who had shown great admiration for the Brotherhood‘s ideology and track 
record. Chief among the direct causes was the confrontation between the Brotherhood and 
the regime of Jamal Abdul Nasser. When in October 1954 the Egyptian government 
decided to outlaw the Brotherhood, Khalil Al-Wazir and a number of Palestinian associates 
adopted a neutral stand, refusing to support one side against the other. Then, in early 1955, 
most of the Palestinian activists within the Brotherhood decided to leave the Islamist 
movement. The few who remained within the ranks of the Brotherhood considered Khalil 
Al-Wazir and his associates as ―saboteurs‖ and ―upstarts‖. But it was the Muslim 
Brotherhood‘s alleged assassination attempt against Nasser's life that drove most 
Palestinians and many non-Palestinians away from the Brotherhood in the direction of the 
Arab nationalist parties.
545
   
 The other direct cause was the widening differences which appeared between these 
young men and the leadership of the Brotherhood, especially after it had rebuffed Khalil 
Al-Wazir‘s proposals for a collateral military structure to be set up within the Brotherhood. 
When this initiative was rejected, a number of Palestinian youths including Al-Wazir took 
it upon themselves to create an independent paramilitary organization dedicated to 
providing military training to Palestinians and fellow Arabs. They felt that they had to go 
through with their ambitious project after the Palestinians of Gaza demonstrated in the 
streets in early 1954, demanding weapons, conscription and the creation of a Palestinian 
army.
546
      
 Al-Wazir and his fellow Palestinian activists within the Brotherhood gradually came 
to the realization that it was incapable of responding to their nationalist ambitions. In a 
memorandum addressed to its leadership in July 1957, Al-Wazir as pointed out earlier 
proposed setting up an independent structure alongside the Brotherhood. He further 
proposed that the new structure should conceal its Islamist nature and concentrate on the 
liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. But the leadership ignored this project and 
paid a high price for doing so, as many Palestinian youths felt dismayed and decided to 
follow Khalil Al-Wazir by withdrawing from the Brotherhood. These young men included 
some who were to prove formidable intelligence officers and leaders within Fatah: Kamal 
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Adwan, Salah Khalaf, Muhammed Yousuf al-Najjar, Salim Al-Za‘noun, Asád al-Saftawi, 
Sa‘eed Al-Mazeen and Ghalib al-Wazir.547     
 The third direct reason for the mass departure of the Palestinians from the Brotherhood 
was the Israeli occupation of the Gaza strip during the Suez War in 1956. The six-month 
occupation weakened and indeed fragmented the Islamists, who had been blamed for 
numerous attacks against Israeli targets. Israel targeted the Brotherhood, despite the fact 
that the latter, which had been outlawed in Egypt, did not take a firm stand against the 
Israeli invasion. This naturally undermined its credibility and popularity among the 
Palestinians.
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 Among the indirect factors which drove the young Palestinians to leave the 
Brotherhood in droves was the emergence, following the Suez fiasco, of Jamal Abdul 
Nasser as a national hero whose charisma and oratorical prowess inflamed the masses 
across the Arab world, especially in the Israeli-occupied Arab lands. After Suez, many 
Palestinians came to pin their hopes of salvation and liberation on Nasser‘s policies.549 The 
second reason was the regression of the Islamist movement in the Arab world in general 
and the oppressive measures meted out to the followers of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and Syria. In Jordan, the Islamists had to adopt a policy of non-resistance to and co-
existence with the Hashemite regime of King Hussein. This led to the disillusionment of 
many Palestinian youths, who rejected such pacifist attitudes towards Israel as that of King 
Hussein and preferred to enlist in such new nationalist revolutionary movements as Fatah. 
Thirdly, the period immediately after the Suez War witnessed a steadily rising tide of pan-
Arabist movements, such as the Arab Nationalists and the Arab Baath (Renaissance) Party. 
The adoption by these movements of the strategy of armed struggle encouraged many 
Palestinians to abandon the Brotherhood in favour of these revolutionary entities. A fourth 
factor may be found in the emergence of the Soviet Union as an active power in the Middle 
East. The USSR‘s arms deals with the nationalist regimes in Syria and Egypt provided the 
Palestinians with a ray of hope, especially as Moscow, eager to establish its presence in the 
region, provided much political support for the revolutionary powers in the region, 
including, later, the Palestinian organizations.  
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Chapter Nine 
Case Study: Fatah’s Intelligence and Security Apparatus 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The traumatic defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war marked a new phase in the 
Palestinian struggle against Israel. The dynamics governing the political and military scene 
in the Middle East underwent an immense change overnight. Responding to the changing 
circumstances, Fatah now placed the task of building an efficient security apparatus at the 
top of its priorities. There was an acute need for accurate intelligence on the areas and 
locations in which Fatah planned to carry out operations deep inside Israel. It also felt 
compelled to protect itself and confront the formidable Israeli effort aimed at wiping out 
Palestinian resistance, armed and civil alike.
550
 But this undertaking was extremely 
challenging, especially as Fatah had neither the expertise nor the human and technical 
resources needed.  
 It is indeed ironic that the defeat of the regular Arab armies at the hands of the Israelis 
should have a positive impact on the Palestinian resistance. The Arab masses, feeling 
betrayed by their regular armed forces, which had done so poorly in the war, now pinned 
their hopes on the Palestinian resistance, which, especially after battle of Karameh of 
March 1968, emerged as a worthy force, capable of resisting the Israelis, making sacrifices 
and fighting for their cause. More importantly, this admiration was often translated into 
generous financial help for Fatah and practically all the other Palestinian groups, as 
donations flooded in from all parts of the Arab world and beyond.
551
       
 Relying mainly on the experience of clandestine work they had gained as members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the Fatah founders embarked upon the task of building security 
and intelligence structures immediately after the 1967 Arab defeat. Although they had 
abandoned the Brotherhood for political reasons, Fatah leaders nevertheless clung to its 
substantive teaching of Quran and Sunnah, which is deeply rooted in Arab Islamic history. 
Their close knowledge of the strategies and tactics employed by the early Muslims in 
spreading the new faith and building the first Muslim state provided them with a model 
which they readily emulated.
552
 As suggested earlier on, the very choice of the religiously 
charged word ‗Fatah‘ as the official name of the paramilitary group can be seen as 
indicative of the Islamic orientation of its leaders.
553
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 The fact that Fatah was at first associated with the Islamic current in general 
contributed not only to its rapid expansion and growth, but also to its quickly becoming the 
leading Palestinian group. On the other hand, this association exposed Fatah to severe 
attacks and criticisms from a variety of political circles: Nasser‘s regime, nationalists and 
the Arab left, which was quite influential at the time. Among other things, Fatah was 
accused of being a ‗backward movement‘ and an ‗Islamic gathering‘, backed by 
‗reactionary regimes‘ in the Arab world. The reality, however, was quite different. 
Unperturbed by and unmindful of the accusations and charges against it, Fatah took the 
objective of liberation as its priority and considered achieving that goal as sacrosanct.
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 In his Preface to the Arabic version of Patrick Seale‘s Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire, 
Ahmed Raef refers to a visit a Palestinian activist to the Amin Al-Husseini
555
 in Beirut. 
Raef quotes Al-Husseini as saying he had heard that the Palestinians were in the process of 
creating an organization to be called the Palestine Liberation Organization. According to 
Raef, Al-Husseini then asked this activist to fetch Yassir Arafat, chairman of Fatah, ―which 
was then Islamic in both substance and orientation‖.556    
 Because Fatah had from the start espoused the strategy of armed struggle to liberate 
the Palestinian lands from Israeli occupation, it was inevitable that it should resort to the 
use of intelligence in order to carry out its operations. This was indeed an important 
development in the fight against the state of Israel. The early successes of Fatah appealed 
to the Arab public, which felt quite disillusioned and frustrated by the miserable 
performance of the regular Arab armies against Israel‘s might. Fatah‘s security apparatus 
was, from its inception until its dissolution following the Oslo accords and the 
establishment of the autonomous Palestinian Authority, under the direct command and 
supervision of Yassir Arafat (Abu Ammar)
557
, Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Salah 
Khalaf (Abu Iyad). These three men were like minded, especially in their strong faith in 
Islam as a guiding ideology and in their determination to distance their newly created 
movement from the then prevalent ideological struggle. They also laid the foundations of 
the independent project and steered the Palestinian cause away from regional and intra-
Arab conflicts and rivalries.
558
 Within a short time, Fatah managed to build efficient 
intelligence and security apparatuses, which as will be seen in the following pages, played 
an important role in the struggle against Israel, developed resistance capabilities and 
extracted international recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians.    
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9.2 Jihaz Al-Rasd Al-Markazi (Central Surveillance Apparatus)  
The Central Surveillance Apparatus, which was first known as Muffawadhiyat Al Rasd Al-
Markazi (Central Surveillance Commission), was established towards the end of 1967. 
According to one of Al-Rasd‘s ex-operatives, its organizational structure and ideological 
orientations reflect, to a large extent, the underground personal experiences of its creators 
as well as the skills and expertise of those Palestinians who were ex-members of Muslim 
Brotherhood. Nevertheless large numbers of its operatives attended training courses 
organized by Arab Intelligence Services, especially in Egypt. Besides military training, the 
courses taught included signals intelligence, explosives and intelligence administrative 
work. Egypt was in point of fact more than willing to provide training to the fedayeen, as 
Palestinian armed resistance would contribute to Nasser‘s War of Attrition launched to 
exhaust Israeli military resources. Help was also sought from Palestinian officers who had 
served in the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armed forces.
559
 In its early stages, the Al-
Rasd, which started by setting up small security units and stations, concentrated on 
collecting intelligence on Israel proper, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This 
intelligence was needed for Fedayeen operations against Israeli targets and interests. At 
first, the communication network was quite modest and depended primarily on human 
intelligence.
560
  
 Farouq Qaddoumi,
561
 Rasd 's first chief officer, was a close friend of Yassir Arafat and 
had been a member of the Central Committee
562
 since early 1964.
563
 A few months later, it 
became apparent that he was not well equipped to lead such an important and sensitive 
security agency; he simply lacked the necessary qualities of a leader and was not attuned to 
the demands and needs of security and clandestine work. He was soon succeeded by Abu 
Iyad,
564
 who took over at the beginning of 1968 and was assisted by Hani Al-Hasan,
565
 
who had just been promoted to the Central Committee.
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 The Surveillance Commission was directly linked to ‗Fatah‘s Operations Centre‘567 an 
arrangement which practically brought it under the personal supervision of Yassir Arafat. 
Because the early recruits and operatives lacked the necessary training and experience, 
their results were poor. The commission also suffered from personal rivalries and lack of 
coordination. Walid Nimr, for example, established his security headquarters in the 
Jordanian town of Daraa, while Zakaria Abdul Rahim set up his security unit in the town 
of Salt. The existence of these two and other security units made it inevitable that each 
would view the others as a rival, rendering their intelligence unreliable.
568
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 Abu Iyad distinguished himself as a quite competent organizer in comparison to his 
competitors. Because his deputy, Al-Hasan, was a close confidant of Arafat, Abu Iyad did 
not feel comfortable. He therefore actively sought to marginalize Al-Hasan‘s role in order 
to assert his authority within the intelligence community and within Fatah in general.
569
 
 In 1969, Abu Iyad adopted the new name, the Surveillance Apparatus, dropping the 
old name of the Surveillance Commission. In time, he managed to transform the Apparatus 
into an important Palestinian force with which both Israelis and Palestinians had to reckon. 
He set up a ‗strike force‘ of 500-600 guerrillas,570 a wide network of 400 informers and 
recruited many Palestinian activists, such as Ali Hassan Salameh (The Red Prince),
571
 as 
well as a number of serving officers in the Jordanian armed forces.
572
 According to a senior 
Israeli counterintelligence official ‗‗Jihaz al-Razd was a competent intelligence unit that 
was both resented and feared within the PLO structure, at least in part because it was so 
successful; ‗they were doing a good job.‖ 573  
 The organizational structure of the Surveillance Apparatus included several sections 
devoted to recruitment, information collection, security and counterintelligence. The 
information collected was normally verified, analyzed and then forwarded to the head of 
the agency,
574
 who would then refer the final product to the Fatah leadership through the 
Operations Centre, where decisions were made.
575
 
 In his recently published memoirs, Fatah Central Committee member Abu Dawoud 
says that upon completion of the training course organized by the Egyptian Military 
Intelligence, Ali Hassan Salameh, Sufian Agha and Abu Dawoud himself went back to 
Amman. In the Jordanian capital, each of the three Palestinian cadres who were entrusted 
with the task of administering and supervising Palestinian intelligence activities assumed a 
nom de guerre. Ali Hassan Salameh adopted the fictitious name of Abul Hassan, Sufian 
Agha became known as Majeed and Abu Dawoud chose the name of Abul Waleed.
576
  
 The three men‘s intelligence work involved classifying, verifying and analyzing 
reports and briefing the Fatah leadership, which they regularly supplied with abstracts on a 
variety of issues relevant to the Palestinian question. Salameh, whose participation was 
intermittent, was more focused on international relations and the analysis of strategic 
reports.  
 Abu Dawoud and Sufian Agha, for their part in counterintelligence, concentrated on 
identifying those Palestinians who might have been recruited by Israeli intelligence to 
infiltrate Fatah or the PLO. They paid great attention to Palestinians who were subjected to 
Israeli threats, intimidation or allurement. Those arrested and then released by the Israelis 
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were of particular interest, especially as the Israeli security forces often recruited 
Palestinians as double agents after their detention or imprisonment. From Amman, orders 
were often given to Palestinian intelligence operatives in the West Bank to investigate 
Palestinian families who had been visited or interrogated by the Israeli police.
577
  
 Abu Dawoud also relates that the Israelis adopted a new and complex strategy which 
at first baffled Palestinian intelligence. They started to send a number of Palestinians 
across General Allenby‘s Bridge to Jordan, where they would approach the Palestinian 
intelligence to volunteer their services and at the same time to declare that they had been 
recruited by the Israelis to work as double agents to spy on Fatah and the Palestinians. It 
was noticed that the numbers of such self-confessed double-agents was on the increase and 
that dealing with them exhausted the Palestinian interrogators and consumed considerable 
time and effort. The Palestinians soon unravelled the secret of this wave of ‗Israeli spies‘, 
who were in fact deception agents sent by the Israelis to cover up the real agents and allow 
the latter to move freely among the Palestinians. Through the adoption of new 
interrogation techniques where numerous short pointed questions were put to suspects in 
the course of lengthy interrogation sessions, and through coordination with some elements, 
who might now be called ―sleeping sells‖ inside Israeli occupied territories, the Palestinian 
intelligence service was able not only to track the real spies but also to use the ‗double 
agents‘ to pass on false intelligence to their Israeli handlers.578  
 In September 1971, following the expulsion of Palestinian groups from Jordan, the 
Fatah Central Committee held a general conference in Lebanon in order to assess the 
Palestinian and regional situation and also to absorb the anger of the Palestinian 
opposition. Severe criticism was directed towards Abu Iyad, who was accused of heading a 
failed intelligence apparatus, which neither predicted future developments nor offered the 
right advice in times of war. In defending the performance of his subordinates, Abu Iyad 
stressed that they had provided accurate information, but that the Fatah leadership chose to 
ignore it.
579
 The main aim of the conference as it turned out was to find a scapegoat or a 
―fall guy‖ on whom all Palestinian misfortunes and setbacks would be blamed. That fall 
guy was identified as Abu Iyad. Arafat had an excellent opportunity to rid himself of Abu 
Iyad, whom he had since 1967 regarded as a potential threat. He therefore allied himself 
with Khalil al-Wazeer,
580
 Yousuf al-Najjar
581
 and Kamal Adwan
582
 to oust Abu Iyad, then 
proceeded to dismantle the Surveillance Apparatus, dispersing its employees among a 
number of Palestinian organizations and sending some of them to train in Syria and other 
countries. There were also those who were hastily arrested on a variety of charges.
583
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 The political environment which prevailed in the Arab world after the military 
humiliation of 1967, into which the Rasd was born, was quite conducive to Palestinian 
action against Israel. The shamed Arab governments of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, which 
were preoccupied with ―wiping out the consequences of aggression‖, found it difficult to 
interfere in Palestinian affairs, especially as the Palestinians were, on the human level, the 
main victims of the military losses. Thousands of Palestinian refugees had to flee their 
land, augmenting and further complicating the already thorny 1948 refugee question. The 
official Arab response to what was described as ‗al-naksa‘ (the setback), was a unanimous 
refusal to recognize the de facto situation. In its Khartoum summit of August 1967, the 
Arab League adopted what came to be known as the Three No‘s Resolution: no peace, no 
negotiations and no recognition of Israel.
584
      
 Despite this seemingly intransigent position, both Egypt and Jordan were soon to 
accept UN Resolution 242 of November 1967, which called upon Israel to withdraw from 
Arab lands in return for the right of each state in the region, including Israel, to live in 
peace and security. Israel, on the other hand, did not accept the Resolution until May 1968, 
when it could no longer resist mounting international pressure demanding withdrawal from 
lands occupied in 1967.
585
 
 Hardly a year had elapsed since the end of hostilities between Israel and the Arabs 
when Egypt and Syria started to plan a new strategy aimed at regaining the lands they lost 
in June 1967 by wearing down the Israeli military capabilities through the launch of what 
came to be known as the War of Attrition. During this war, the borders with Israel 
witnessed numerous artillery and aerial engagements. The situation was deemed 
sufficiently serious by the superpowers, especially the USA, for there to be a period of 
intense diplomatic activity, as part of which US Secretary of State William Rogers 
launched on 9 December 1969 a new peace initiative: the Rogers Plan. Among other 
things, the plan called for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, a return to pre-5
th
 June 1967 
borders in the West Bank and postponement of the status of the Gaza Strip.
586
 The plan, 
which at first received a lukewarm reception from Egypt and the USSR, was finally 
accepted by Egypt on 22
nd
 July 1970. Israel at first rejected the initiative, but declared its 
acceptance after it had received American assurances that US weapons would continue to 
flow.  
 The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed dramatic developments in the Arab world: 
military coups in Iraq (1968), Libya (1969) and the Sudan (1969), the sudden death of 
Nasser (1970) and the end of Nasserism in Egypt, political upheaval in Syria and the Battle 
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of Karameh in Jordan (1968). But most significant of all was the rapid growth and 
strengthening of Palestinian paramilitary groups, which were able to set up their own safe 
bases in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
587
 The growing popularity and influence of the 
Palestinian paramilitaries prompted thousands of young men to join these groups in such 
overwhelmingly great numbers that they were compelled to turn down thousands of 
applicants. Meanwhile, competition between rival Palestinian groups led to a dramatic 
increase in the number of Fedayeen operations against Israel. The resultant atmosphere 
was one of anxiety and terror. In order not to be overtaken by the rapid developments on 
the Palestinian scene and to appear to adhere to their nationalist and pan-Arabist slogans, 
some Arab states like Syria and Iraq sponsored, trained and financed their own Palestinian 
Fedayeen groups.
588
  
 Fatah saw in these developments a real opportunity to enhance Palestinian capabilities, 
especially as the outcome of the June 1967 war had humiliated and weakened the Arab 
regimes, strengthened and bolstered the Palestinian cause and focused attention on the 
necessity to stand up to Israel‘s expansionist designs. Many Fatah leaders, such as Khalid 
Al-Hasan, Farouq Qaddoumi and Kemal Adwan, felt that a window of opportunity for 
creating an independent Palestinian entity had at long last opened.
589
 It was against this 
background that Fatah and more broadly the PLO laid the first building blocks of the 
Palestinian military and security apparatus, as well as other institutions dedicated to 
advancing the Palestinian cause.  
 
9.3 Jihaz Al-Rasd Al-Markazi – Fari’ Lubnan (Central Surveillance Apparatus –
Lebanon Branch) 
The Central Surveillance Apparatus - Lebanon Branch was established in Beirut in 1968. 
Despite the fact that the Lebanon was the domain of its activities and operations, this 
branch constituted an important and vital component of the Central Surveillance office. 
Unlike the situation in the other Arab countries, the relatively liberal atmosphere of 
Lebanon made it possible for this branch to act and move with few if any restrictions. 
Another factor behind the great importance and weight of this branch was that with the 
exception of Jordan, Lebanon hosted more Palestinians than any other Arab country. 
Besides the one million Palestinians living on Lebanese soil, there were numerous 
Palestinian political, humanitarian and Fedayeen organizations. After the eviction of 
Palestinian paramilitary groups from Jordan in 1970, Lebanon became the military and 
political hub of the PLO, hosting its central offices in Beirut.
590
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 The first of the Fari‟ Lubnan  (Lebanese branch) ‗deniable units‘ was Munadhamat 
Ailoul Al-Aswad or the Black September Organization (BSO), which took its name, as 
Livingstone and Halevy point out, from the ―bloody military defeat suffered by the 
Palestinians in September 1970, when King Hussein of Jordan drove the PLO, which had 
openly challenged his rule, from Jordan.‖591 In reality, BSO was the covert operations 
instrument of Rasd, the intelligence and surveillance arm of Fatah. The commander-in-
chief of Black September was Abu Iyad, one of the founding triumvirate of Fatah‘s 
security apparatus, who, while remaining the overseer and nominal head of BSO, delegated 
operational control to Mohammed Yussef al-Najjar.
592
 Among the high-ranking staff 
officers of BSO were Ali Hasan Salameh, who became in charge of operations and 
commander of Force 17, Abu Dawoud, Fakhri Al-Omeri and Kemal Adwan.  
 Following the disbandment of the Jordan Branch of the Surveillance Apparatus, Ali 
Hassan Salameh, supported by Salah Khalaf, recruited some of its ex-employees who were 
absolutely loyal to Khalaf personally. One of the main objectives behind the creation of 
BSO was to eliminate all those deemed to be enemies of the Palestinians, inside the Arab 
world and beyond. The veteran BSO officer Abu Dawoud adds: 
             Morale [among Palestinians] almost totally collapsed after we left Jordan. It 
was imperative that we should create an atmosphere in which the young could 
regain their self-confidence… Then the idea of carrying out external operations 
came up. Abu Iyad, myself and other young men were behind this new idea. In 
order that Fatah might not be blamed for operations the success of which was 
not guaranteed, we decided to use the name Black September. Our targets were 
clearly defined: Israeli intelligence and interests everywhere in the world.
593
       
 
 Farouq Qaddoumi, who does not consider the operations carried out by BSO as 
terrorist acts, provides his own explanation: 
 When a baby is born, it does not speak its mother tongue. When it needs to 
be fed, it resorts to crying, which is the only means available. But when the 
baby grows and learns the language, it does not cry to communicate with its 
mother but uses language. And so, when no one listened to us when we said 
our land was occupied, we had to carry out the kind of operations we 
implemented … in order to draw the attention of the world to our cause.594    
 
 Through the BSO, the PLO also sought to create an atmosphere of terror and alarm 
and to draw the attention of the world community to the Palestinian question. Indeed, some 
analysts claim that it was the BSO that paved the way for Yassir Arafat to be admitted to 
the United Nations, carrying an olive branch in one hand and a gun in the other.
595
Many 
factors contributed to the success of Fatah on the international scene. The strategy of 
political dissembling brought this leading Palestinian paramilitary group wide international 
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recognition, culminating in the awarding to it by the United Nations of observer status. 
Arab financial support made it possible for Fatah leader Yassir Arafat to concentrate on 
functions other than the vital task of fundraising. Fatah also exploited to the full the 
strained relations between East and West. By siding with the Soviet Bloc and with socialist 
and radical regimes throughout the world, Arafat ensured that technical and material 
support would continue to flow, from Saddam‘s Baghdad in the East to Berlin in the West.   
 It was natural that BSO should start its programme of ruthless retaliation by targeting 
those whom Fatah considered responsible for the ‗massacre‘ of the Palestinians in Jordan. 
The first major operation was the revenge assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister, 
Wasfi Al-Tell, on 28
th
 November 1971,
596
 an operation executed by a special death squad 
and organized by Fakhri Al-Omeri, who had drawn up a list of targets for elimination, at 
the head of which was Wasfi Al-Tell. The plans were cleared by Arafat himself. Four 
Palestinian Fedayeen left for Egypt, travelling on forged passports. From Cairo airport they 
headed straight for the Sheraton Hotel, where the Jordanian delegation to the Arab League 
was staying and from where the BSO agents were able to closely monitor and shadow the 
movements of the targeted delegation. On 28
th
 November 1971 Al-Tell was gunned down 
outside the hotel.
597
   
 BSO‘s second operation was also directed against Jordanian officials. On 6th February 
1972, the Jordanian ambassador to the UK, Zeid Al-Rifa‘ee, was attacked in the streets of 
London, where he was shot and seriously wounded. In Europe, the BSO carried out a 
number of operations including the bombing of a Dutch gas plant and a German electronic 
company. BSO claimed that the attacks were carried out to punish these companies for 
their dealings with Israel.
598
  
 The bloodiest operation which drew world attention to BSO took place at the Munich 
Olympic Games.
599
 On 5
th
 September 1972, eight armed Palestinians infiltrated the 
Olympic village where they seized 11 Israeli athletes, coaches and a referee murdered 
those who fought back and held the rest hostage. Hours later, during a failed rescue 
operation by the West German police, the terrorists killed every Israeli. The guerrillas had 
previously threatened to kill all the hostages if 200 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel were 
not released. According to one BSO member, Yassir Arafat planned the operation. Among 
the others killed were five of the armed Palestinians and a German policeman. The rest of 
the armed Palestinians were then captured whilst attempting to flee German soil. Although 
the Palestinian perpetrators were operating under the guise of BSO, most of them were, in 
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point of fact, members of the ‗Strike force‘ which was directly linked to the Central 
Surveillance Apparatus.
600
  
 Just after the Munich operation, an attempt was made on the life of Zaduk Ofeer, 
Mossad‘s station officer in Brussels. Abu Iyad laid down the plan to eliminate Ofeer, 
whose main task at the time was to recruit Arab agents. One of BSO‘s operatives, 
Muhammed Ahmed, was instructed to head for the Belgian capital to carry out the plan. 
Ahmed was specifically instructed to do nothing but loiter there in order to attract the 
attention of Mossad‘s local station head. The bait was taken sooner than had been 
anticipated: two days after the start of the Israeli retaliatory operation, Ahmed asked his 
new handler to meet him at a certain café for an important matter. At the appointed time 
Ahmed drew his gun, shot Ofeer and in the ensuing commotion managed to escape the 
scene. Despite serious injury, Ofeer survived the attempt.
601
 
 On orders from Abu Iyad, BSO launched an attack on the Israeli embassy in Bangkok 
on 28
th
 December 1972. Two armed BSO men broke into the embassy function room and 
managed to take hostage two high-ranking Israeli diplomats and four others. The intruders 
then demanded the release of 36 Palestinians from Israeli prisons in return for freeing the 
hostages, but the two terrorists left for Cairo 19 hours after the start of the operation, under 
mysterious circumstances.
602
  
 In January 1973, many letter bombs were sent to Israeli and Jordanian officials. Khalaf 
also dispatched a 17-man team in February 1973 in order to kidnap the Jordanian Prime 
Minister and the American ambassador. The far-reaching plot was discovered in time and 
all those involved were captured and later sentenced to death.
603
  
 Another notorious BSO operation was the attack in March 1973 on the Saudi embassy 
in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, sanctioned by the Central Committee of Fatah, which 
began when a juggernaut carrying nine armed BSO members crashed through the gates of 
the embassy. Twenty-six hours after the forced entry they killed the US Chargé d‘Affaires 
and the Belgian ambassador to Khartoum.
604
 Abu Iyad later attempted to justify this 
operation by claiming it was intended to force King Hussein to secure the release of the 
convicted 16-man Fatah team by exerting pressure through President Richard Nixon on 
him.
605
  
 In Madrid, someone believed to be an Israeli businessman, Hanan Beisha, was killed 
by BSO; the victim, however, was not a businessman but the ex-military commander of the 
city of Nablus in the West Bank, named Barus Cohen, who was chasing Yassir Arafat and 
at one point almost succeeded in capturing the PLO chairman.
606
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 In an attempt to revive the activities of the Central Security Apparatus in Jordan, Abu 
Iyad sought to exploit the negative political atmosphere created by Jordan‘s negotiations 
with Israel regarding the creation of a so-called ―United Arab Kingdom‖. The negotiations 
aimed at undermining the PLO by creating a new state, which was to include Arab 
territories on both sides of the River Jordan. As the Palestinian officer in charge of the 
Jordan Desk, Abu Iyad recruited many ex-members of the Surveillance Apparatus in order 
to carry out acts of sabotage in Jordan. The Jordanian security forces soon found out about 
the clandestine plots and foiled the attempts of the new bureau.
607
  
 It was inevitable that Israel would vigorously retaliate against these bloody operations. 
Immediately after the Munich massacre, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir ordered the 
security agencies to prepare a hit list of all those who planned or participated in the Munich 
attack. The Israeli Intelligence succeeded in eliminating many of Yassir Arafat‘s comrades, 
including the head of BSO.   
 Upon the assassination of Muhammad Yousuf al-Najjar and Kamal Adwan at the 
hands of Israeli agents and following the reconciliation of Abu Iyad with Yassir Arafat, 
Abu Iyad was asked to take charge of coordinating and unifying all security and 
intelligence activities. He exploited this opportunity to the full, working hard to build a 
strong personal power base through which he was later able to influence Arafat‘s 
decisions, especially in filling leading political, diplomatic and military posts.
608
 
 The role played by BSO had an immense impact not only on the Palestinian standing 
in the world but on the Arab-Israeli conflict in general. Despite the ruthless methods and 
bloody tactics employed by BSO and other Palestinian paramilitary groups, the world, 
which the Palestinians felt had totally ignored them, now began to listen to their voice and 
take them more seriously.  
 
9.4 Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Reasi / Al-Quwa 17 (Presidential Security Apparatus / Force 17) 
The Central Surveillance Apparatus played an active role in the battles between the 
Palestinians and the Jordanian Armed Forces of September 1970, but its work produced no 
tangible results, as the Palestinians were simply outnumbered and outgunned by their 
Jordanian adversaries. Of the 169 Central Surveillance men who took part in the fighting 
alongside the armed Palestinian militias, 152 perished and only 17 survived, including the 
chief of the Apparatus, Abu Al-Tayyib.
609
 Many of those who fell in action either belonged 
to the ―Strike Force‖ of Central Surveillance or simply joined their comrades in what they 
considered the battle of destiny. Despite the lack of any documentary evidence, the idea of 
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forming Force 17 as a replacement appears to have been the brainchild of Yassir Arafat 
himself. All those who served in it stress that Arafat personally supervised every stage in 
the development and growth of this elite force, which came into being immediately after 
the PLO relocated to Lebanon.     
 The Palestinian-Jordanian negotiations which followed the Arab League-sponsored 
cease-fire resulted in the departure of all armed Palestinian groups from Jordan to 
Lebanon. Among those who left were the 17 survivors, who headed for the Hay al-Na‘ama 
quarter in Beirut, which they adopted as their base. A list containing the names of these 
men was then submitted to PLO chairman Yassir Arafat, who ordered that payment of their 
salaries be expedited. From then on, the epithet ‗17‘ became attached to these men, who 
were now charged with the task of providing personal protection to Yassir Arafat.
610
  
 There are, however, other accounts of the creation of this elite force, which came to 
wield great power in the years to come. Some, for example, attribute the name to Arafat‘s 
telephone extension number in Beirut, while others claim that the Palestinians adopted it to 
distinguish the Palestinian Force from the Lebanese military units known as Force 16.
611
  
 Following dismantlement of the Revolutionary Surveillance Apparatus, one of its 
active officers, Black September chief Ali Hassan Salameh, who was later to be known as 
the Red Prince, headed for Kuwait in search of employment. He had not settled in this oil-
rich state before Yassir Arafat called him back to Beirut.
612
 Arafat had great admiration for 
Salameh‘s father, who had fought valiantly against both British and Zionists during the 
nineteen-thirties and forties. The chairman also valued the experience gained by Salameh 
when he was at the head of Black September, so he asked the flamboyant young militant to 
set up an elite force dedicated to his personal protection.
613
  
 Elated at the prospect of joining the inner circle of the PLO chief, Salameh spared no 
effort in establishing a loyal Praetorian guard. To help him build a reliable force, capable 
of providing effective personal protection to Arafat, Salameh chose Mahmoud Al-Natour, 
(Abu Al-Tayyeb), a close friend and confidant, to be his assistant and deputy. Members of 
the new covert force, known variously as Force 17 or the Presidential Security 
Force,
614
 not only served as Arafat‘s personal bodyguards, but were also the enforcers of 
his will. Force 17‘s mission later expanded to include the protection of foreign visitors and 
senior PLO officials, as well as the collection of intelligence data. ‗Protection‘, however, 
also meant the elimination of Arafat‘s rivals and those who plotted against him. Recruits 
were very carefully chosen and only after proving that they were as Livingstone and 
Halevy Point unswervingly loyal to both Salameh and Arafat: 
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 The initial recruits were all Palestinians; in time however, Salameh reached 
out to draw into the unit many non-Palestinians, including Lebanese Christians, 
Lebanese Shiites, and even a number of Western Europeans. Although the 
recruitment of non-Palestinians meant that most of Force 17‘s members were 
not interested or involved in the internal disputes and bickering that 
characterized the PLO, it also meant that the unit was more vulnerable to 
penetration by foreign intelligence organizations. In time the United States, the 
Israelis, and even the Lebanese Christian Phalange had agents within 
Force17.
615
  
 
 Some of the difficulties encountered by Force 17 were caused by the fact that lists of 
PLO enemies were compiled and vetted not by the Force itself but by other PLO security 
branches. It was therefore only natural that some overlapping should occur in the course of 
preparing for or executing an attack or clandestine operation.
616
  
 Force 17 located its headquarters in eastern the part of Beirut, where Ali Hassan 
Salameh was able to draw upon his experience in the field of covert action to develop its 
capabilities. While he and his staff were quite competent in collecting, verifying and 
analyzing information, he lacked knowledge of the other aspects of the duties assigned to 
the Force, especially in providing executive protection to the PLO chairman and his 
cohorts. To surmount this difficulty, Salameh turned to the intelligence services of the 
Eastern Bloc governments, especially the East Germans and the Romanians. Through 
vigorous training programmes for VIP protection, fresh recruits were turned into ruthless 
and highly disciplined units.
617
  
 In order that new recruits might be better equipped to carry out security and 
intelligence tasks, Salameh set up a training centre at one of the Palestinian camps, Beer 
Hassan, in the Lebanese capital. An old friend of Salameh‘s, Saad Sayel, was put in 
charge. Sayel adopted the Egyptian style of instruction and training. He also relied on a 
number of experts and lecturers from a variety of PLO departments. These veteran fighters 
often spoke of their experiences in clandestine work and pointed out lessons learnt from 
their past successes or failures. Salameh‘s goal was to build a force capable of carrying out 
the duties of ordinary soldiers as well as executing highly sensitive security and 
intelligence tasks.
618
  
 Throughout the period 1970 to 1975, when the Lebanese central government was 
disintegrating and increasing numbers of foreign nationals were being kidnapped, the PLO 
exploited the prevalent conditions in a number of ways. Through Salameh, it succeeded in 
infiltrating most of the weak government‘s agencies, which were deeply divided along 
religious and ethnic lines, had different loyalties and worked for a number of foreign 
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powers. Salameh also wrote to a number of foreign intelligence agencies asking for 
donations in return for information on the whereabouts of their kidnapped subjects, their 
captors and the powers which lay behind the perpetrators. Salameh, now known as the Red 
Prince, scored a resounding success in this field, especially in the case of opening a 
channel of dialogue with the US government. Although Washington‘s declared policy was 
the rejection of any negotiations with the PLO, it was in fact an open secret that the CIA 
had always dealt with Salameh, who had cultivated close links with the Americans.
619
  
 While Washington had always depended on its own operatives and those of Mossad 
when it came to intelligence related to the Arab world, Salameh managed to carve out a 
niche for himself and convinced the USA that through Force 17, the Palestinians were 
capable of protecting US interests in Lebanon and beyond. The Americans seemed to have 
accepted some of the new realities in Lebanon and intensified their contacts with the Red 
Prince, whose cooperation with them grew in scope until relations with the Central 
Intelligence Agency station head became direct: 
 Salameh worked closely with former CIA official Robert Ames, who died in 
1983 in the bomb blast that destroyed the U.S. embassy in Beirut. Whether 
Salameh was actually ‗run‘ by Ames or regarded as a CIA asset is still open to 
question, but it is clear that Ames established a discreet back channel to 
Salameh that was cloaked in secrecy because of secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger‘s agreement with the Israelis not to deal directly with the PLO. 620  
 
 Salameh‘s clandestine relationship with the Americans, behind the back of Tel Aviv, 
greatly embittered the Israelis. It is now thought that Israel‘s decision to eliminate Salameh 
was taken not so much for his pivotal role in the Munich massacre, but because of his 
growing influence with the Americans.
621
 Following a number of unsuccessful attempts on 
his life in which an innocent Moroccan was mistakenly killed, Salameh was finally 
assassinated in a daring operation in Beirut on 21 January 1979 at the hands of a UK 
national working as an agent for the Mossad.
622
  
 Following Salameh‘s assassination, Brigadier Mahmoud Al-Natour, known as Abu 
Al-Tayeb, became Force 17‘s commanding officer. His term, which continued until 1993, 
was characterized by a sharp increase in the number of the Force‘s operatives, who 
numbered 800 by the end of the eighties. Abu Al-Tayeb tried very hard and succeeded in 
turning the organization into a military strike force which could be depended upon to deal 
with any insurgency or domestic crisis. He managed to obtain a variety of heavy machine-
guns, howitzers, armoured vehicles and even some tanks. Force 17‘s recruits were trained 
by professional staff officers who concentrated on the arts of conventional warfare. Al-
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Tayeb‘s armament efforts intensified when it became evident that Israel was about to 
invade Lebanon in the summer of 1982.
623
  
 As part of the preparation to resist the imminent Israeli invasion and in order that the 
Israelis might not take the Palestinians by surprise, the PLO divided Lebanon into a 
number of zones and sectors. Force 17 was charged with the defence of Sector 3, which 
extended from the Bakneek through Al-Awzaee, where the Force put up tough 
resistance.
624
 The war ended with a cease-fire, which was soon followed by the withdrawal 
of all Palestinian armed groups from the Lebanese territory and their dispersion in a 
number of Arab countries, especially Tunisia, Jordan and Syria.
625
  
The post-invasion period was quite difficult for the PLO. The retreat from Lebanon sowed 
the seeds of dissention and rebellion among many Palestinians, who started pointing the 
finger of blame towards this Palestinian party or that. Force 17, however, remained quite 
faithful to Yassir Arafat, who used it to quell any nascent rebellion.
626
 It was during this 
stormy period that the Force‘s chief convinced Arafat to set up offices for it abroad. Abu 
Al-Tayeb, realizing that the spirit of rebellion against Yassir Arafat was spreading among 
Palestinian expatriates in many Middle Eastern and European countries, feared that Arafat 
might lose his grip on PLO affairs. He considered it in the best interests of the PLO not 
only to keep a close eye on the movements and activities of those who opposed, but also to 
deal with those dissidents directly and on the spot.
627
 
 Force 17‘s foreign-based operatives who were introduced to the host countries as 
attachés or liaison officers were responsible, among other things, for protecting the 
Palestinian missions abroad and with carrying out a number of operations against 
dissidents. On some occasions they physically eliminated high ranking Palestinian cadres 
and official representatives who dared to oppose the policies of the PLO chairman.
628
  
 Following its settlement in Tunis, the PLO tried several times to operate in the 
Lebanese theatre. To that end, it tried to smuggle into the country a number of Force 17 
operatives, along with arms and equipment. But all such attempts were destined to fail, 
especially as relations between Arafat and Damascus were soured by, among other things, 
their conflicting attitudes towards the Iraq-Iran War. While the Palestinians expressed full 
and unequivocal support for Saddam Hussein, whom they provided with intelligence and 
volunteers, Syria‘s Hafiz Al-Assad sided with Khomeini‘s Iran, practically defying the rest 
of the Arab and Sunni Muslim world.
629
  
 Besides the Syrians, who were adamant about obliterating any Palestinian influence in 
Lebanon, there were of course the Israelis, who watched the Lebanese scene very closely 
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and frequently intercepted boats which were being used to smuggle men or weapons. The 
few officers who managed to reach Lebanese soil were later tracked down and eliminated 
by Mossad agents.
630
  
 In 1984, Abu Al-Tayeb set up a military wing within Force 17, whose duties were to 
carry out operations deep inside Israeli territory. Unlike the Western Sector Apparatus, 
these units were at first only involved in executing military orders rather than in collecting 
intelligence. The backbone of the force consisted of new recruits from the Palestinian 
camps. The military wing was also directed to lend support and participate actively in the 
First Intifada against the Israelis, which erupted in 1987.
631
  
 The new military wing was later placed under the direct supervision of Yassir Arafat, 
who gave his full support to its members, providing them with all they needed to carry out 
their operations. Upon his directives, moral support and financial rewards were generously 
given to all members of these units. In return for Arafat‘s unlimited support, the military 
wing became staunchly supportive of whatever course he might decide to take. This wing 
in time became a ruthless tool in the hands of the PLO chairman, who used it to eliminate 
any potential rival within the Palestinian movement.
632
 
 With the expansion of the military wing of Force 17, a need was felt for an 
intelligence unit dedicated to the collection of intelligence on Israeli targets and also to the 
recruitment of sympathetic foreigners in Europe and elsewhere. The foreign elements were 
used to collect information on visiting Israelis as well as on others inside Israel itself. They 
were also used to smuggle arms into Israel and as front proprietors who bought, sold and 
rented property in a number of countries.
633
 The unit followed the accepted methods used 
by intelligence services almost everywhere. There were those who collected the data, while 
others evaluated and verified the information. Before reports were disseminated, 
intelligence experts within the unit made sure that the analysis contained a realistic 
appraisal of any specific issue.
634
  
  Following the second Oslo accord of 1994, Force 17, with all its units and personnel, 
was incorporated into the Palestinian Authority, which was offered a degree of autonomy 
over the domestic Palestinian scene.  
 Among the operations carried out by Force 17 was an attack in 1985 on an Israeli 
yacht in the harbour of Nicosia, Cyprus, which left three dead. A British national, who was 
later captured and tried, was one of the gunmen. Similarly, in a series of attacks on the 
British airbase in Akrotiri, Cyprus, Force 17 employed both Cypriot and French 
nationals.
635
 It was also implicated in the assassination on 22 July 1987 of Palestinian 
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caricaturist Nagy El-Ali, who was shot on the steps of the Kuwaiti newspaper El-Kabas in 
Chelsea in London. As El-Ali, who was known for his political cartoons against the 
Palestinian leadership and against Arafat in particular, was a British citizen, the authorities 
in London invested great efforts in solving the murder. The investigation eventually led to 
the arrest of members of Force 17. A search of an apartment belonging to one of them 
uncovered weapons, hand grenades and 145 kg of Semtex plastic explosives.
636
  
 The late 1980‘s witnessed the creation of yet another elite unit, which came to be 
known as the Special Operations Group, or more commonly the Hawari Group. Its founder 
and leader was Colonel Abdallah Abd El Labib, more widely known as Colonel Hawari. 
The mission of the group was to serve as yet another clandestine operational wing of Fatah, 
dealing with terrorist activities in Europe.
637
 It was established to support the activities of 
the Jihaz Al-Rasd and was initially charged with operating covertly against the Syrian 
intelligence services and their forces stationed in Lebanon. By 1983, it had also been 
ordered to conduct operations against dissident Fatah rebels like Abu Musa. During 1983-
84 the unit carried out successful carbomb attacks in Beirut and Damascus and against Abu 
Musa‘s headquarters in Chatura in Lebanon‘s Bekaa Valley. Elements of the Special 
Operations Group were based in Arab countries and Western Europe, where its operatives 
carried out attacks in Rome, Madrid, Geneva and other locations, often against Syrian 
targets.
638
  
 Among the European operations of the Hawari Group, which was meant to be totally 
deniable, was the smuggling of 16 kg of explosives and a variety of light arms into France. 
The perpetrator was caught and sentenced to 5 years in prison, while his commander, 
Colonel Hawari, was sentenced in absentia to ten years. The group was also responsible 
for a blast on board a TWA aircraft in April 1986, which killed four passengers and 
wounded ten.
639
 The group has not been heard of since the death of its leader in a car crash 
in May 1991, while travelling from Baghdad to Jordan.
640
  
 
9.5  Jihaz Al-Amn al-Markazi (Central Security Apparatus)  
The outcome of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontations of 1970 was disastrous for the 
PLO, especially as it lost practically all the infrastructure, military bases and training 
centres it had so diligently built on Jordanian soil. Before September 1970, the PLO had 
wielded immense influence in Jordan. It was in effect a state within a state. During that 
period, some Palestinian groups were openly demanding a share in the Jordanian 
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government, while the more extremist among them unashamedly called for the toppling of 
the regime in Amman.  
 In Lebanon, Fatah concentrated on rebuilding its bases and enhancing its military 
capabilities. It further aimed to absorb as many youths as it could into its ranks. But there 
were dozens of Palestinian groups and political parties who were actively seeking to build 
bases in Lebanon, especially near its southern frontier with Israel. As it turned out, 
Lebanon afforded the growing Palestinian resistance not only a safe haven but fertile 
ground for political action as well.
641
 
 The new political and social environment was quite different from that of Jordan. In 
Lebanon there were a great number of parties, political organizations, religious 
movements, radical and ultra-conservative ideologies, most of which had links with 
regional or international powers. Unlike the rest of the Arab states, Lebanon provided a 
wide margin of liberty and freedom of movement for all organizations based on its soil. 
This open atmosphere encouraged competition among the Palestinians, who began to speak 
of their suspicions or show their support for this organization or that, without fear of 
persecution or reprisal. On the other hand, the new atmosphere made it easier to infiltrate 
Palestinian resistance.  
 Soon after the mass exodus to Lebanon, Fatah intensified its efforts to regain its 
leading role within the Palestinian community. This vigorous drive resulted in a rapid 
increase in recruitment. During this period too, many other Palestinian groups descended 
upon the Lebanese arena, especially in the southern region of the country.
642
 The 
concentration of so many different groups created an atmosphere of rivalry and suspicion 
among the Palestinians. There was also the fear of Israeli and regional infiltration of 
Palestinian ranks. It was at this point that Fatah seriously considered the creation of a 
strong security apparatus, capable of defending the organization, influencing developments 
on the Palestinian scene and resisting Israeli attempts to undermine the Palestinian 
resistance.
643
  
 In order that Fatah might be better equipped to face the rapid and dramatic 
developments not only on the Lebanese front but also in the Arab world as a whole, a new 
security apparatus was created, under the name of Jihaz al-Amn al-Markazi (Central 
Security Apparatus). Al-Markazi was first headed by Fatah Central Committee member 
Muhammad Al-Najjar, assisted
 
by Abu Ramzi (Muhammad al-Aiydi). When Al-Najjar 
was assassinated by the Israelis in the Fardan quarter of Beirut in 1973,
644
 Hayel Abdul-
Hameed (Abu al-Hawl or the Sphinx) took over and remained at the head of al-Markazi 
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until 1991, when he was killed by a militant splinter group of Fatah, known as ‗Fatah: the 
Revolutionary Council
645
 and led by Abu Nidhal. Among those who helped Abu Al-Hawl 
were his deputy, Hani al-Hasan, and Tariq Ahmad Shnaiwrah (Abu Rajab), who was the 
chief of Palestinian Intelligence in 2006.
646
  
 When the Central Security Apparatus (CSA) was first created, it was feeble and 
lacking in professional training and practical experience. Its commanders did not have the 
prerequisite leadership qualities and political will. But when Abu al-Hawl took over, he did 
his best to capitalize on his close association with the Egyptian security organizations, 
especially the Egyptian General Intelligence. He managed to secure professional training 
for his men, especially in the field of military intelligence. What helped Abu al-Hawl in 
improving the performance of the CSA was the unlimited support he had from his long-
time friend, Yassir Arafat.
647
  
 Egypt was not the only provider of training to CSA staff. Fatah‘s security and 
intelligence cadres were, with the passage of time, sent for training purposes to a number 
of countries, including East Germany, Syria, Algeria and Iraq. When relations with King 
Hussein improved, Fatah also sent a number of its security and intelligence staff to receive 
training in Jordan. While pursuing training courses in these countries, Fatah intelligence 
officers spared no effort to identify useful elements among the Palestinian expatriates and 
to recruit them in order to advance the strategies of the Palestinian resistance.
648
  
Fatah managed to patch up differences with many of the regional powers, such as Jordan 
and Iraq. Furthermore, Arafat succeeded in solidifying the cordial relations he had initiated 
with such European countries as Rumania, East and West Germany, and Italy. In short, the 
Central Security Apparatus grew in size to such an extent that in 1982, there were 900 
official staff members on its monthly payroll.
649
. 
 The training courses attended by Fatah intelligence and security officers included 
sessions on the use of arms, detection, electronic espionage, cryptography.
650
 Courses on 
personnel and VIP protection were provided by the East German government. Egypt, 
Algeria, Rumania while Yugoslavia provided Fatah with a variety of equipment and 
electronic devices.
651
  
 In 1975 the CSA created a specialized institute for intelligence studies called the 
Security School, which was based in the Fakahani quarter of Beirut and offered training 
courses for new recruits. Besides modules on intelligence and security, such as counter-
intelligence, topography, recruitment, surveillance and data analysis, the syllabus also 
included courses on languages, political science and international relations. It was hoped 
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that following the three-month intensive courses, trainees would be better equipped to 
carry out their intelligence and security duties. Lecturers and specialists from higher 
educational institutes in Lebanon were contracted to offer their expertise.
652
  
 Throughout the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), the CSA succeeded in attracting a 
number of highly qualified experts in intelligence belonging to a variety of Lebanese 
political and paramilitary groups, such as the Independent Nasserites
653
, the Baath Party
654
, 
the Communists
655
 and the Progressive Socialist Party.
656
 It is to be remembered that 
during those turbulent years, the PLO was offering some sort of support to more than 36 
groups in Lebanon. The CSA exchanged intelligence with those groups and often played 
the part of mediator when differences or clashes occurred among them.
657
  
 The Lebanese civil war, with its resultant polarization, division, animosity and armed 
rivalries, helped the CSA to acquire a wealth of experience in intelligence work. Soon after 
the outbreak of the war, the CSA created a special intelligence unit dedicated entirely to 
shadowing hostile Lebanese groups and movements, especially the Christian Lebanese 
Forces Party led by Sheikh Basheer Al-Jumaiyel and viewed by the PLO as on the side of 
the Israelis.
658
  
 By 1977, the CSA had expanded to such an extent that it had started to operate outside 
Lebanese territory: it now had stations and representatives in Algeria, Tunisia, Qatar, 
Libya and Egypt. Relations with Egypt were severed, however, following President Anwar 
Sadat‘s visit to Israel. The CSA also operated in some European countries, especially in 
Yugoslavia, Rumania, East and West Germany, Italy, France and Britain. In some 
countries, CSA operatives carried out their activities under the guise of business or the 
pursuit of higher education;
659
 in others, they worked under diplomatic cover, as 
functionaries attached to the PLO missions: 
 Where there is Israeli political or economic activity, or involvement in 
security, the PLO representative undertakes surveillance of their activities in 
order to undermine them. In Kenya, for example, the PLO works through 
Muslim members of Parliament and through the press to try and convince the 
government of Kenya to cancel the permission granted to El-Al, the Israeli 
national airline, for transit landing in Nairobi, en route to Johannesburg.
660
  
 
 The strategy behind this expansion was to collect as much intelligence as possible 
about Israeli affairs, particularly Israeli influence in these countries. The PLO also aimed 
to strengthen relations with these countries through intelligence cooperation and the 
exchange of information. The CSA was concerned that Israel was providing them with 
biased and inaccurate information about a number of ordinary Palestinians whom Israel 
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pictured as terrorists intent on carrying out operations in Europe. It was therefore the duty 
of the CSA liaison officers to coordinate work with their hosts, correct the misinformation 
supplied by the Israeli intelligence and refute any allegation of those individuals‘ 
involvement in terrorist activities. By 1979, the CSA had cemented relations with a 
number of European states and carried out its usual duties with the full knowledge of the 
host states. These countries included France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus and a number of East 
European countries, notably East Germany.
661
  
 The CSA received financial support from a number of sources. Thanks to Fatah 
chairman Arafat‘s mastery of the art of rhetoric and public relations, the CSA received 
generous donations from the Arab world. Fatah‘s extensive and lucrative investments also 
ensured that CSA staff were well paid and looked after.
662
  
 Despite the diversity of the functions carried out by the CSA and the fact that it had its 
own organizational structure, everything was under the tight control of one man, the CSA 
chief, who could practically do as he liked. The apparatus had its own sections and 
specialized units, dealing with matters such as data collection, espionage on the Lebanese 
forces allied to the Israelis, liaison between the PLO and Palestinian prisoners, as well as 
electronic, financial and administrative departments. There were often no clear-cut lines of 
demarcation between sections, so that a good deal of time was wasted and some work was 
unnecessarily duplicated. There were furthermore some sections within the CSA which 
were involved in a variety of security and intelligence activities, including spying on 
friendly as well as hostile political groups in Lebanon and elsewhere.
663
  
 The CSA exploited its relationships with Lebanese intellectuals, especially 
professionals and those with an academic background, enhancing its influence through the 
recruitment of Palestinian and Lebanese students, to whom it offered scholarships or work 
opportunities in Lebanon and abroad. Despite its rapid and sustained expansion, the CSA 
had no activities inside Israel or the occupied territories.
664
  
 A turning point in the history of the CSA came in 1979, when the Arab League, 
through the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior, assigned to it the task of representing 
the PLO abroad. This particular assignment enabled the apparatus to carry out its functions 
and also to strengthen relations with its counterpart Arab security departments. In addition 
to its primary security and intelligence duties, the CSA started playing an increasingly 
significant political role. This did not escape the attention of foreign governments, which 
started using it as a channel through which messages could be delivered and received.
665
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 In 1982, when the Palestinian groups were forced to leave Lebanon following the 
Israeli invasion of the country, the CSA moved its headquarters to Tunis, but it dispersed 
many of its sections across the Arab world, especially where the PLO had a military 
presence, such as Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Iraq and Syria. The CSA offices in Syria closed 
down in 1983, however, following an internal rift within the Palestinian movement.
666
 The 
CSA continued to function until the Oslo agreement of 1993 between the PLO and Israel, 
when it was disbanded and most of its operatives, like those of other security and 
intelligence organs, were attached to the Palestinian General Intelligence.
667
  
 Among its counter-intelligence activities, the CSA was able to expose and capture an 
Israeli female agent, who had arrived in Beirut in 1979 on a foreign passport. CSA 
operatives shadowed this 40-year old spy, Amina Al-Mufti, who was in fact the wife of an 
Israeli pilot and had come to Lebanon to spy on Palestinian groups.
668
 Al-Mufti was 
released from prison in a Red Cross-sponsored deal between Israel and the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine: General Command, in exchange for two top Fatah men and 
more than 500 Palestinian prisoners.
669
  
 
9.6  Jihaz Al-Amn al-Muwahhad (Unified Intelligence Apparatus)  
In 1974, all member states of the Arab League recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people". This diplomatic coup was soon followed by a 
flurry of activity, especially on the security and intelligence fronts, in which the PLO tried 
and to a large extent succeeded in establishing itself as a player not only in the Arab world 
but also in the region as a whole. To that end, a complete restructuring of the security and 
intelligence organs was launched. This resulted in the creation of Jihaz Al-Amn al-
Muwahhad (Unified Intelligence Apparatus), with Abu Iyad as its chief, Amin Al-Hindi as 
his deputy and Atif Bassiso as third in command. One of its prime duties was to 
‗‗coordinate and unite the intelligence efforts of all the guerrilla groups.‘‘670 The 
organizational structure of the Amn Al-Muwahhad clearly defined the responsibilities and 
duties of each of these men, who collectively led this highly secretive and sensitive 
organisation.
671
  
 Abu Iyad‘s diligence and total dedication to security and intelligence work were soon 
to bear fruit. In 1975, he succeeded in establishing close links with the intelligence 
community of the Soviet Union as well as most Eastern European countries.
672
 A number 
of agreements were concluded between PLO and these states in the field of coordinating 
activities and exchanging intelligence, particularly in countering the work of Israeli agents 
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in the European theatre. The Soviet Union and its European satellites offered the PLO 
considerable technical assistance in the form of highly developed technological equipment 
and.
673
 ‗‗They were taught how CIA and other services were recruiting among them‘‘.674 
Atif Bassiso was in charge of supervising cooperation with the Eastern Bloc countries to 
which PLO turned for assistance especially in acquiring some badly needed sophisticated 
equipment and also to scrape whatever intelligence about Israel as it could get from 
them.
675
  
 The security of Amn al-Muwahhad was also the responsibility of Bassiso, who 
assiduously sought fresh recruits to bolster and reinforce the newly-created force. This was 
no easy task, as most foreign intelligence services were keen to infiltrate the Palestinian 
movement, but Bassiso‘s wide experience foiled most if not all such attempts. He worked 
closely with the intelligence agencies of the Eastern Bloc, which readily agreed to organize 
training courses for the new recruits and to set up special camps for the purpose. Bassiso 
also managed to win numerous scholarships and grants from Eastern European academic 
institutions. Most scholarships were given to Palestinian students specializing in legal and 
security studies, who had signed contracts binding them to the Jihaz.
676
  
 The use of ‗sleepers‘ was one of the methods adopted by the Palestinian Unified 
Intelligence Apparatus (UIA), which would clandestinely sponsor prospective agents to 
travel abroad and settle in a specific country or area, where they would be encouraged to 
learn the local languages and social customs. Such agents, who would remain ‗sleeping‘ 
until needed, were also encouraged to blend into the communities they lived amongst and 
to weave a wide net of social contacts from all walks of life.
677
  
 The UIA had a unit specially dedicated to counter-espionage, which was directly 
linked to the office of Atif Bassiso. Despite the fact that the counterespionage unit was 
created during the early months of the Lebanese civil war, when Lebanon was awash with 
foreign intelligence agents, especially the Israeli Mossad, Bassiso was able to score a 
number of successes when his agents allegedly uncovered a number of Israeli spy rings. 
For example, the UIA captured some Israeli agents who had facilitated the assassination of 
Zuhair Muhsin, a leading PLO activist. A number of Israeli agents equipped with highly 
sophisticated telecommunications systems were also captured. The seized codification 
systems and communications equipment were carefully studied by Egyptian intelligence 
experts, from whom Bassiso received constant technical assistance and training,
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allowing Palestinian intelligence to learn a good deal about the technical methods adopted 
by their Israeli adversaries when contacting their agents in the Arab world and beyond.
679
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 The UIA had close links with its counterparts in Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar 
and other Arab countries, especially Tunisia. The footprint of the Palestinian intelligence 
apparatus soon after 1975 expanded in such a way that it started to shadow Israeli agents 
everywhere possible, while security coordination with East European intelligence services 
resulted in the uncovering of a number of Mossad agents in Europe.
680
  
 Besides the Eastern Bloc, the UIA also established reasonably good working 
relationships with Western intelligence services, particularly during the 1980s, 
coordinating some of its activities with Western powers including France, Italy, West 
Germany and the United States. Indeed, the UIA developed good relations with the CIA, 
especially during the period before the assassination of Abu Iyad in Tunis in the early 
nineties.
681
  
 One of the difficulties which confronted Palestinian intelligence officers working 
abroad was the diplomatic status of most Israeli agents attached to the accredited Israeli 
missions. The diplomatic immunity and cover under which the Israelis operated stood in 
the way of identifying them and made the task of uncovering them quite difficult. But the 
Palestinians surmounted this difficulty by working closely with the governments of the 
host states, thus managing to keep track of many Israeli agents abroad.
682
  
 Cooperation between Palestinian intelligence and the ex-Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe helped Fatah to counter-propaganda diffused by Israeli agents about 
Palestinians and Arabs. All of these attacks and counterattacks were carried out within the 
framework of the intelligence ‗warfare‘ raging between Israelis and Palestinians.683  
 The Unified Intelligence Apparatus had a small ‗hit team‘ which took part in some of 
the attacks directed against Jewish or western targets. Among other operations, the UIA 
attacked a synagogue and a train carrying Jewish immigrants in Germany in the early 
seventies. It also participated in some of the attacks launched by Black September, 
especially in the hijacking of Israeli, European and US aircraft.
684
 Abu Dawoud was 
among the highest-ranking officers in charge of directing the UIA operations abroad. His 
recently published memoirs contain ample information on the inner workings of the 
Apparatus and the activities in which he was involved.
685
  
 Other ranking officers included Abu Muhammad Fakhri al-Omari, who was 
assassinated in Tunis along with Abu Iyad and Abu al-Hawl at the hands of  Abu Nidhal. 
General Amin Al-Hindi, the ex-Director of General Intelligence in the Palestinian 
Authority was in charge of the UIA‘s relations with (West) Germany, France and Italy. 
Brigadier Tawfeeq Al-Tearawi, served as the chief of General Intelligence in the West 
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Bank before he was sacked by President Mahmoud Abbas in February 2008, Muhammad 
Mansour appointed by Abbas to head the G. I. and Abu Hisham Sameeh Abdul Fattah, 
who had served as ambassador to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia and was a cabinet member 
in the government of President Mahmoud Abbas (2007), were among the UIA officers who 
held leading positions within the UIA.
686
  
 The UIA was charged with identifying people with special skills, especially in forging 
documents, passports, driving licences, banknotes and coins, particularly the US currency. 
Thanks to the UIA‘s large-scale forgeries, it was quite easy for any Palestinian wishing to 
travel to an Arab or foreign country to obtain the necessary documents. UIA operatives 
were of course supplied with all kinds of forged documents before beginning to carry out 
any operation.
687
  
 The UIA received substantial support from the PLO as well as from the Gulf states 
and other Arab countries. Financial contributions came in the form of cheques, normally 
handed to Yassir Arafat himself, although some funds were directly given to Abu Iyad, 
especially in the case of Libya. Abu Iyad managed to establish a very close relationship 
with Colonel Gaddafi after helping him to capture and then execute one of the Libyan 
regime‘s bitter enemies, Omar al-Muhaishi, who was once a member of the Libyan 
Revolutionary Command Council.
688
 Abu Iyad also managed to establish an excellent 
working relationship with Tunisia‘s foreign minister, Muhammad al-Masmoudi, who 
offered the UIA considerable help during the period in which the PLO operated from its 
headquarters in Tunis.
689
  
 On the international scene, Abu Iyad forged close relations with the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front
690
 in the Philippines. Several of its activists were given military training in 
various sites in Lebanon. This relationship did not last long, however, ending almost 
abruptly following the exodus of the Palestinian groups from Lebanon to Tunisia in the 
summer of 1982.
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 The UIA, which was originally set up to protect the Palestinian revolution, soon 
developed into a terrorist organization which became deeply involved in acts of 
embezzlement and blackmail and whose designs knew no boundaries. At one point, some 
UIA elements were directed to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan during the 1974 
Summit in Rabat. High ranking UIA officers, including Amin Al-Hindi, Sameeh Abdul 
Fattah and Abu Hisham, were among the perpetrators. The Moroccan security forces 
uncovered the plot however and arrested all those involved before the zero hour. In 
justifying the planned assassination, Fatah said that it was intended to force Jordan to 
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recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It appears 
to have been planned without the knowledge or approval of Chairman Arafat, who strongly 
condemned it when it was later revealed to the outside world.
692
  
 During the early 1970s, the UIA launched a failed attack against the offices of the 
Israeli airline El-Al in Rome. The UIA operative who was arrested during the attack spent 
many years in an Italian prison, because his attempt caused the death of an Italian 
policeman who was guarding the building.
693
  
 The UIA had a specialized unit devoted to the collection and analysis of information, 
which would then be referred to the Apparatus chief. It also had a special section for 
planning and research, headed by General Nizar Ammar. Ammar succeeded Abul-Waleed 
Al-Iraqi, who is now serving a long term in a US prison for his direct involvement in a 
number of criminal attempts and cases of forgery.
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9.7 Al-Qita Al-Garbi (Western Sector Command) 
The Western Sector Command (WSC), which as the name suggests was responsible for 
Fatah‘s intelligence activities in the West Bank, was set up in 1971 under Kamal Adwan, 
Fatah Central Committee member and one of the leading officers of the Asifa (Storm) 
organization. Like many other Palestinian groups and organizations, the Command chose 
Beirut as its headquarters. Adwan had hardly spent two years as chief when he was 
assassinated in April 1973 by an Israeli commando unit headed by Ehud Barak, who later 
rose to become Israel‘s prime minister and secretary general of the Labour Party. Upon 
Adwan‘s assassination, Abu Jihad, Yassir Arafat‘s close associate and deputy in Fatah, 
became the Command‘s new chief.695  
 With the appointment of Abu Jihad, the WSC entered a new era of restructuring and 
orientation. Its operatives were at first given only military training, but Abu Jihad 
embarked upon an ambitious project through which it started to send its employees to 
receive training in intelligence and data analysis.
696
  
 As soon as Abu Jihad took over, the Command‘s footprint grew larger and larger; it 
was no longer restricted to Israel proper and the occupied territories, but expanded to 
include Israeli targets in Europe and elsewhere. To this end, Abu Jihad set up a specialized 
unit within the Command, dedicated to contacting and coordinating with international 
revolutionary groups as well as with non-governmental organizations. Its activities also 
included the collection of intelligence on Israel‘s armament programmes in Europe. 
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Special attention was given to Israel‘s activities and procurements in Greece, Italy, and the 
Soviet Union.
697
  
 In shadowing Israelis abroad, the WSC, like the CSA, often resorted to employing the 
cover of business or study to mask the activities of its agents. This was especially the case 
wherever the Command‘s operatives abroad were not granted diplomatic immunity or 
diplomatic representation.  
 Although the Command was, by and large, military in many ways, especially in its 
duties, organizational structure and chain of command, it was heavily engaged in 
espionage activities, sabotage, armed operations, suicide mission, both inside Israel proper 
and throughout the West Bank.  Its operatives gathered information on Israeli military and 
security targets, which was then analyzed and passed on to Command headquarters, which 
would take its decisions in the light of the intelligence. Although the WSC managed to 
carry out a number of successful operations against the Israelis, there were also many 
planned attacks which were uncovered and frustrated by the Israelis before they could be 
executed.
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 The WSC was quite adept in the art of camouflage and deception. This is especially 
true in the field of telecommunications and cryptography. Contacts between the 
Command‘s HQ and its outstations were always carried out indirectly and through a maze 
of routes, designed to mislead the Israelis. A message from Beirut, for example, or from 
inside Israel to Athens, would normally be rerouted along a zigzag path, which could take 
it to any European or Asian city, before it was delivered to its final destination.
699
  
 To achieve its purposes, the Western Sector Command often resorted to the 
recruitment of non-Palestinians, whom it would direct to go to Israel in order to collect 
first-hand information on this facility or that, take photographs or provide accurate 
topographical descriptions of designated targets. Special attention was given to collecting 
information on Israeli troops and their movements, which would then be delivered to the 
leadership either directly by hand, through coded messages sent via travellers or through 
other means.
700
  
 The Command did not confine itself to gathering intelligence and military activities, 
but played a significant part in practically all aspects of Palestinian life. It was deeply 
involved in covert operations, clandestine political action, and secretly funded a number of 
economic, media and social projects. As might be expected, the media was of particular 
interest to the Command, which supported a number of local as well as Arab dailies and 
other publications. Slush funds were set up, intended to influence these publications and 
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use them as channels through which Palestinians were directly or indirectly urged to join 
the resistance to Israeli occupation and to work for the liberation of Palestinian lands.
701
  
 The WSC spared no effort in adopting and supporting gifted Palestinians. Young 
artists, writers, orators or any other outstanding and influential persons, regardless of their 
speciality, were quite often rewarded and used as indirect organs of the PLO. Such people 
would be paid generously to travel the world in order to present the Palestinian cause to the 
international community.
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 Inside the West Bank, the covert action activities continued and the Command 
operated like a government in exile, controlling practically all the major events and 
developments on the ground. It organized political rallies and demonstrations, which were 
later to culminate in the Intifada. It also coordinated the activities of the trade unions 
within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Command sought to exploit all means of 
exerting an influence on the Israeli political scene. To that end, it established contacts with 
a number of Israeli peace groups which were calling for the creation of a Palestinian state 
alongside Israel. Chief among these was the Peace Now movement, which sought to apply 
political and moral pressure on successive Israeli governments.
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 To modernize its communications systems, great effort was expended on the 
procurement of highly developed equipment. So much importance was attached to 
monitoring Israeli communications that the WSC set up a special unit exclusively 
dedicated to the surveillance of the contacts between Israeli military commands and their 
regiments. In the SIGINT side, human and electronic resources were used to obtain 
information. In time, this unit grew in size and responsibilities, which came to include the 
collection of intelligence on all aspects of the military in Israel. The Command also started 
to commission specialized strategic studies, the results of which were then passed on to 
Abu Jihad and Yassir Arafat.
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 The organizational structure of the WSC was expanded to include a branch called the 
Western Security Apparatus, whose main duty was to protect the Command‘s personnel 
against infiltration and against Israeli assassination attempts and sabotage, and whose 
greatest asset was the abundant human resources inside the Palestinian territories. Security 
Apparatus operatives were able to provide the PLO leadership with valuable information 
on all aspects of life under Israeli occupation.
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 The fact that the Arab states bordering Israel (Jordan, Syria and Egypt) did not 
cooperate with the WSC was a source of great disappointment to the PLO. These countries 
categorically refused all attempts by the Command to use their territory as launching pads 
193 
 
for attacks against the Jewish state. Despite this serious constraint, the Command managed 
to carry out a number of operations against Israel by resorting to the Mediterranean, where 
its operatives used small boats and dinghies, which allowed infiltrators to evade Israeli 
radar and naval guards.
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 WSC also mastermind suicidal missions which were carried out 
inside Israel by units of the intelligence apparatus called (alkhidma alkhassa) Special 
Service
707
.  
 The WSC was involved in training a wide range of liberation groups across the 
world and in providing them with arms and finance. It enjoyed good relations with a large 
number of the political organizations, including atheist and Islamic movements. The 
Iranian Islamic movement led by Khomeini depended at one time on the WSC for military 
training, supply of arms and partial funding. The Command was also engaged in training  
and supporting paramilitary groups in Asia, chief among which were the Tamil Tigers in 
Sri Lanka. It had an active office in Syria, which operated under the name Bureau 23 and 
was headed by Abu Ziad, who in 1996 became Governor of the town of Tulkarem. Bureau 
23 was involved in the military training of students from the occupied West Bank and 
Gaza.
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 The growing strength of the WSC, derived from the wealth of intelligence it 
disseminated to PLO leaders, won Abu Jihad a distinguished position not only within the 
PLO but also among most Palestinians. However, his popularity, strong influence and solid 
stature made him a thorn in the side of Arafat, who never looked too kindly on any 
potential rival and who came to view his comrade in arms with an increasing sense of 
resentment and jealousy.
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 Following the assassination of Abu Jihad, the WSC passed through its most difficult 
period, from which it never recovered. Arafat quickly seized the opportunity afforded by 
the sudden disappearance of the Command‘s leader and set his men to obliterate all traces 
of it from the national consciousness of the Palestinians. Lest the Command continue to be 
a centre of gravity within the Palestinian movement, Arafat gradually undermined its 
organizational structure, originally set up to revolve around Abu Jihad, who had enjoyed 
total supremacy over all its offices and bureaux. The effort to dismantle the Command did 
not spare the military wing, which was also gradually supplanted by Force 17, to which the 
Command‘s personnel and operatives were then attached. With the signing of the second 
Oslo Agreement in 1993, the Western Sector Command ceased to exist.
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9.8 Case Study Conclusion 
This case study has shown that within the PLO, Fatah, until recently the largest and best-
organized Palestinian paramilitary group, has invested heavily in the employment of 
intelligence as an effective tool to further its objectives. Despite all denials and 
impassioned attestations, Fatah has on numerous occasions been proved to have been 
involved in violent attacks on Israeli targets, both military and civilian. From the creation 
of its first security apparatus until the Oslo peace accord of 1993  Fatah had entrusted its 
intelligence and security responsibilities to a number of  organizational structures. In terms 
of their duties and the nature of their work these intelligence organs passed through four 
distinct stages. 
 
9.8.1 The Jordan stage 1967-1970. 
Fatah established its first intelligence organ (Jihaz Al-Rasd al-Markazi) in 1967. The 
purpose was to protect the movement and its cadres and fulfil the aims which Fatah sought 
to achieve. The head of the Rasd was directly responsible to Fatah‘s leadership through the 
―Operations Centre‖. The founders of Rasd were in the main ex-Muslim Brotherhood 
members who had been involved in clandestine operations over a long period of collective 
time dating back to the early fifties. Fatah‘s performance in the battle of Karameh was such 
that it raised its profile to new heights and  attracted multitudes of young men and women 
who were eager to join this paramilitary group which was able to stand up to the Israeli 
war machine and achieve what the Arab regular armies could not achieve in their previous 
engagement with the Israelis. The great influx in the number of volunteers afforded the 
Fatah leaders an excellent opportunity to choose those best suited to intelligence work. 
Salah Khalaf who had been engaged in clandestine work since his student days devoted his 
time and expertise to build an efficient intelligence apparatus which was made up of two 
divisions. The first was the ―Information Wing‖ which at one point was 600 strong: 400 
informers and 200 military agents of different ranks within the Jordanian Armed Forces. 
The other wing was the ―Strike Force‖ which at one point numbered 500 men under arms. 
 The Rasd was especially active in intelligence gathering, counterintelligence and 
covert action. While Palestinians came to dread the Rasd, some Arab countries such as 
Egypt sought its assistance in providing intelligence on Israel and Jordan. The Rasd -Egypt 
relationship was based on mutual benefit. In return for intelligence on the goings on inside 
Israel, Fatah would receive training and, arms and ammunition as well as technical 
assistance from Egypt. This intelligence cooperation was the fruit of the first meeting 
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between Salah Khalaf, the spiritual father of Palestinian intelligence and Farouq Qaddoumi 
on the Palestinian side, and Salah Nasr, Chief of  Intelligence and Shams Badran, the 
Defence Minister on the Egyptian side.
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In helping the Palestinians launch attacks against 
Israeli targets, Egypt was hoping to distract Israel and keep it preoccupied with skirmishes 
and retaliations, so that the Egyptians could rebuild their armed forces.  
 A number of factors contributed to the success of the Jihaz during this period. There 
was above all else, an intelligence concept to which it closely adhered. The intelligence 
leadership was made up of cadres, experienced and hardened by long years of clandestine 
work. The growing numbers of recruits and sympathisers, inside Jordan and elsewhere, 
afforded the Fatah leadership a wide choice to select the most suitable operatives. A crucial 
factor was of course the military and financial support which poured into Fatah from most 
Arab regimes, especially from the oil-rich countries. But the efforts of the Rasd were cut 
short by the events of September 1970 in Jordan which meted out a devastating blow to the 
Palestinian intelligence project and evicted the Palestinian military presence from 
Jordanian soil. 
 
9.8.2 The Lebanon Stage 1971-1973 
Following the events of what the Palestinians call Black September, Fatah‘s Central 
Committee held a general conference to assess the situation and draw lessons from the 
Palestinian defeat in Jordan. Instead of carrying out a realistic and objective investigation 
into what went wrong, the Fatah leaders found in the conference a golden opportunity to 
get rid of the Rasd‘s head, Abu Iyad who had grown in stature to the extent that Arafat and 
others felt threatened by him. The conferees accused him of total failure in forecasting 
developments in Jordan and decided to disband the Rasd and re-assign what is left of its 
personnel to other Fatah or PLO offices. Despite Abu Iyad‘s protestations to the contrary, 
the Fatah leadership was simply intent on disregarding whatever argument he posited.  
In place of the Rasd, a new apparatus called Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Markazi (Central Security) 
was created. The Markazi was to be headed by Muhammad Yousif Al-Najjar. It was during 
this period that the leader of the disbanded Rasd attempted to take the initiative and bring 
the Palestinian question to the attention of world public opinion. In order to mislead world 
public opinion and protect its leaders and operatives, Fatah ex-intelligence chief (Abu 
Iyad) created deniable units which Fatah could conveniently disavow. The establishment of 
such a fictitious organization as Black September was a case in point. After the Munich 
massacre of the Israeli Olympic team in 1972, Fatah confronted the whole outraged world 
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with assertion after assertion that it had nothing to do with the perpetrators, who insisted 
that they belonged to a group which calls itself Black September.  
 To launch so many bloody attacks on Israeli and Western targets, which included 
among other outrages attacks on civilian aircraft, embassies, businesses, military and dual-
use installations, Fatah depended on its own intelligence cadres, who regularly supplied 
Arafat and the Palestinian leadership with reports and recommendations as to the best 
course of action to take. In this respect, Fatah, like many other paramilitary groups in the 
Middle East and elsewhere, was simultaneously a producer and a consumer of intelligence. 
Drawing upon its massive human resources inside the occupied territories and elsewhere, 
Fatah was able to produce a mass of information carefully gleaned by its operatives and 
agents. The collected data was processed through the intelligence cycle which carefully 
sifted and analysed by specialists before passing it on as a final product to decision makers. 
Following the Munich and other operations Israel assassinated two of Fatah‘s central 
committee: Muhammad Yousif al-Najjar, head of Markazi  and Kemal Adwan  in April 
1973. The assassinations were a big blow to Palestinian intelligence community. What 
exacerbated the situation was the fact that the intelligence community was practically left 
without a leadership which enjoys the full trust of Chairman Arafat, who fearing the 
emergence of  rivals, continued to seek full control of the Markazi despite his growing 
political responsibilities.    
 
9.8.3 The Third Stage 1974-1988 
In 1974 following Arab and international recognition of the PLO as a sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO decided to restructure its intelligence 
apparatus and clearly define the responsibilities and duties of each department within the 
security and intelligence sector. Among the decisions taken: creation of Jihaz Al-Amn Al-
Muwahhed (Unified Security) and the expansion of ―Force 17‖ and the ―Western Sector‖. 
In so doing Fatah was hoping to revitalize intelligence work and make it more effective. 
The aim was to create semi-autonomous intelligence organs working independently of 
each other but unified at the top and directed by only one chief: Yassir Arafat. It was hoped 
that the new restructuring would render the intelligence effort more efficient especially as 
the new formations were given more powers and were envisaged to complement each 
other. (CIA) headed by Hayel Abdul-Hamid, was in charge of clandestine collection. 
Counter-intelligence and Presidential security were the domain of Yassir Arafat who 
empowered Ali Hassan Salameh to create Force 17. Abu Jihad was appointed in charge of 
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Covert Action in the Western Sector. In order to coordinate intelligence activities a new 
office was created. This was to be called ‗‗Central Operations Room‘‘ headed by Sayil and 
kept under the direct command of  the ‗Central Committee‘ chaired by Arafat.  
 In an attempt to control the intelligence organs of the other Palestinian 
organizations, Yassir Arafat created the Unified Security Apparatus. The new structure 
was headed by Abu Iyad. Abu Iyad however exploited his new position to entrench his 
status within the PLO. Arafat who would not tolerate any competition or rivalry used the 
great financial resources at his disposal to contain and undermine any would be contender. 
What enabled Arafat to use the financial weapon was the fact that all remittances from the 
oil rich countries were in his own personal name. This allowed him not only to have full 
control of Fatah‘s finances but also to use these immense resources to eradicate any 
opposition or potential rivalry and to support and expand the powers of Force 17 which he 
transformed into a powerful intelligence and military organ.  
 
9.8.4 The Final Stage 1989-1992  
Following the assassination of Khalil Al-Wazir in April 1988, the Palestinian intelligence 
organs entered a new phase. The Western Sector was disbanded and a new three-man 
Security Committee was created. The committee was headed by Arafat. The other two 
members were the heads of the two other apparatuses: Abu Iyad and Abu Al-Hawl. The 
committee continued to work until these two members were assassinated in Tunis in 1991. 
Of all the founders of Palestinian intelligence work, only Yassir Arafat now remained. This 
enabled Arafat to engage in secret negotiations with the Israelis and the signing of the Oslo 
agreement. Following that significant development which resulted in the creation of the 
Palestinian Authority in the West bank and Gaza all security and intelligence organs were 
banded together and restructured.  
 To conclude, it can be argued that the initial success of the Palestinian intelligence 
work in Jordan can be attributed to a number of factors. Chief among these is the fact that 
Fatah adhered to a single intelligence school of thought. The expertise and leadership of 
the intelligence chief was another factor. The unity of command as well as the well-defined 
duties and responsibilities also made the success possible. Unlike the first or third stage, 
the second stage in the development of intelligence work however was characterized by 
failure and inefficiency. The lack of a clearly defined organizational structure as well as 
employment to terrorist tactics in intelligence work led to serious failures. What 
confounded the situation was the fact that Palestinian intelligence community did not 
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follow one specific intelligence school. While Rasd, Muwahhad and Western Sector 
followed the Arab/Islamist Brotherhood intelligence concept, Markezi adhered to the 
Egyptian intelligence school. Force 17 on the other hand followed a combination of 
Egyptian and East European schools of intelligence concepts.  
 The common denominator behind the failure of Fatah‘s intelligence organs was the 
inability to separate between intelligence work and armed struggle. This exposed its 
leaders and operatives alike to an unending cycle of murder and assassination. The 
founders of Palestinian intelligence work did not seem to have learnt their lesson and kept 
falling one after the other. The second generation followed different intelligence schools of 
thought. Rivalry, internal infighting, and an atmosphere of mutual suspicions interrupted 
the flow of intelligence to Fatah‘s chief. This explains Arafat‘s decision to expand, 
strengthen and empower Force 17 to the extent that it was soon to become a significant 
player in Palestinian intelligence. 
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusion 
 
Intelligence activities are not a new development in the history of the Arabs. Despite 
assertions to the contrary, it has been practiced since long before the advent of Islam.
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Ample evidence is afforded by Arabic classical literature, folklore, inherited oral tales and 
metrical romances. In its earliest stages, the craft of espionage was admittedly practiced in 
a primitive and rudimentary form. With the passage of time, however, it was developed to 
meet the ancient Arabs‘ need to resist the changing military and intelligence challenges 
posed by their enemies. This research has shown that Arab and Islamic paramilitary 
organizations have since the sixth century resorted to intelligence operations in order to 
protect themselves, score victories over rivals and adversaries and implement their own 
agendas. The study has also shown that in order to force their agendas, present-day 
organizations, like their predecessors, continue to carry out such intelligence activities as 
clandestine collection, analysis and dissemination, counterintelligence and covert action. 
To enable leaders to make the right decisions, these paramilitary groups test collected 
information by subjecting it to the intelligence cycle. As intelligence actors, they have 
shown themselves to be as professional as their counterparts in any national intelligence 
agency and perhaps even more dedicated in the execution of their work. 
 Before the tragic events of 11
th
 September 2001, the international community was 
focusing most of its attention on preventing and pre-empting terrorist operations. The 
primary aim was to protect the lives of innocent citizens, especially in the Western world, 
which was and remains the main target of terrorist attacks. Very little attention was paid to 
the way in which clandestine terrorist organizations administered intelligence work. 
 The atrocities of 9/11, 7/7, Madrid and more recently Mumbai underscore the 
importance of understanding the intelligence concept of terrorist organizations and the 
necessity of investigating the way in which terrorists go about their intelligence business. 
These events, which have exposed the failures and shortcomings of the intelligence 
communities in most Western countries and in India, but especially in the USA, have also 
shown the magnitude of the dangers posed by these military groups and their capability to 
carry out intelligence operations in much the same way as national intelligence agencies 
with immensely greater human, technical and financial resources.  
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 The 9/11 events and those which followed have proved that the perpetrators are tough 
challengers and a power with which the international community has had to reckon. These 
events would not have been possible without the existence of an intelligence concept and a 
well defined strategy. It is through the study of the historical background and cultural and 
social roots of those planning or executing terrorist attacks that one can grasp the 
fundamentals upon which the intelligence concepts of these paramilitary groups are based. 
 The present investigation into the strategies of paramilitary organizations, the 
intellectual framework within which they operate and the models which they have 
attempted to emulate has clearly shown that these revolutionary groups have always 
espoused Islam as their main ideological wellspring and source of inspiration. These 
organizations have furthermore adopted the Islamic concept of intelligence, which is based 
on three elements: the Quran, Prophet Muhammed‘s Traditions and Ijtihad (the reasoned 
interpretation of theological texts).  
 Long before the creation of such faith-driven paramilitary groups as Hezbullah and 
Hamas, Fatah had been quick to realize the impact of religion in the conflict with Israel. It 
was the first paramilitary organization in the Middle East which turned to Islam for 
inspiration and guidance. Indeed, no other group comes closer to Islam than Fatah, all of 
whose leaders had connection with the Muslim Brotherhood. The founding members who 
came to command and oversee the intelligence units within Fatah and indeed the PLO in 
general succeeded in scoring a number of intelligence successes and managed to wrest 
recognition from their Israeli adversaries as well as the whole international community. 
The intelligence concept to which Fatah subscribes is an organic part of a whole system of 
thought which is deeply rooted in the Islamic cultural heritage of the Arabs.  
The establishment of Fatah in the late 1950's was declared, after extensive debates, 
which took place with several Palestinian groups at that time. The most notable group was 
the Muslim Brotherhood where most of the Fatah founders originally came from. Despite 
the common grounds which Fatah shared with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Fatah founders 
had their distinctive political approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the Muslim 
Brotherhood‘s political agenda seeks to establish the Islamic caliphate first, then liberate 
the occupied land in Palestine, to Fatah founders, the liberation of Palestine through armed 
struggle comes at the top of their agenda. 
The Muslim Brotherhood is dedicated to the credo ―Allah is our objective, the 
Prophet is our leader, The Qur'an is our law, jihad is our way and dying in the way of Allah 
is our highest hope.‘‘713 To the Brotherhood members, implementation of the Islamic law 
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takes precedence over all other aims. The Islamization of society should be total and 
should cover all aspects of human endeavour including of course political life, security and 
intelligence projects. The founders of Fatah had greatly benefited from their long 
association with the Muslim‘s Brotherhood. Not only had they become knowledgeable of 
those aspects of belief and the rich Islamic heritage, but also the means, methods and 
techniques that were applied by the Muslim Brotherhood in their networking. In applying 
the Islamic intelligence concept, the Fatah founders followed Prophet Muhammed‘s 
intelligence practices which called for discipline, secrecy, and total obedience to the 
leadership. This was quite evident in the formation of their intelligence arm.  
Since its inception, Fatah, adopted the Islamic intelligence concept of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and their methods of deniability which was implemented as a result of the 
dissolution of the Brotherhood by the Egyptian authority in 1956. Responding to the grave 
dangers with which the Brotherhood was confronted following the attempt on Nasser‘s life 
in 1954 the Muslim Brotherhood introduced to its political body ‗the secret apparatus‘ (Al-
Jihaz Al-Sirri)
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 an intelligence unit devoted to clandestine activities. Fatah tracked the 
steps of the mother movement by establishing its first intelligence arm (Central 
Surveillance Apparatus) and attached it to its Central Committee. In intelligence practices, 
the Quran and emulation of Prophet Muhammed‘s Sunnah guided them. Not only that, but 
also they benefited from the Islamic Jurisprudence (Ijtihad) which allowed them to become 
acquainted with modern-day techniques and sophisticated technology used in intelligence 
work. That was achieved by coordinating and seeking help from allies in the Arab States 
and the Eastern bloc intelligence agencies. As a result of cooperating with the Intelligence 
agencies of what was known as the Socialist or Communist bloc, Fatah also became 
familiar with the ‗modus operandi‘ of the Israeli‘s intelligence service.  
In spite of Fatah‘s adoption of patriotic slogans which sought to appeal to the 
Palestinian and Arab masses and win new recruits and supporters from all ideological and 
religious groups, the majority of its leaders remained practically islamist in inclination and 
worked under deep cover. The Quran, Sunnah, and the Muslim Brotherhood‘s Islamic 
intelligence ‗modus operandi‘ inspired Fatah‘s Intelligence machinery. The two pioneers 
of the Palestinian intelligence community, Abu Iyad and Abu Jihad, understood fully the 
Islamic intelligence concept and later seriously and professionally attempted to implement 
it. The successes achieved by some of Fatah's intelligence apparatuses could be attributed 
to the successful understanding and implementation of such a concept.  
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The evolution and transformation of Fatah‘s intelligence activities and tradecraft, 
from an underground movement to a government in exile echoes the first Islamic 
intelligence experience. The Islamic state in Medina (June 622) went through three 
distinctive stages; secret, open, and state formation. Fatah, too, passed through three 
similar stages, the first of which was the clandestine phase, which was marked with 
"absolute secrecy". The thick cover of secretiveness was necessary to achieve essential 
duties such as clandestine collection, successful recruitment, clandestine communications, 
and use of safe houses. In the second ‗Jordan‘ stage the movement went public, declared 
its political agenda, and resorted to intensive intelligence activities in order to protect its 
leaders, members of the movement, influence events and achieve some political goals. The 
third ‗state building stage‘ began in Lebanon, where the Palestinian government in exile 
was formed and intelligence institutions proliferated.    
 Historically, the Arabs were no exception to the civilizations that preceded them in 
employing intelligence activities in their conflicts. Recently discovered archaeological 
friezes indicate that they used a relatively advanced form of intelligence activities in the 
third century AD. Literary and historical sources indicate that these activities were quite 
diversified and reflect the prevalent culture and customs of those ancient times. The level 
of these activities during the periods that preceded Islam varied from the primitive such as 
attempting to deduce the future through palm-reading, astrology, magicians and quacks, to 
the more advanced level of deploying special units attached to their armies, which were 
entirely devoted to intelligence activities. Intelligence gathering depended on specialists 
called uyoun, rabee‟ah, talee‟ah and daleel. The activities of these operatives were carried 
out in secrecy and their intelligence reports were instrumental in making appropriate 
recommendations and decisions, especially in time of war.  
 The Arabs, particularly those dwelling the central parts of the Arabian Peninsula, 
developed their intelligence activities spontaneously through experience gained from raids 
and inter-tribal wars. External powers hardly presented any threat against the Arabs of this 
part of the Peninsula, as the desert formed a natural and protective barrier against any 
invasion. The desert also had a negative impact on the development of intelligence 
techniques and strategies. The sands constituted a barrier which prevented communication 
with the surrounding civilizations and which prevented the Arabs from benefiting from or 
simply copying their neighbours‘ intelligence models. 
 With the advent of Islam in the sixth century, the Muslims succeeded in developing 
and applying numerous intelligence tactics and methodologies, which played an important 
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role in the establishment of the first Islamic state in Medina. At first, the early Muslims, 
particularly during the time of Prophet Muhammed, did not have specialized intelligence 
units. As in other affairs of state, this specific activity was directly overseen by the 
leadership, which used as its headquarters the mosque, where all such affairs were 
administered. Specialized institutions did not emerge and develop until a few years after 
the death of Prophet Muhammed, when the rapidly expanding empire of the Muslims 
required an effective intelligence network.  
 As supreme commander, all Prophet Muhammed needed to do was to personally direct 
one or other of his followers to monitor, investigate or collect intelligence, when he met 
them before or after one of the five prayers which Muslims performed in congregation at 
the mosque. Upon completion of the mission, the operative could either return to the 
headquarters at the mosque at any of the appointed times of prayer, or head to the 
commander‘s residence, annexed to the mosque. The mosque thus played  a key part as a 
centre for worship, religious education and administration of state affairs. As for decision 
making, the leader was helped by his aides and counsellors in deciding on a specific course 
of action in the light of available information. 
 Decision making in Islam is taken in accordance with the principle of Shura 
(consultation) as stipulated in the Quran.
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 Prophet Muhammed set an example for 
Muslims to follow by applying this principle in his own daily life and practice. In all 
matters relating to the affairs of the Umma (nation), he used to seek counsel from his 
companions, known for their wisdom and sound judgement. He listened to them and 
accepted their proposals and counsel on a variety of issues concerning state affairs, 
especially political and military matters. 
 In Islam, Prophet Muhammed represents the leader chosen by Allah to lead mankind 
to the true path. His companions believed in him and in his message, for they too were 
chosen by Allah, in order to implement Allah‘s teachings and commandments. The central 
decisions were taken by Prophet Muhammed alone, while counsellors offered advice and 
recommendations. Several verses in the Quran show the Prophet‘s agreement with the 
proposals of his companions. This principle of Shura was adopted as a mechanism through 
which decisions were made on the basis of intelligence reports. 
 The Muslims rapidly developed the methods of intelligence-gathering and 
dissemination. During the ten years between the emigration to Medina and the 
establishment of the Islamic state, intelligence developed from a rudimentary basic level to 
a relatively advanced stage by the standards of that time. From the siege of Mecca and the 
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imposition of economic blockade when trade caravans were prevented access to it, the 
Muslims learned how to obtain and disseminate the intelligence needed to make their 
blockade a success.  
 The network that remained in Mecca after the Prophet‘s Hijra to Medina constituted 
the main source of information regarding such matters as the plots schemed against 
Prophet Muhammed or the departure and arrival of trade caravans from Syria or the 
Yemen. The Muslims did not succeed in preventing these caravans from going to or 
departing from Mecca during the early stages of the economic blockade. In point of fact, a 
number of caravans succeeded in reaching their destination and returning without being 
intercepted by Muslims. But the Medina intelligence community learnt from their mistakes 
and in due course managed to fill in the gaps and remedy the shortcomings.  
 From the time the Muslims waged their first major battle, they proved their 
reconnaissance capabilities and made the best use of the information gathered. Guides 
(daleel) were used in military operations to map out the best routes across the deserts or 
mountains. Traversing the Peninsula also required a thorough knowledge of the tribes 
through which these routes passed. The daleels were of great importance to the army, as 
they were the prime intelligence specialists to guide the commander to the best and most 
secure overland route. The mission of the uyoun, on the other hand, was to gather 
information about friends and foes and all that concerned military campaigns. On the 
reports of the uyoun depended decisions on whether to attack and engage in battle or not. 
The talee‘ah played an important role in providing early warning of the dangers 
confronting army movements. Moreover, reconnaissance of the battlefield was entrusted to 
specialized groups to advise the commander or his lieutenants on whether to concentrate 
troops in a specific strategic position or make use of certain natural barriers. The clever use 
of talee‘ah enabled the Muslims to achieve impressive victories despite their small 
numbers and inadequate equipment. 
 One of the important factors which contributed to the early military successes of the 
Muslims was the employment of specialists in reconnaissance and military planning. The 
early victories had a great psychological impact in that droves of Quraishis and others 
came to embrace the new religion. As the number of those who accepted Islam increased 
and as Muslim forces expanded both in number and capabilities, the need increased for 
strategic information about opponents other than Quraishis, especially neighbouring 
powers such as the Byzantines, Persians and Copts. With the expansion of the Islamic 
faith, Muslims did not fail to spread their intelligence network for the purpose of gathering 
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information, be it military or non-military. Prophet Muhammed conscripted a large number 
of tribesmen, and made use of merchants and messengers to obtain information about the 
movement of military forces in the areas adjacent to the Arabian Peninsula as well as to 
observe enemies outside Medina. The strategic intelligence obtained greatly helped in 
making preparations for the defence of Medina, in the deployment of troops and in 
carrying out pre-emptive strikes. These networks of uyoun constituted the backbone of the 
special units tasked with monitoring tribal and other influential leaders.  
 The Muslims were able, within ten years, to bring the whole Arabian Peninsula to 
embrace Islam, and to create an army of ten thousand fighting men. No efforts were wasted 
on obtaining information on personal lives, which helped the Islamic state to concentrate 
on important issues relating to what constituted a danger to the nation.  
 No wonder, then, that the Arabs were able to undertake operations aimed at 
eliminating the dangers posed by their enemies and opponents. Prophet Muhammed scored 
many intelligence successes on the domestic scene. His intelligence operatives were able to 
uncover a number of clandestine assassination plots. His source in Mecca provided him 
with adequate information on these planned assassinations, while his uyoun in other parts 
of the Peninsula provided accurate information on other attempts. Those uyoun, 
particularly in Medina, helped in uncovering hostile movements by the Hypocrites against 
Muslims. The Safa contingent, created originally as bodyguards of the prophet, was also 
charged with enforce security and counterintelligence.  
 Covert action was of particular interest to the Muslims, especially operations intended 
for purely political, psychological or information purposes. Under direct guidance from 
Prophet Muhammed, the Muslims started to implement a number of operations aimed at 
disposing of agitators, leaders or poets hostile to Islam. The Muslims carefully selected the 
right operatives and chose the most suitable time for the execution of such operations. 
Special attention was also paid to the choice of a credible cover.  
  In attempting to provide a composite picture of the Islamic concept of intelligence 
adopted by Muslim paramilitary groups, it is essential to examine closely the Muslims‘ 
Holy Book. The Quran provides a number of references to and examples of intelligence 
work. Some of its verses clearly set demarcation lines between what is admissible and that 
which is inadmissible in intelligence activities. Significantly, the Quran cites illustrative 
examples of the intelligence cycle at work, starting from information collection and ending 
with decision making.  
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 The Quranic intelligence cycle is characterized by the great emphasis laid on 
verification before any analysis is adopted or decision made. The Quran also places a 
number of restraints on those involved in intelligence work. Islam, for example, prohibits 
any tactics which deviate from or run counter to the Shari‘a as a means of deception, 
seduction or entrapment in order to obtain information. This includes the use of women, 
sex and wine.  Islam‘s prohibition of spying on the personal lives of the citizenry is aimed 
at safeguarding privacy and personal freedoms. On the other hand, the Quran sanctions 
covert action and all that which ultimately contributes to the good of Islam. Scholars and 
those well versed in Islamic jurisprudence have developed a penal code for those who spy 
on Muslims, whether in the ―House of War‖ or the ―House of Peace‖.  
 The Islamic concept of intelligence is governed by a number of rules and regulations, 
designed to guide those involved in the execution of intelligence work and prevent them 
from abusing their powers. Operating in an environment where there are well-defined and 
clear-cut rules and codes of behaviour facilitates intelligence work and makes the 
intelligence community more proactive and dedicated, especially if these codes and rulings 
are thought by the Muslims to have emanated from the Quran. Chief among the 
distinguishing features of the Islamic concept of intelligence are:  
1. The existence of a long-term holy strategic aim, which stems from Islam. All 
members of the Islamic paramilitary groups, from the top leadership through policy 
makers and down to the lowest operative ranks, are expected to be wholly 
dedicated to achieving this holy aim such as liberating an occupied land or 
spreading Islam. 
2. Exercising intelligence activities sanctioned by the Quran and refraining from those 
prohibited by the Islamic Holy Book.  
3. Emulating the intelligence tactics and methodologies practiced by the Prophet 
Muhammed, in all stages of the Islamic call.  
4. Exercising the method of Ijtihad in intelligence aspects where the Islamic 
intelligence doctrine is inapplicable. 
 The Islamic concept of intelligence reflects the impact of culture and religion on 
intelligence theory in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Because intelligence is linked to 
politics and is in point of fact a complementary part of it, it is imperative that in order to 
understand the policies of some Arab or Islamic states one should, as Adda Bozeman 
consistently argues, concentrate on understanding the impact of culture and religion on the 
political events in these countries. Such an approach will help to unlock and solve many of 
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the complexities associated with the Middle Eastern Arabs, who strongly believe in and 
profess two identities: one religious (Muslim) and the other national (Arab). This double-
barrelled identity has greatly influenced the cultural, ethical and social values of the 
region‘s peoples and has furthermore coloured the attitudes and worldviews of these 
communities, politically and intellectually.  
 The region has witnessed the emergence of numerous political movements and schools 
of thought. Some of these groupings are extremist, engage in armed resistance and violent 
activities and can be classified as paramilitary organizations. Unless the intellectual frame 
of reference, ideologies and intelligence doctrines which drive them are carefully studied, 
it would be extremely difficult to understand the nature of these militant groups or identify 
their strategies and long-term aims. The Islamic concept of intelligence provides a helping 
hand in the search for such an understanding. Of all the intelligence concepts prevalent 
today, the Islamic concept alone offers a rational explanation of the conduct of those who 
join extremist religious groups or nationalist political movements in the Arab and Islamic 
worlds. The conduct of these radical groupings is always associated with a strong 
willpower and a conscious determination to sacrifice. Dying for one‘s country or in the 
service of Islam is considered a sacred duty which both Islam and the homeland demand. 
 This mental attitude towards sacrifice is what drives both nationalist and religious 
movements in the Middle East. In order to embody their dream of establishing a 
Palestinian state or achieve tangible successes on the ground, many young Fatah members 
are eager to sacrifice themselves for their national cause. On the other hand, members of 
religious movements are even more eager to sacrifice themselves in return for eternal bliss 
in the next world. The glamour surrounding martyrdom in the Islamic world and especially 
in Palestine has caused many young men and women to join radical movements which 
offer fresh recruits an opportunity to practice Jihad, die for a worthy cause and win the 
ultimate accolade, which surpasses and outweighs all worldly gains.  
 Misunderstanding the forces at work in Middle Eastern communities has led many 
scholars and strategists to look upon Islamic paramilitary groups as small and isolated 
terrorist organizations which must in the interest of peace and stability be completely 
wiped out. Such an attitude betrays a lack of understanding and a failure to grasp the nature 
of the formidable force of faith which never ceases to drive many young men and women 
towards these extremist organizations. According to the Islamic concept of intelligence, 
total faith in the justice of one‘s cause becomes a prodigious material force, capable of 
destroying the world. The Islamic perspective may therefore provide an explanation for 
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this cosmic phenomenon and may also help in the search for an appropriate response to 
this highly dangerous and grave threat.  
 What characterizes the strategies and thought patterns of these paramilitary groups is 
the fact that they recognize no limits or limitations except those delineated and imposed by 
their own ideologies. They have no regard whatsoever for the authority of international 
law, the principle of national sovereignty or the legal systems adopted by any of the 
world‘s communities. Members of these groups are furthermore characterized by 
toughness, patience, perseverance and blind faith in destiny. This was quite evident in 
Fatah‘s activities on the world scene when it resorted to violence and espoused armed 
struggle as a means to liberate Palestine and the Aqsa Mosque. In bringing in the Aqsa 
Mosque, Fatah added a religious and highly emotive dimension to its national struggle. 
The result became evident within a very short time. Fatah succeeded in acquiring a special 
status in the hearts of the Muslims all over the world, transforming it into a fierce striking 
force which shocked the international community with the ferocity of its operations, 
especially Israel, the USA and some Arab and European countries.    
Finally, on account of the immense threat posed by highly secretive organizations 
which have over and over again proved capable of causing mass human catastrophes, it is 
vital that more studies should be carried out in order to comprehend the way these 
organizations go about their business, unravel the methods they employ to recruit new 
operatives, and bring to light the way they spread and manage their networks.   
This research has attempted to address the gap in the intelligence literature on the 
Middle East, especially in delineating and understanding the concept of intelligence in the 
Islamic world. The case study has illustrated that the intellectual framework of the leaders 
of Fatah, based as it was on the Arab and Islamic heritage, played a vital role in 
crystallizing their concept as well as practices of intelligence. Understanding the close 
interrelationship between the socio-religious framework and intelligence work may 
therefore lead to a better understanding of Islamist paramilitary groups. For academics and 
intelligence practitioners alike, the need to explore the Islamic concept of intelligence is 
quite essential if we are to understand the use of violence and terror by many Middle 
Eastern paramilitary organizations. It is hoped that the present research can provide a 
generic framework to develop an understanding of the inner workings of paramilitary 
organizations as Hamas and Hezbullah, and ultimately assist politicians and security 
personnel to better understand the politics and forces at work in the volatile parts of the 
world, wherever religion holds sway in society.  
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